GHSA-pfq2-hh62-7m96: Renovate Renovate Vulnerable To Arbitrary Command Vulnerability

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-pfq2-hh62-7m96",
  "modified" : "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
  "published" : "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Renovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via Gradle Wrapper and malicious `distributionUrl`",
  "details" : "### Summary\nRenovate can be tricked into executing shell code while updating the Gradle Wrapper. A malicious `distributionUrl` in `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties` can lead to command execution in the Renovate runtime.\n\n### Details\nWhen Renovate handles Gradle Wrapper artifacts, it may run a wrapper update command such as:\n- `./gradlew :wrapper --gradle-distribution-url <value>`\n\nIn the observed behavior, Renovate executes this via a shell (e.g., `/bin/sh -c ...`).  \nIf `distributionUrl` contains shell command substitution syntax like `$(...)`, the shell evaluates it **before** Gradle validates/parses the URL.\n\nAfter that, Gradle attempts to parse the URL as a URI and fails with `URISyntaxException`, but the shell substitution has already executed.\n\nThis is reproducible even when `allowScripts` is disabled (default is OFF), because this execution happens as part of Gradle Wrapper artifact handling rather than “repository install scripts”.\n\nPrerequisites / attack conditions:\n- The attacker must be able to get a malicious `gradle-wrapper.properties` into a repository that Renovate scans (e.g., direct write access, or a maintainer merges an attacker’s change/PR).\n- Renovate must be configured to process Gradle Wrapper updates/artifacts for that repository (default behavior for the Gradle Wrapper manager).\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a repository with a Gradle Wrapper (`gradlew`, `gradlew.bat`, `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar`, and `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties`).\n2. Set `distributionUrl` in `gradle-wrapper.properties` to include `$(...)`.\n3. Run Renovate against the repository.\n4. Observe that a file is created during Renovate’s wrapper update step **before** Gradle fails with `URISyntaxException`.\n\nA [screen recording](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nveSCgyz4pKPCZuelqDD_xGEO00DXr4P/view) is attached showing end-to-end reproduction. In the demo, the payload creates `/tmp/passwd_dump` containing `/etc/passwd`, demonstrating that file read/exfiltration is possible within the Renovate execution context.\n\n### Impact\nThis allows arbitrary command execution in the Renovate runtime during Gradle Wrapper updates. Depending on deployment, this may expose credentials/tokens available to the bot and may allow an attacker to modify repositories or access internal resources reachable from the Renovate environment.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrading to Renovate [42.68.5](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.68.5) (2025-12-31) fixes this issue, and closes out other risks of shell evaluation for commands run by Renovate.\n\nIf using the `composer`, `yarn` (v1) or `flux` managers, please upgrade to [42.74.5](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.74.5) (2026-01-08), as there were follow-up fixes to keep these managers working.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "renovate"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "32.124.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "42.68.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-pfq2-hh62-7m96"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.68.5"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}