Vulnerabilities in pkg:nuget/MessagePack.UnityShims

PACKAGE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf
Advisory Summary

CVE-2020-5234 is a MODERATE (CVSS 4.8) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow) affecting MessagePack libraries in the NuGet ecosystem. The issue involves untrusted data can lead to dos attack due to hash collisions and stack overflow in messagepack. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.9.11, 2.1.90.

1 Known Advisory Record(s)
Package Vulnerability Intelligence

pkg:nuget/MessagePack.UnityShims

1 Known Advisory Record(s)

Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:nuget/MessagePack.UnityShims. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.

Advisory ID CVE / NVD Severity Summary
GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf CVE-2020-5234 MODERATE Untrusted data can lead to DoS attack due to hash collisions and stack overflow in MessagePack

CVE-2020-5234 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2020-5234
GHSA Identifier GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 4.8
CWE Classification CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
Affected Product MessagePack
Package Ecosystem NuGet
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 4.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2020-5234

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected MessagePack dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

MessagePack fixed: 1.9.11
Upgrade MessagePack to 1.9.11
MessagePack fixed: 2.1.90
Upgrade MessagePack to 2.1.90
MessagePack.ImmutableCollection fixed: 1.9.11
Upgrade MessagePack.ImmutableCollection to 1.9.11
MessagePack.ImmutableCollection fixed: 2.1.90
Upgrade MessagePack.ImmutableCollection to 2.1.90
MessagePack.ReactiveProperty fixed: 1.9.11
Upgrade MessagePack.ReactiveProperty to 1.9.11
MessagePack.ReactiveProperty fixed: 2.1.90
Upgrade MessagePack.ReactiveProperty to 2.1.90
MessagePack.UnityShims fixed: 1.9.11
Upgrade MessagePack.UnityShims to 1.9.11
MessagePack.UnityShims fixed: 2.1.90
Upgrade MessagePack.UnityShims to 2.1.90
MessagePack.Unity fixed: 1.9.11
Upgrade MessagePack.Unity to 1.9.11
MessagePack.Unity fixed: 2.1.90
Upgrade MessagePack.Unity to 2.1.90
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for MessagePack

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2020-5234, inspect your project dependencies for MessagePack:

inspect dependencies for MessagePack

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of MessagePack in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.9.11), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow, where a stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function). In MessagePack, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Impact When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by either of two vectors: 1. hash collisions - leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized. 1. stack overflow - leading to the deserializing process crashing. ### Patches The following steps are required to mitigate this risk. 1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available 1. Add code to your application to put MessagePack into the defensive `UntrustedData` mode. 1. Identify all MessagePack extensions that implement `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations that do not ship with the MessagePack library to include the security mitigations. This includes those acquired from 3rd party packages and classes included directly into your project. Any AOT formatters generated with the MPC tool must be regenerated with the patched version of mpc. 1. Review your messagepack-serializable data structures for hash-based collections that use custom or unusual types for the hashed key. See below for details on handling such situations. Review the `MessagePackSecurity` class to tweak any settings as necessary to strike the right balance between performance, functionality, and security. Specialized `IEqualityComparer<T>` implementations provide the hash collision resistance. Each type of hashed key may require a specialized implementation of its own. The patched MessagePack library includes many such implementations for primitive types commonly used as keys in hash-based collections. If your data structures use custom types as keys in these hash-based collections, putting MessagePack in `UntrustedData` mode may lead the deserializer to throw an exception because no safe `IEqualityComparer<T>` is available for your custom `T` type. You can provide your own safe implementation by deriving from the `MessagePackSecurity` class and overriding the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()` method to return your own custom implementation when `T` matches your type, and fallback to `return base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>();` for types you do not have custom implementations for. Unrelated to this advisory, but as general security guidance, you should also avoid the Typeless serializer/formatters/resolvers for untrusted data as that opens the door for the untrusted data to potentially deserialize unanticipated types that can compromise security. #### MessagePack 1.x users 1. Upgrade to any 1.9.x version. 1. When deserializing untrusted data, put MessagePack into a more secure mode with: ```cs MessagePackSecurity.Active = MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData; ``` In MessagePack v1.x this is a static property and thus the security level is shared by the entire process or AppDomain. Use MessagePack v2.1 or later for better control over the security level for your particular use. 1. Any code produced by mpc should be regenerated with the mpc tool with the matching (patched) version. Such generated code usually is written to a file called `Generated.cs`. A patched `Generated.cs` file will typically reference the `MessagePackSecurity` class. Review any custom-written `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations in your project or that you might use from 3rd party packages to ensure they also utilize the `MessagePackSecurity` class as required. In particular, a formatter that deserializes an object (as opposed to a primitive value) should wrap the deserialization in a `using (MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep())` block. For example: ```cs public MyObject Deserialize(ref MessagePackReader reader, MessagePackSerializerOptions options) { if (reader.TryReadNil()) { return default; } else { using (MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep()) // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION { MyObject o = new MyObject(); // deserialize members of the object here. return o; } } } ``` If your custom formatter creates hash-based collections (e.g. `Dictionary<K, V>` or `HashSet<T>`) where the hashed key comes from the messagepack data, always instantiate your collection using `MessagePackSecurity.Active.GetEqualityComparer<T>()` as the equality comparer: ```cs var collection = new HashSet<T>(MessagePackSecurity.Active.GetEqualityComparer<T>()); ``` This ensures that when reading untrusted data, you will be using a collision-resistent hash algorithm. Learn more about [best security practices when reading untrusted data with MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security). #### MessagePack 2.x users 1. Upgrade to any 2.1.x or later version. 1. When deserializing untrusted data, put MessagePack into a more secure mode by configuring your `MessagePackSerializerOptions.Security` property: ```cs var options = MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard .WithSecurity(MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData); // Pass the options explicitly for the greatest control. T object = MessagePackSerializer.Deserialize<T>(data, options); // Or set the security level as the default. MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions = options; ``` 1. Any code produced by mpc should be regenerated with the mpc tool with the matching (patched) version. Such generated code usually is written to a file called `Generated.cs`. A patched `Generated.cs` file will typically reference the `Security` member on the `MessagePackSerializerOptions` parameter. Review any custom-written `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations in your project or that you might use from 3rd party packages to ensure they also utilize the `MessagePackSecurity` class as required. In particular, a formatter that deserializes an object (as opposed to a primitive value) should call `options.Security.DepthStep(ref reader);` before deserializing the object's members, and be sure to revert the depth step with `reader.Depth--;` before exiting the method. For example: ```cs public MyObject Deserialize(ref MessagePackReader reader, MessagePackSerializerOptions options) { if (reader.TryReadNil()) { return default; } else { options.Security.DepthStep(ref reader); // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION, line 1 try { MyObject o = new MyObject(); // deserialize members of the object here. return o; } finally { reader.Depth--; // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION, line 2 } } } ``` If your custom formatter creates hash-based collections (e.g. `Dictionary<K, V>` or `HashSet<T>`) where the hashed key comes from the messagepack data, always instantiate your collection using `options.Security.GetEqualityComparer<TKey>()` as the equality comparer: ```cs var collection = new HashSet<T>(options.Security.GetEqualityComparer<T>()); ``` This ensures that when reading untrusted data, you will be using a collision-resistent hash algorithm. Learn more about [best security practices when reading untrusted data with MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp#security). ### Workarounds The security vulnerabilities are in the formatters. Avoiding the built-in formatters entirely in favor of reading messagepack primitive data directly or relying on carefully written custom formatters can provide a workaround. MessagePack v1.x users may utilize the `MessagePackBinary` static class directly to read the data they expect. MessagePack v2.x users may utilize the `MessagePackReader` struct directly to read the data they expect. ### References Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp#security). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [MessagePack-CSharp](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/issues/new/choose) * [Email us](mailto:andrewarnott@gmail.com)

CVE-2020-5234 Affected MessagePack Versions

10 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.9.112.1.90
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
MessagePack
NuGet
< 1.9.11
1.9.11
MessagePack
NuGet
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.1.90
2.1.90
MessagePack.ImmutableCollection
NuGet
< 1.9.11
1.9.11
MessagePack.ImmutableCollection
NuGet
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.1.90
2.1.90
MessagePack.ReactiveProperty
NuGet
< 1.9.11
1.9.11
MessagePack.ReactiveProperty
NuGet
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.1.90
2.1.90
MessagePack.UnityShims
NuGet
< 1.9.11
1.9.11
MessagePack.UnityShims
NuGet
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.1.90
2.1.90
MessagePack.Unity
NuGet
< 1.9.11
1.9.11
MessagePack.Unity
NuGet
≥ 2.0.0
< 2.1.90
2.1.90

