CVE-2026-57124: PraisonAI Missing Authentication For Critical Function Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w
CVSS 9.8
CWE-78 CWE-306
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-57124 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) missing authentication for critical function vulnerability (CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves missing authentication for critical function and improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') in praisonai. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.6.59.

CVE-2026-57124 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-57124
GHSA Identifier GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.8
CWE Classification CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Affected Product PraisonAI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-57124

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

praisonai fixed: 4.6.59
pip install praisonai>=4.6.59
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show praisonai

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-57124, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show praisonai

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.6.59), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show praisonai command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an os command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended os command when it is sent to a downstream component. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands ## Summary PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send `POST /api/mcp/connect` with a `command` and `args` field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user. The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (`praisonai ui`, `praisonai ui agents`, `praisonai claw`, and any app using `praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app()` / `build_host_app()`). `praisonai ui` and related Typer UI commands bind to `0.0.0.0` by default. ## Affected Versions Confirmed affected: - `praisonai` v4.6.48 - Commit tested: `d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d` - Tag tested: `v4.6.48` - Pinned UI dependency: `aiui==0.3.121` from `src/praisonai/uv.lock` Likely affected: - Any PraisonAI release that exposes `aiui` / `praisonaiui` `create_app()` through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes the `mcp` dependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit. ## Severity Reasoning: - `AV`: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route. - `AC`: a single POST request is sufficient. - `PR`: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured. - `UI`: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running. - `S`: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context. - `C/I/A`: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption. ## Root Cause PraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras: - `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11` includes base dependencies. - `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19` includes `mcp>=1.20.0`. - `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25` defines the `ui` extra with `aiui>=0.3.121,<0.4`. - `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197` defines the `claw` extra with `aiui[all]>=0.3.121,<0.4`. PraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch `aiui run`: - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114` sets `host="0.0.0.0"` for `praisonai ui`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163` passes that host to `aiui run`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186`, `:204`, and `:222` also default subcommands to `0.0.0.0`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41` defines the full dashboard command. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93` launches `aiui run` with the selected host. PraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication: - `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18` calls `configure_host(...)`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142` exports `app = create_host_app()`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63` calls `configure_host(...)`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128` exports `app = create_host_app()`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174` imports `praisonaiui.server.create_app`. - `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180` returns `create_app()`. In `aiui==0.3.121`, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in: - `praisonaiui/server.py:1483` defines `api_mcp_connect`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:1488` reads attacker-controlled JSON. - `praisonaiui/server.py:1491` accepts either `command` or `url`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:1496` calls `connect_mcp_server(body)`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:2516` defines `create_app(..., require_auth=False, ...)`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:2550` adds `AuthEnforcementMiddleware`, but it only enforces auth when `AUTH_ENFORCE=true`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:2769` registers `/api/mcp/servers`. - `praisonaiui/server.py:2770` registers `/api/mcp/connect`. The MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch: - `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325` defines `connect_server(self, server_config)`. - `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330` chooses stdio transport when `command` is present. - `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332` constructs `StdioMCPClient(command=server_config["command"], args=server_config.get("args", []))`. - `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360` calls `client.connect()`, which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process. ## Minimal PoC PoC file: `poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py` The PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute `/usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt`. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials. Observed output from the tested checkout with `aiui==0.3.121` and `mcp==1.25.0` available: ```text [19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN. [19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: 'tuple' object has no attribute 'initialize' HTTP_STATUS= 200 RESPONSE= {"server":{"name":"poc-stdio-process-0","transport":"stdio","status":"error","tools":[],"last_error":"Connection failed"}} SUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0 MARKER_EXISTS= True MARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt ``` The MCP handshake fails because `aiui==0.3.121` is not compatible with the locked `mcp==1.25.0` return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until `/usr/bin/touch` wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error. ## Exploit Scenario An operator runs: ```bash pip install "praisonai[ui]" praisonai ui ``` Because `praisonai ui` binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send: ```http POST /api/mcp/connect Content-Type: application/json { "name": "evil", "command": "/usr/bin/touch", "args": ["/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp"] } ``` In a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user. ## Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis Searched sources: - OSV query for PyPI `praisonai`: 51 advisories returned. - OSV query for PyPI `aiui`: 0 advisories returned. - OSV query for PyPI `praisonaiui`: 0 advisories returned. - GitHub Advisory Database search for exact `/api/mcp/connect`, `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, and `praisonaiui.features.mcp`. - NVD API searches for `PraisonAI StdioMCPClient`, `PraisonAI api_mcp_connect`, `PraisonAI /api/mcp/connect`, `PraisonAIUI /api/mcp/connect`, and `aiui StdioMCPClient`: 0 results. - GitHub issue/PR searches in `MervinPraison/PraisonAI` for exact endpoint/function/class terms. Only one unrelated PR was returned for `/api/mcp/connect`; no issue/PR matched `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, or `praisonaiui.features.mcp`. - Broad web searches for exact endpoint, file, class, and function terms returned no matching public vulnerability report. Why this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories: - Not the excluded `praisonai serve agents --api-key` `/agents` auth bypass. This report targets `POST /api/mcp/connect` in the PraisonAIUI host app. - Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve `MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()` command parsing. This finding uses `praisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -> praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -> StdioMCPClient`. - Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution. - Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes. - Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI's MCP server tool dispatcher. ## Recommended Fix 1. Remove arbitrary `command`/`args` from the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON. 2. Require authentication and authorization on `/api/mcp/connect`, `/api/mcp/disconnect/*`, and `/api/mcp/servers` regardless of `AUTH_ENFORCE`. 3. Change UI command defaults from `0.0.0.0` to `127.0.0.1`, or require an explicit `--unsafe-expose` style flag when binding externally without auth. 4. If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands. 5. Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to `/api/mcp/connect` cannot start a subprocess, including when `AUTH_ENFORCE` is unset.

