CVE-2026-63124: netty-incubator-codec-ohttp Binary HTTP Parser Infinite Loop Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q
CVSS 7.5
CWE-400 CWE-835
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-63124 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) binary http parser infinite loop vulnerability (CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) affecting netty-incubator-codec-ohttp libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves binary http parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.0.23.Final.

CVE-2026-63124 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-63124
GHSA Identifier GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Affected Product netty-incubator-codec-ohttp
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-63124

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected netty-incubator-codec-ohttp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp fixed: 0.0.23.Final
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.netty.incubator</groupId>
    <artifactId>netty-incubator-codec-bhttp</artifactId>
    <version>0.0.23.Final</version>
</dependency>
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-63124, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of netty-incubator-codec-ohttp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.0.23.Final), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, where the product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. In netty-incubator-codec-ohttp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp` can enter a non-terminating parse loop when a known-length Binary HTTP field section ends exactly after a complete field line. A remote peer that can send Binary HTTP input to a Netty pipeline using `BinaryHttpParser` / `BinaryHttpDecoder` can use a tiny malformed request or response to keep the parsing thread busy indefinitely, causing denial of service. ## Details In `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java`, `readFieldSection(...)` tracks the remaining field-section length in `fieldSectionLength`, then repeatedly calls `readFieldLine(...)` until the length reaches zero: - `readFieldSection(...)` parses the known-length field section and enters `while (fieldSectionLength != 0)` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:619`. - Inside the loop, it records `readableBytes`, calls `readFieldLine(...)`, computes `read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes()`, asserts `read > 0`, and subtracts `read` from `fieldSectionLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:620-625`. - `readFieldLine(...)` returns `null` without consuming bytes when the field line ends exactly at the end of the readable slice because it uses `if (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return null` after adding the value length (`BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681`). - With JVM assertions disabled (the production default), `assert read > 0` is not active. The parser therefore subtracts zero forever and never returns. The boundary condition is reachable with a valid known-length field section containing exactly one complete field line and no extra byte after that line. Example field section: length `4`, then name length `1`, name `a`, value length `1`, value `b`. ## Proof of concept Safe local verification performed in this repository: 1. Compile the module and classpath: ```bash ./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp -am compile test-compile ./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt printf '%s' "codec-bhttp/target/classes:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt)" > /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt ``` 2. Compile and run this minimal verifier with production-style assertions disabled: ```java import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf; import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled; import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser; import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.VarIntCodecUtils; import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets; public final class VerifyBhttpHang { private static void writeAscii(ByteBuf out, String value) { VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(out, value.length()); out.writeCharSequence(value, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII); } public static void main(String[] args) { ByteBuf buffer = Unpooled.buffer(); VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 0); // known-length request writeAscii(buffer, "GET"); writeAscii(buffer, "https"); writeAscii(buffer, "example.com"); writeAscii(buffer, "/"); VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 4); // field section length writeAscii(buffer, "a"); writeAscii(buffer, "b"); new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(buffer, false); System.out.println("returned"); } } ``` Execution result observed locally: ```text timeout 3 java -cp "/tmp:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt)" VerifyBhttpHang exit=124 ``` Exit code `124` from `timeout` confirms the parser did not return within three seconds. When assertions are enabled by Surefire, the same payload fails at `BinaryHttpParser.java:622` (`assert read > 0`), confirming the non-progress condition. ## Impact A peer that can deliver crafted BHTTP bytes can cause the parser to loop forever. In Netty deployments this can pin the event-loop thread or worker responsible for the channel, reducing or eliminating availability for other channels on the same event loop. Through OHTTP, the same parser is used after successful decryption of protected payloads, so authenticated/decryptable OHTTP peers can trigger the same condition in the inner BHTTP parser. ## Suggested remediation - Treat `readFieldLine(...) == null` as incomplete input and return `null` from `readFieldSection(...)` instead of continuing. - Replace boundary checks in `readFieldLine(...)` that require an extra byte after a complete field line. A complete field line ending exactly at the known field-section boundary should be accepted. - Add a production runtime guard that throws a controlled decoder exception if a parser loop iteration makes no progress. - Add regression tests with JVM assertions disabled for known-length header and trailer field sections that end exactly at the field-section boundary. ## References - `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-625` - `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681` - RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages

CVE-2026-63124 Affected netty-incubator-codec-ohttp Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.0.23.Final
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp
Maven
< 0.0.23.Final
0.0.23.Final

