Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/openwisp-ipam

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-x287-5c68-36wp",
  "modified" : "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "OpenWISP IPAM has broken object-level authorization: ExportSubnetView lets a member of one organization export another organization's subnet and all its IP addresses",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nOpenWISP IPAM is multi-tenant: every `Subnet` belongs to an `organization`, and API access is scoped to the organizations a user belongs to. The CSV **export** endpoint, `ExportSubnetView`, omits the organization-membership check that its **import** sibling performs, and loads the subnet by primary key with no organization filter. An authenticated user who is a member of one organization can therefore export a subnet belonging to **another** organization — its name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it — by issuing an export request for that subnet's id.\n\n## Details\n\n`ImportSubnetView.post()` authorizes first, by calling `assert_organization_permissions()`:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py  (ImportSubnetView)\ndef post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):\n    self.assert_organization_permissions(request)        # <-- org-membership check\n    file = request.FILES[\"csvfile\"]\n    ...\n    self.subnet_model().import_csv(file)\n```\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/utils.py:16  (AuthorizeCSVImport)\ndef assert_organization_permissions(self, request):\n    if request.user.is_superuser:\n        return\n    # ... otherwise verifies the user belongs to the target organization\n```\n\n`ExportSubnetView.post()` performs **no** such check. It is declared with `IpAddressOrgMixin` (whose organization scoping lives in `get_queryset()`), but its overridden `post()` never calls `get_queryset()` **or** `assert_organization_permissions()` — it goes straight to `export_csv()`:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py:246\nclass ExportSubnetView(ProtectedAPIMixin, IpAddressOrgMixin, CreateAPIView):\n    subnet_model = Subnet\n    def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):\n        response = HttpResponse(content_type=\"text/csv\")\n        response[\"Content-Disposition\"] = 'attachment; filename=\"ip_address.csv\"'\n        writer = csv.writer(response)\n        self.subnet_model().export_csv(kwargs[\"subnet_id\"], writer)   # no org check reached\n        return response\n```\n\n`export_csv()` resolves the subnet by primary key with no organization filter and writes its full contents:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/base/models.py:242\ndef export_csv(self, subnet_id, writer):\n    ipaddress_model = load_model(\"openwisp_ipam\", \"IpAddress\")\n    subnet = load_model(\"openwisp_ipam\", \"Subnet\").objects.get(pk=subnet_id)   # any org's subnet\n    # ... writes subnet name, CIDR, organization slug, and every IpAddress (address, description, …)\n```\n\nThe `subnet_id` is a random `UUIDField` (`migrations/0001_initial.py`: `models.UUIDField(default=uuid.uuid4)`), so an attacker must **obtain** the target subnet's id rather than enumerate it — hence **Attack Complexity: High**. This is a genuine missing-authorization flaw regardless: the import/export asymmetry shows the check was intended, and subnet ids routinely appear in URLs, logs, shared CSV exports and support tickets, from which a cross-organization id can leak.\n\nThe same single-object pattern (resolving the subnet by `subnet_id` outside the org-scoped queryset) also appears in `AvailableIpView.get()` and `RequestIPView.post()` (the latter additionally **writes** an IP into the target subnet); these are worth reviewing alongside the export fix.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nPrerequisites: an OpenWISP IPAM instance with two organizations **OrgA** and **OrgB**; a normal (non-superuser) user who is a member of **OrgB** only; a subnet in **OrgA** whose id `S` is known to the attacker (e.g. leaked via a URL/log/shared export).\n\n1. As the OrgB user, authenticate to the API.\n2. `POST /api/v1/subnet/{S}/export/` (OrgA's subnet id).\n3. **Result:** a CSV download containing OrgA's subnet name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it — even though the user belongs only to OrgB.\n4. **Control (proves it's an oversight):** the corresponding import endpoint `POST /api/v1/import-subnet/` with OrgA data is rejected for the same user by `assert_organization_permissions()`.\n\n*(Reported from a first-hand source review of the current `master`: the missing check in `ExportSubnetView.post`, the guarded `ImportSubnetView.post` sibling, the un-filtered `Subnet.objects.get(pk=…)` in `export_csv`, and the `UUIDField` primary key were each verified by hand. The fix is a one-line authorization call, so a maintainer can confirm trivially with two organizations.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nA member of one organization can read the complete contents of another organization's subnet — its IP allocation inventory (addresses, descriptions, organization slug, CIDR). In a WISP / network-management deployment this discloses another tenant's network topology and host inventory. Exploitation requires obtaining the target subnet's UUID (AC:H), but the authorization check is missing outright. (`RequestIPView` shares the pattern and additionally allows writing an IP into another organization's subnet — a separate integrity concern for the maintainer to confirm.)\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd the organization-membership check to `ExportSubnetView.post()` — call `self.assert_organization_permissions(request)` (as `ImportSubnetView` does), or resolve the subnet through the org-scoped `get_queryset()` / `get_object()` and return 404 when it isn't in the caller's organizations. Apply the same to `AvailableIpView` and `RequestIPView`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "openwisp-ipam"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.2.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.2.0.post1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/security/advisories/GHSA-x287-5c68-36wp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/pull/220"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/commit/04a2ef949498c6591f9ac35713d7451fb9f75362"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/commit/a4b272461bfa7a1762baf0b1fd76b4f5b681586b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/releases/tag/1.2.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}