CVE-2026-57124 Affected PraisonAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.6.59
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
praisonai
PyPI
< 4.6.59
4.6.59

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-57124?
CVE-2026-57124 is a security vulnerability in PraisonAI involving Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.6.59 across affected packages: praisonai.
What version fixes CVE-2026-57124?
Upgrading to 4.6.59 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is praisonai affected?
Yes, praisonai is affected in releases prior to 4.6.59. Upgrade your dependency to 4.6.59 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-57124?
CVE-2026-57124 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-57124?
CVE-2026-57124 is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-57124?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show praisonai'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T21:25:16Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-18T13:58:14Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-57124" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai",
  "details" : "# Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send `POST /api/mcp/connect` with a `command` and `args` field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.\n\nThe issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (`praisonai ui`, `praisonai ui agents`, `praisonai claw`, and any app using `praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app()` / `build_host_app()`). `praisonai ui` and related Typer UI commands bind to `0.0.0.0` by default.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- `praisonai` v4.6.48\n- Commit tested: `d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d`\n- Tag tested: `v4.6.48`\n- Pinned UI dependency: `aiui==0.3.121` from `src/praisonai/uv.lock`\n\nLikely affected:\n\n- Any PraisonAI release that exposes `aiui` / `praisonaiui` `create_app()` through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes the `mcp` dependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit.\n\n## Severity\n\nReasoning:\n\n- `AV`: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route.\n- `AC`: a single POST request is sufficient.\n- `PR`: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured.\n- `UI`: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running.\n- `S`: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context.\n- `C/I/A`: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nPraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:\n\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11` includes base dependencies.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19` includes `mcp>=1.20.0`.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25` defines the `ui` extra with `aiui>=0.3.121,<0.4`.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197` defines the `claw` extra with `aiui[all]>=0.3.121,<0.4`.\n\nPraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch `aiui run`:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114` sets `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` for `praisonai ui`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163` passes that host to `aiui run`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186`, `:204`, and `:222` also default subcommands to `0.0.0.0`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41` defines the full dashboard command.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93` launches `aiui run` with the selected host.\n\nPraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18` calls `configure_host(...)`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142` exports `app = create_host_app()`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63` calls `configure_host(...)`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128` exports `app = create_host_app()`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174` imports `praisonaiui.server.create_app`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180` returns `create_app()`.\n\nIn `aiui==0.3.121`, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:\n\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1483` defines `api_mcp_connect`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1488` reads attacker-controlled JSON.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1491` accepts either `command` or `url`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1496` calls `connect_mcp_server(body)`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2516` defines `create_app(..., require_auth=False, ...)`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2550` adds `AuthEnforcementMiddleware`, but it only enforces auth when `AUTH_ENFORCE=true`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2769` registers `/api/mcp/servers`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2770` registers `/api/mcp/connect`.