CVE-2026-48818: Starlette SSRF And NTLM Credential Theft Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wqp7-x3pw-xc5r",
  "modified" : "2026-06-15T20:16:30Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-15T20:16:30Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-48818" ],
  "summary" : "Starlette: SSRF and NTLM credential theft via UNC paths in StaticFiles on Windows",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nWhen serving static files on Windows, `StaticFiles` resolves the requested path with [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath). If a UNC path (such as `\\\\attacker.com\\share`) reaches the resolver, `realpath` causes the process to open a connection to the remote host over SMB (port 445). This is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) that leaks the service account's NTLMv2 credentials to the attacker-controlled host, which can then be cracked offline or relayed to other hosts.\n\n### Details\n\n`StaticFiles.lookup_path()` joins the requested path onto the served directory and calls [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath) on the result before checking containment with [`os.path.commonpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.commonpath). On Windows, a UNC path is absolute, so [`os.path.join`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.join) discards the served directory and `realpath` resolves the bare UNC path, triggering the outbound SMB connection and NTLM authentication before the containment check rejects the path. The HTTP response is a benign 404, but the credential disclosure has already happened. POSIX systems are not affected.\n\nThis only affects the default configuration (`follow_symlink=False`), which uses [`os.path.realpath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.realpath). The `follow_symlink=True` branch uses [`os.path.abspath`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.path.html#os.path.abspath), which performs no I/O.\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications running on Windows that serve files with `StaticFiles` (directly, or via a framework built on Starlette such as FastAPI) in the default configuration are affected. `StaticFiles` is typically unauthenticated, so any client can trigger the SMB connection and leak the service account's NTLMv2 hash. A secondary impact is discovering internal hosts reachable over SMB by timing responses for valid versus invalid addresses.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nApplications not running on Windows are not affected. On Windows, serving static files through a dedicated web server (such as nginx or IIS) instead of `StaticFiles` avoids the issue. Blocking outbound SMB (port 445) from the application host prevents the credential disclosure even if a UNC path is resolved.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "starlette"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.1.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-wqp7-x3pw-xc5r"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-15T20:16:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}