CVE-2026-63124: netty-incubator-codec-ohttp Binary HTTP Parser Infinite Loop Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-63124 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) binary http parser infinite loop vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting netty-incubator-codec-ohttp libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves binary http parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-63124 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-63124
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected netty-incubator-codec-ohttp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
<dependency>
<groupId>io.netty.incubator</groupId>
<artifactId>netty-incubator-codec-bhttp</artifactId>
<version>0.0.23.Final</version>
</dependency>
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-63124, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of netty-incubator-codec-ohttp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.23.Final), your application is affected.
Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In netty-incubator-codec-ohttp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-63124 Affected netty-incubator-codec-ohttp Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp
|
Maven |
< 0.0.23.Final
|
0.0.23.Final
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-63124?
Which netty-incubator-codec-ohttp versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-63124?
Is netty-incubator-codec-bhttp affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-63124?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-63124?
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-63124?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q",
"modified" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
"published" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-63124" ],
"summary" : "netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary",
"details" : "## Summary\n\n`io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp` can enter a non-terminating parse loop when a known-length Binary HTTP field section ends exactly after a complete field line. A remote peer that can send Binary HTTP input to a Netty pipeline using `BinaryHttpParser` / `BinaryHttpDecoder` can use a tiny malformed request or response to keep the parsing thread busy indefinitely, causing denial of service.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java`, `readFieldSection(...)` tracks the remaining field-section length in `fieldSectionLength`, then repeatedly calls `readFieldLine(...)` until the length reaches zero:\n\n- `readFieldSection(...)` parses the known-length field section and enters `while (fieldSectionLength != 0)` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:619`.\n- Inside the loop, it records `readableBytes`, calls `readFieldLine(...)`, computes `read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes()`, asserts `read > 0`, and subtracts `read` from `fieldSectionLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:620-625`.\n- `readFieldLine(...)` returns `null` without consuming bytes when the field line ends exactly at the end of the readable slice because it uses `if (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return null` after adding the value length (`BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681`).\n- With JVM assertions disabled (the production default), `assert read > 0` is not active. The parser therefore subtracts zero forever and never returns.\n\nThe boundary condition is reachable with a valid known-length field section containing exactly one complete field line and no extra byte after that line. Example field section: length `4`, then name length `1`, name `a`, value length `1`, value `b`.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSafe local verification performed in this repository:\n\n1. Compile the module and classpath:\n\n```bash\n./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp -am compile test-compile\n./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt\nprintf '%s' \"codec-bhttp/target/classes:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt)\" > /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt\n```\n\n2. Compile and run this minimal verifier with production-style assertions disabled:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;\nimport io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.VarIntCodecUtils;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\npublic final class VerifyBhttpHang {\n private static void writeAscii(ByteBuf out, String value) {\n VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(out, value.length());\n out.writeCharSequence(value, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n }\n public static void main(String[] args) {\n ByteBuf buffer = Unpooled.buffer();\n VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 0); // known-length request\n writeAscii(buffer, \"GET\");\n writeAscii(buffer, \"https\");\n writeAscii(buffer, \"example.com\");\n writeAscii(buffer, \"/\");\n VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 4); // field section length\n writeAscii(buffer, \"a\");\n writeAscii(buffer, \"b\");\n new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(buffer, false);\n System.out.println(\"returned\");\n }\n}\n```\n\nExecution result observed locally:\n\n```text\ntimeout 3 java -cp \"/tmp:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt)\" VerifyBhttpHang\nexit=124\n```\n\nExit code `124` from `timeout` confirms the parser did not return within three seconds. When assertions are enabled by Surefire, the same payload fails at `BinaryHttpParser.java:622` (`assert read > 0`), confirming the non-progress condition.\n\n## Impact\n\nA peer that can deliver crafted BHTTP bytes can cause the parser to loop forever. In Netty deployments this can pin the event-loop thread or worker responsible for the channel, reducing or eliminating availability for other channels on the same event loop. Through OHTTP, the same parser is used after successful decryption of protected payloads, so authenticated/decryptable OHTTP peers can trigger the same condition in the inner BHTTP parser.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Treat `readFieldLine(...) == null` as incomplete input and return `null` from `readFieldSection(...)` instead of continuing.\n- Replace boundary checks in `readFieldLine(...)` that require an extra byte after a complete field line. A complete field line ending exactly at the known field-section boundary should be accepted.\n- Add a production runtime guard that throws a controlled decoder exception if a parser loop iteration makes no progress.\n- Add regression tests with JVM assertions disabled for known-length header and trailer field sections that end exactly at the field-section boundary.\n\n## References\n\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-625`\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681`\n- RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Maven",
"name" : "io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.0.23.Final"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.0.22.Final"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/releases/tag/netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400", "CWE-835" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}