Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@aiondadotcom/mcp-ssh

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-p4h8-56qp-hpgv",
  "modified" : "2026-04-14T00:04:10Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-14T00:04:10Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "SSH/SCP option injection allowing local RCE in @aiondadotcom/mcp-ssh",
  "details" : "## Impact\n\nA crafted `hostAlias` argument such as `-oProxyCommand=...` was passed to `ssh`/`scp` without an argument terminator. SSH interprets arguments starting with `-` as options regardless of position, so the option-injection caused SSH to execute the attacker-supplied `ProxyCommand` **locally** on the machine running the MCP server — before any network connection. This bypassed the documented protection of `# @password:` annotations and exposed local SSH keys, browser cookies, other MCP server credentials, and anything else readable by the server process.\n\nA second local-RCE vector existed on Windows: `spawn(..., { shell: true })` was used so that `ssh.exe`/`scp.exe` could be found via `PATH`. With `shell: true`, every argument is re-parsed by `cmd.exe`, so shell metacharacters (`&`, `|`, `^`, `>`, `\"`, `;`, …) in `hostAlias`, `command`, `localPath` or `remotePath` would have been interpreted by `cmd.exe` and could have triggered arbitrary local command execution on Windows.\n\nThe MCP server runs locally over STDIO, but the LLM driving it is not trusted: its tool arguments can be steered by **prompt injection** from any untrusted text the LLM ingests (web pages, e-mails, repository files, output of other MCP servers). The attack does not require a malicious user — only that the LLM ingests attacker-controlled text at any point during the session.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.3.5**.\n\n- Add `--` argument terminator to all `ssh`/`scp` invocations.\n- Strict whitelist for `hostAlias` (rejects leading `-` and shell metacharacters).\n- Known-host check: every `hostAlias` must be defined in `~/.ssh/config` (including `Include` directives) or present in `~/.ssh/known_hosts`.\n- Resolve `ssh.exe`/`scp.exe` to absolute paths and use `shell: false` everywhere on Windows.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to 1.3.5.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by Pico (@piiiico) as part of an MCP server security audit.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@aiondadotcom/mcp-ssh"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.3.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/security/advisories/GHSA-p4h8-56qp-hpgv"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/issues/9"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/AiondaDotCom/mcp-ssh/releases/tag/1.3.5"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78", "CWE-88" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-14T00:04:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}