Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/potato-annotation

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf",
  "modified" : "2026-05-08T17:31:07Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-08T17:31:07Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass",
  "details" : "## Summary\n`validate_path_security` uses string-prefix containment (`startswith`) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are **outside** the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., `/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/...` vs `/tmp/potato_proj_demo`) to be accepted.\n\n## Details\n### Affected source location (root cause)\n**File:** `potato/server_utils/config_module.py`\n\n**Snippet (lines 370–373):**\n```python\nreal_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)\nreal_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)\nif not real_path.startswith(real_base):\n    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)\n```\n\n**Snippet (lines 384–389):**\n```python\nreal_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)\ncheck_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir\nreal_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)\nif not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):\n    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)\n```\n\n`startswith()` is string-based, so `/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/...` passes when checked against `/tmp/potato_proj_demo`.\n\n### Confirmed affected call sites\n**File:** `potato/server_utils/config_module.py`\n\n1) `validate_file_paths` task_dir branch (line 2113)\n```python\nvalidated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)\n```\n\n2) `validate_file_paths` data_files branch (line 2151)\n```python\nvalidated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)\n```\n\n3) `validate_training_config` training.data_file branch (line 2286)\n```python\nvalidated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)\n```\n\n## PoC\n```python\nfrom potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security\n\nbase = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'\nvuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'\n\ntry:\n    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))\nexcept Exception as e:\n    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)\n\ntry:\n    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)\nexcept Exception as e:\n    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)\n\nprint('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))\n```\n\n## Impact\n- Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.\n- Can affect read paths (`data_files`, `training.data_file`, `base_css`, `header_logo`) and output/path placement depending on configuration.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "potato-annotation"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.4.5"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/davidjurgens/potato/security/advisories/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/davidjurgens/potato"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-08T17:31:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}