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-63124?
CVE-2026-63124 is a security vulnerability in netty-incubator-codec-ohttp involving Binary HTTP parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Which netty-incubator-codec-ohttp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.0.23.Final across affected packages: io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-63124?
Upgrading to 0.0.23.Final (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is netty-incubator-codec-bhttp affected?
Yes, io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp is affected in releases prior to 0.0.23.Final. Upgrade your dependency to 0.0.23.Final or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-63124?
CVE-2026-63124 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-63124?
CVE-2026-63124 is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-63124?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.netty.incubator'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q",
  "modified" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-63124" ],
  "summary" : "netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser infinite loop on known-length field section boundary",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp` can enter a non-terminating parse loop when a known-length Binary HTTP field section ends exactly after a complete field line. A remote peer that can send Binary HTTP input to a Netty pipeline using `BinaryHttpParser` / `BinaryHttpDecoder` can use a tiny malformed request or response to keep the parsing thread busy indefinitely, causing denial of service.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java`, `readFieldSection(...)` tracks the remaining field-section length in `fieldSectionLength`, then repeatedly calls `readFieldLine(...)` until the length reaches zero:\n\n- `readFieldSection(...)` parses the known-length field section and enters `while (fieldSectionLength != 0)` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:619`.\n- Inside the loop, it records `readableBytes`, calls `readFieldLine(...)`, computes `read = readableBytes - in.readableBytes()`, asserts `read > 0`, and subtracts `read` from `fieldSectionLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:620-625`.\n- `readFieldLine(...)` returns `null` without consuming bytes when the field line ends exactly at the end of the readable slice because it uses `if (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return null` after adding the value length (`BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681`).\n- With JVM assertions disabled (the production default), `assert read > 0` is not active. The parser therefore subtracts zero forever and never returns.\n\nThe boundary condition is reachable with a valid known-length field section containing exactly one complete field line and no extra byte after that line. Example field section: length `4`, then name length `1`, name `a`, value length `1`, value `b`.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSafe local verification performed in this repository:\n\n1. Compile the module and classpath:\n\n```bash\n./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp -am compile test-compile\n./mvnw -q -pl codec-bhttp dependency:build-classpath -Dmdep.outputFile=/tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt\nprintf '%s' \"codec-bhttp/target/classes:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-cp.txt)\" > /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt\n```\n\n2. Compile and run this minimal verifier with production-style assertions disabled:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;\nimport io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.VarIntCodecUtils;\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\npublic final class VerifyBhttpHang {\n  private static void writeAscii(ByteBuf out, String value) {\n    VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(out, value.length());\n    out.writeCharSequence(value, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n  }\n  public static void main(String[] args) {\n    ByteBuf buffer = Unpooled.buffer();\n    VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 0); // known-length request\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"GET\");\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"https\");\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"example.com\");\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"/\");\n    VarIntCodecUtils.writeVariableLengthInteger(buffer, 4); // field section length\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"a\");\n    writeAscii(buffer, \"b\");\n    new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(buffer, false);\n    System.out.println(\"returned\");\n  }\n}\n```\n\nExecution result observed locally:\n\n```text\ntimeout 3 java -cp \"/tmp:$(cat /tmp/codec-bhttp-run-cp.txt)\" VerifyBhttpHang\nexit=124\n```\n\nExit code `124` from `timeout` confirms the parser did not return within three seconds. When assertions are enabled by Surefire, the same payload fails at `BinaryHttpParser.java:622` (`assert read > 0`), confirming the non-progress condition.\n\n## Impact\n\nA peer that can deliver crafted BHTTP bytes can cause the parser to loop forever. In Netty deployments this can pin the event-loop thread or worker responsible for the channel, reducing or eliminating availability for other channels on the same event loop. Through OHTTP, the same parser is used after successful decryption of protected payloads, so authenticated/decryptable OHTTP peers can trigger the same condition in the inner BHTTP parser.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Treat `readFieldLine(...) == null` as incomplete input and return `null` from `readFieldSection(...)` instead of continuing.\n- Replace boundary checks in `readFieldLine(...)` that require an extra byte after a complete field line. A complete field line ending exactly at the known field-section boundary should be accepted.\n- Add a production runtime guard that throws a controlled decoder exception if a parser loop iteration makes no progress.\n- Add regression tests with JVM assertions disabled for known-length header and trailer field sections that end exactly at the field-section boundary.\n\n## References\n\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-625`\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:678-681`\n- RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.0.23.Final"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.0.22.Final"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-8cfx-wx3q-mh5q"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/releases/tag/netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-400", "CWE-835" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-20T18:43:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}