Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/pacioli-guard

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4",
  "modified" : "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-107841" ],
  "summary" : "pacioli: A submit consent marker licensed cancellation of caller-named pre-existing documents",
  "details" : "### Impact\n\n`pacioli-guard`'s document-layer consent gate requires a human-minted, single-use, document-bound and **act-bound** marker before a credential carrying `API Key Scope.require_consent` may submit or cancel a document. Because ERPNext performs further document writes as a consequence of a governed act, nested acts are allowed to \"ride\" the consent established by the enclosing act instead of needing a marker of their own.\n\nThe ride predicate returned `true` for **every** cancel, regardless of which act the enclosing marker authorised. Riding never reaches `consent_verdict`, which is where the marker-to-act binding is enforced. The result: any `Document.cancel()` performed inside an act that had established consent reached `docstatus = 2` with no marker, no act-binding check, no single-use spend, and **no denial audit row**.\n\nThis is reachable with the exact grant an operator is documented to give the broker, and the cancelled document's identity is caller-controlled:\n\n- `Sales Invoice.on_submit` (`sales_invoice.py:507`) calls `process_asset_depreciation()` unconditionally, reaching `depreciate_asset_on_sale` (`:1508-1516`).\n- That iterates the invoice's item rows and calls `frappe.get_doc(\"Asset\", d.asset)`. `Sales Invoice Item.asset` is a plain writable `Link` with no `read_only` and no `fetch_from`, so the caller supplies it in the request body. The validation that would constrain it sits behind `if d.is_fixed_asset:` (`:428-429`), a server-set field.\n- The chain reaches `depreciation.py:481` and then `asset_depreciation_schedule.py:215-217`, which calls `current_schedule.cancel()` on a `docstatus == 1`, submittable `Asset Depreciation Schedule` **through the document lifecycle** (only `should_not_cancel_depreciation_entries` is set, not `ignore_validate`, so `before_cancel` does fire and the ride is what admitted it).\n\nSo one marker authorising `submit Sales Invoice X` cancelled a submitted document the human was never shown and never approved. Cancelling such a document reverses its ledger effect.\n\nThe same shape exists behind wider grants, for example `Unreconcile Payment.on_submit` (`unreconcile_payment.py:59-64`), which walks a child table the caller fills and reaches `accounts/utils.py:857`/`:859` `gain_loss_je.cancel()` on submitted Journal Entries.\n\n### Who is affected\n\nOnly sites that had opted into consent gating: a credential must hold an `API Key Scope` with `require_consent` set. `pacioli-guard` is inert for principals without such a grant, and the credential-scoping floor (`auth_hooks`) is unaffected by this issue.\n\nThe document-layer consent gate was first published in 0.9.6, which is the only released version in the affected range.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.10.0**. The ride now discriminates on the **enclosing act**: an undo may cascade into further undos, but a submit may not cascade into the cancellation of a document that already has a name, because that is an act a human could have been asked to approve. The custody stamp carries the act it was established for rather than a bare boolean, which is the state the vulnerable code lacked.\n\n**Upgrading changes behavior.** Any ERPNext flow where a submit cascades into a lifecycle cancel now requires a consent marker for that cancel as well as for the act itself. In ERPNext v16 that includes asset sale, partial-quantity asset sale, a credit note against an asset sale, Asset Repair capitalization, Asset Shift Allocation, Asset Value Adjustment, and `Unreconcile Payment`. To make that possible, the `X-Pacioli-Consent` header now accepts several markers separated by whitespace or commas; each remains bound to one document and one act, requires a different minter, and is spent exactly once.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nOn 0.9.6, remove `require_consent` from affected grants and rely on the credential-scoping floor alone, or scope governed credentials so they cannot submit documents whose controllers cancel other documents (for ERPNext slice-one, `Sales Invoice` with a populated item-row `asset` link is the known path). Neither is a substitute for upgrading.\n\n### Residual, stated\n\nUnder a governed **cancel**, a cascaded cancel of a pre-existing document still rides. That is load-bearing for undo (an ordinary invoice cancel makes ERPNext cancel the credit/debit notes and journals it generated, via `accounts_controller.py:2001-2005`) and cannot be narrowed without a signal that a cascaded cancel is a consequence of the enclosing document specifically. That justification does not describe everything the residual admits: at least one instance is caller-steered in the same shape as the issue fixed here, `Asset Repair.on_cancel` (`asset_repair.py:215-222`), which cancels a `Serial and Batch Bundle` named by a Link the caller fills in a child table. `pacioli-guard` also does not see writes that set `flags.ignore_validate` or that skip the document lifecycle entirely (raw SQL, `db_update`/`db_set` field writes); those residuals are published in the project's own documentation and are unchanged by this advisory.\n\n### Credit\n\nFound by an internal adversarial review on 2026-07-28 that traced the predicate against frappe 16.28.0 and ERPNext v16 source rather than the project's own documentation. The prior code comment asserted that no such lever was known; that assertion had been written without the corresponding source sweep.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "pacioli-guard"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.9.6"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.10.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/security/advisories/GHSA-3hj7-6vmj-h8v4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107841"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/commit/f3c7219f5dde6050bd7921e0ac55afd02771250c"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli/releases/tag/guard-v0.10.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-863" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-09T20:42:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-09T18:17:06Z"
  }
}