\n\nThe MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:\n\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325` defines `connect_server(self, server_config)`.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330` chooses stdio transport when `command` is present.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332` constructs `StdioMCPClient(command=server_config[\"command\"], args=server_config.get(\"args\", []))`.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360` calls `client.connect()`, which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process.\n\n## Minimal PoC\n\nPoC file: `poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py`\n\nThe PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute `/usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt`. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.\n\nObserved output from the tested checkout with `aiui==0.3.121` and `mcp==1.25.0` available:\n\n```text\n[19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN.\n[19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: 'tuple' object has no attribute 'initialize'\nHTTP_STATUS= 200\nRESPONSE= {\"server\":{\"name\":\"poc-stdio-process-0\",\"transport\":\"stdio\",\"status\":\"error\",\"tools\":[],\"last_error\":\"Connection failed\"}}\nSUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0\nMARKER_EXISTS= True\nMARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt\n```\n\nThe MCP handshake fails because `aiui==0.3.121` is not compatible with the locked `mcp==1.25.0` return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until `/usr/bin/touch` wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error.\n\n## Exploit Scenario\n\nAn operator runs:\n\n```bash\npip install \"praisonai[ui]\"\npraisonai ui\n```\n\nBecause `praisonai ui` binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/mcp/connect\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"name\": \"evil\",\n  \"command\": \"/usr/bin/touch\",\n  \"args\": [\"/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp\"]\n}\n```\n\nIn a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user.\n\n## Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis\n\nSearched sources:\n\n- OSV query for PyPI `praisonai`: 51 advisories returned.\n- OSV query for PyPI `aiui`: 0 advisories returned.\n- OSV query for PyPI `praisonaiui`: 0 advisories returned.\n- GitHub Advisory Database search for exact `/api/mcp/connect`, `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, and `praisonaiui.features.mcp`.\n- NVD API searches for `PraisonAI StdioMCPClient`, `PraisonAI api_mcp_connect`, `PraisonAI /api/mcp/connect`, `PraisonAIUI /api/mcp/connect`, and `aiui StdioMCPClient`: 0 results.\n- GitHub issue/PR searches in `MervinPraison/PraisonAI` for exact endpoint/function/class terms. Only one unrelated PR was returned for `/api/mcp/connect`; no issue/PR matched `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, or `praisonaiui.features.mcp`.\n- Broad web searches for exact endpoint, file, class, and function terms returned no matching public vulnerability report.\n\nWhy this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:\n\n- Not the excluded `praisonai serve agents --api-key` `/agents` auth bypass. This report targets `POST /api/mcp/connect` in the PraisonAIUI host app.\n- Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve `MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()` command parsing. This finding uses `praisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -> praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -> StdioMCPClient`.\n- Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution.\n- Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes.\n- Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI's MCP server tool dispatcher.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Remove arbitrary `command`/`args` from the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON.\n2. Require authentication and authorization on `/api/mcp/connect`, `/api/mcp/disconnect/*`, and `/api/mcp/servers` regardless of `AUTH_ENFORCE`.\n3. Change UI command defaults from `0.0.0.0` to `127.0.0.1`, or require an explicit `--unsafe-expose` style flag when binding externally without auth.\n4. If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands.\n5. Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to `/api/mcp/connect` cannot start a subprocess, including when `AUTH_ENFORCE` is unset.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.6.59"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.6.48"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-306", "CWE-78" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-18T13:58:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}