Vulnerabilities in pkg:pypi/esphome-device-builder

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rrxg-g2pf-6hh4",
  "modified" : "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-59178" ],
  "summary" : "ESPHome Device Builder: Renamed auth env vars silently disable dashboard authentication on upgrade",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe dashboard reads its authentication credentials from `$ESPHOME_USERNAME` and `$ESPHOME_PASSWORD`. Earlier versions, and the legacy `esphome` dashboard, read the bare `$USERNAME` and `$PASSWORD` instead. When the env vars were renamed the bare names were dropped with no fallback, so an operator who had protected their dashboard with `USERNAME` / `PASSWORD` (as the older getting started guide documented) loses authentication on upgrade and the dashboard starts open to anyone who can reach its port.\n\n## Details\n\nCredentials are resolved in `DashboardSettings.parse_args`. The fallback originally read `os.getenv(\"USERNAME\")` and `os.getenv(\"PASSWORD\")`. The env var rename (#265) replaced those with `ESPHOME_USERNAME` / `ESPHOME_PASSWORD` and intentionally removed the bare names, because `$USERNAME` collides with the OS login user on Linux and Windows and reading it on its own would silently promote the shell user to the dashboard username.\n\nThe rename closed that footgun but introduced a backward compatibility break: a deployment that set only the bare names now resolves to no credentials, `using_password` is false, and the REST auth middleware and the WebSocket login gate are both disabled. The process logs a `WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION` banner at startup, but a container started detached (`docker run -d`) never surfaces it, so the exposure is silent in practice.\n\nThis reaches users because the `dashboard` subcommand of the `ghcr.io/esphome/esphome` container runs this package: the container pins `esphome-device-builder` and execs it for `dashboard`, inheriting whatever env the operator passed. The standalone Docker path runs without `--ha-addon`, so it is the affected path. Home Assistant add on installs are not affected; they pass `--ha-addon` and authenticate through the supervisor ingress proxy, and do not use these env vars.\n\nThe rename was tagged as a breaking change but was not surfaced in the 2026.6.0 changelog, so operators had no signal to migrate before upgrading.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated client with network access to the dashboard port can manage devices, including editing configurations and flashing firmware. Only deployments that relied on the bare `$USERNAME` / `$PASSWORD` env vars for authentication are affected; deployments using `--username` / `--password`, the new `$ESPHOME_*` env vars, or HA add on ingress are not.\n\n## Severity rationale\n\nAn unauthenticated network client crosses the dashboard's only security boundary, and a client past that boundary has host equivalent capability. ESPHome's [threat model](https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/blob/main/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) documents that an authenticated dashboard caller can run arbitrary code at compile time and read or write files in the config and data directories, so confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all High, with no credentials, no user interaction, and low attack complexity.\n\nThe base score is rated for the worst case, an internet reachable dashboard. That worst case is the right anchor here, because this issue only affects operators who had deliberately configured a dashboard password, and setting a password is the control an operator uses precisely when the dashboard is reachable by parties they do not fully trust, including a deployment exposed to the internet or a network segment shared with untrusted devices. For the affected population a trusted network cannot be assumed, so authentication should be restored as urgent.\n\nOperational risk is lower for the subset of affected installations that run on a single trusted home or business network behind a firewall, since reaching the dashboard there requires an attacker who is already inside that network. ESPHome is [designed for deployment on trusted networks](https://esphome.io/guides/security_best_practices/) with the network perimeter as the primary defense, so that deployment context reduces real world exposure; it does not lower the base severity, and operators on shared, guest, or internet reachable networks remain at full risk.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 1.0.12. The bare `$USERNAME` / `$PASSWORD` are accepted again as a deprecated fallback so previously protected instances stay protected across the upgrade without operator intervention, with a loud deprecation warning at startup directing operators to rename them to `$ESPHOME_USERNAME` / `$ESPHOME_PASSWORD`. The fallback is gated on `$PASSWORD` being set and is only adopted as a pair, so the OS provided `$USERNAME` is never read on its own and the original collision footgun stays closed. A lone bare `$PASSWORD` with no username still fails loud as a credential mismatch rather than starting unauthenticated.\n\nThis restores compatibility rather than failing closed on the legacy names, because the priority is that an instance which was protected before the upgrade stays protected without the operator having to act; the deprecation warning plus a future removal handles the migration. Operators should migrate to the `$ESPHOME_*` names.\n\nThe esphome container delivers the fix in the 2026.6.2 release, which bumps its pinned `esphome-device-builder` version to 1.0.12.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nWithout upgrading, restore authentication immediately by setting the new env vars to the same values, on any affected version:\n\n```\nESPHOME_USERNAME=<your-username>\nESPHOME_PASSWORD=<your-password>\n```\n\nAlternatively, do not expose the dashboard port to untrusted networks, and check the startup logs for the `WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION` banner to confirm whether a given instance is currently open.\n\n## References\n\n- Original report against the esphome container: GHSA-446m-c8jp-v37m\n- Env var rename that introduced the regression: esphome/device-builder#265\n- 2026.6.0 changelog (breaking change was not documented): https://esphome.io/changelog/2026.6.0\n- Old setup documentation that used the bare names: https://esphome.io/guides/getting_started_command_line",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "esphome-device-builder"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.0.12"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/security/advisories/GHSA-rrxg-g2pf-6hh4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/pull/1625"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/commit/9e294f729c3eb7334bb57b9fc49b75b728052f52"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/releases/tag/1.0.12"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-306" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}