GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5: Agentic-Flow OS Command Injection Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5",
  "modified" : "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Agentic-Flow: OS Command Injection in agentic-flow MCP server tools via unsanitized tool-parameter interpolation into execSync",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`agentic-flow` versions `<= 2.0.13` MCP server tools interpolated attacker-influenceable tool parameters (e.g. `agent`, `task`, `name`, `language`, `agentdb` arguments) directly into shell command strings passed to `execSync()`. A malicious value reaching any of the affected MCP tools could break out of the surrounding double-quoted argument and execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.\n\nThis was a partial-fix gap: prior commit `6a06854` (#158) fixed CWE-78 elsewhere in the project but missed the MCP server files entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny MCP tool argument that the AI agent treats as data but the implementation interpolates into a shell command string becomes a command-injection vector. In MCP deployments where untrusted content (web pages, files, third-party tool output) is processed by the agent, this is reachable without direct attacker access to the host. The HTTP/SSE transports (`http-sse.ts`, `http-streaming-updated.ts`) expose the same sinks without authentication or Origin/Host validation, which may raise the effective severity in any deployment that binds them to a reachable network interface.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- `src/mcp/standalone-stdio.ts` — `agentic_flow_agent`, `agentic_flow_create_agent`, `agentic_flow_list_all_agents`, `agentic_flow_agent_info`, `agentic_flow_check_conflicts`, `agentic_flow_optimize_model`, `agentic_flow_list_agents`, `agent_booster_edit_file`, `agent_booster_batch_edit`, `agent_booster_parse_markdown`, `agentdb_stats`, `agentdb_pattern_store`, `agentdb_pattern_search`, `agentdb_pattern_stats`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/claude-flow-sdk.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/stdio-full.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-streaming-updated.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-sse.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/poc-stdio.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/agent/{execute,list,parallel}.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/swarm/orchestrate.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/hooks/pretrain.ts` (depth path only)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```ts\n// Pre-fix (standalone-stdio.ts, agentic_flow_agent)\nlet cmd = `npx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"${agent}\" --task \"${task}\"`;\nconst result = execSync(cmd, { encoding: 'utf-8', ... });\n```\n\nInvoking the MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"agent\": \"coder\",\n  \"task\": \"x\\\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo \\\"\"\n}\n```\n\nproduces, after interpolation:\n\n```\nnpx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"coder\" --task \"x\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"\n```\n\nWhen `execSync` hands that to `/bin/sh -c`, the shell parses three commands: the truncated `npx`, then `touch /tmp/INJECTED`, then `id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"`. The marker file `/tmp/INJECTED` is created and the user's `id` output is written to `/tmp/rce.txt`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in [`agentic-flow@2.0.14`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14) — every affected call site rewritten to use `execFileSync(file, argv, { shell: false })` so attacker-controlled argv elements are passed straight to `execve(2)` without shell parsing.\n\nFix PR: ruvnet/agentic-flow#170 (merged at `0c2ec96`)\n\nA regression test (`tests/security/cwe-78-mcp-execsync.test.ts`) was added that statically scans every `src/mcp/**/*.ts` file and fails the build if any new `execSync()` call is reintroduced outside of a documented exemption, plus a behavioural smoke check that the canonical PoC payload remains inert when passed as an argv element to `execFileSync`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `agentic-flow >= 2.0.14`. There is no in-product configuration that mitigates this without upgrading.\n\n## Downstream pin\n\nThe `ruflo` / `claude-flow` / `@claude-flow/cli` packages bumped from `3.12.3` → `3.12.4` to pull the patched `agentic-flow`:\n\n- `ruflo@3.12.4`\n- `claude-flow@3.12.4`\n- `@claude-flow/cli@3.12.4`\n\nEnd users running any of `npx ruflo@latest`, `npx claude-flow@latest`, or `npx @claude-flow/cli@latest` are pinned to the fixed version.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by **hackchang** via a well-scoped red-team report package (`npm_agentic-flow_report_package_20260618_163017.zip`) that included a sink inventory, a minimized PoC payload, and a clear explanation of why this was a partial-fix gap rather than intended behaviour. The sink inventory directly drove the single-grep pass that closed every reachable call site; the PoC payload became the behavioural smoke test that proves the canonical attack stays inert as an argv element.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "agentic-flow"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.0.14"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.0.13"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/issues/169"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/issues/2414"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/pull/170"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/pull/2415"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/releases/tag/v3.12.4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}