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2020-5234?
CVE-2020-5234 is a security vulnerability in MessagePack involving Untrusted data can lead to DoS attack due to hash collisions and stack overflow in MessagePack under CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow.
Which MessagePack versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.9.11, 2.1.90 across affected packages: MessagePack, MessagePack.ImmutableCollection, MessagePack.ReactiveProperty, MessagePack.UnityShims, MessagePack.Unity.
What version fixes CVE-2020-5234?
Upgrading to 1.9.11, 2.1.90 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is MessagePack affected?
Yes, MessagePack is affected in releases prior to 1.9.11, 2.1.90. Upgrade your dependency to 1.9.11, 2.1.90 or later.
Is MessagePack.ImmutableCollection affected?
Yes, MessagePack.ImmutableCollection is affected in releases prior to 1.9.11, 2.1.90. Upgrade your dependency to 1.9.11, 2.1.90 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2020-5234?
CVE-2020-5234 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.8 (MODERATE) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2020-5234?
CVE-2020-5234 is classified under CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow (A stack-based buffer overflow condition is a condition where the buffer being overwritten is allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, rarely, a parameter to a function).).
How can I check NuGet dependencies for CVE-2020-5234?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for MessagePack'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf",
  "modified" : "2024-10-16T22:06:55Z",
  "published" : "2020-01-31T17:59:20Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2020-5234" ],
  "summary" : "Untrusted data can lead to DoS attack due to hash collisions and stack overflow in MessagePack",
  "details" : "### Impact\n\nWhen this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by either of two vectors:\n\n1. hash collisions - leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.\n1. stack overflow - leading to the deserializing process crashing.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe following steps are required to mitigate this risk.\n\n1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available\n1. Add code to your application to put MessagePack into the defensive `UntrustedData` mode.\n1. Identify all MessagePack extensions that implement `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations that do not ship with the MessagePack library to include the security mitigations. This includes those acquired from 3rd party packages and classes included directly into your project. Any AOT formatters generated with the MPC tool must be regenerated with the patched version of mpc.\n1. Review your messagepack-serializable data structures for hash-based collections that use custom or unusual types for the hashed key. See below for details on handling such situations.\n\nReview the `MessagePackSecurity` class to tweak any settings as necessary to strike the right balance between performance, functionality, and security.\n\nSpecialized `IEqualityComparer<T>` implementations provide the hash collision resistance.\nEach type of hashed key may require a specialized implementation of its own.\nThe patched MessagePack library includes many such implementations for primitive types commonly used as keys in hash-based collections.\nIf your data structures use custom types as keys in these hash-based collections,\nputting MessagePack in `UntrustedData` mode may lead the deserializer to throw an exception\nbecause no safe `IEqualityComparer<T>` is available for your custom `T` type.\nYou can provide your own safe implementation by deriving from the `MessagePackSecurity` class\nand overriding the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()` method to return your own\ncustom implementation when `T` matches your type, and fallback to `return base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>();` for types you do not have custom implementations for.\n\nUnrelated to this advisory, but as general security guidance, you should also avoid the Typeless serializer/formatters/resolvers for untrusted data as that opens the door for the untrusted data to potentially deserialize unanticipated types that can compromise security.\n\n#### MessagePack 1.x users\n\n1. Upgrade to any 1.9.x version.\n\n1. When deserializing untrusted data, put MessagePack into a more secure mode with:\n\n    ```cs\n    MessagePackSecurity.Active = MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData;\n    ```\n\n    In MessagePack v1.x this is a static property and thus the security level is shared by the entire process or AppDomain.\n    Use MessagePack v2.1 or later for better control over the security level for your particular use.\n\n1. Any code produced by mpc should be regenerated with the mpc tool with the matching (patched) version. Such generated code usually is written to a file called `Generated.cs`. A patched `Generated.cs` file will typically reference the `MessagePackSecurity` class.\n\n    Review any custom-written `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations in your project or that you might use from 3rd party packages to ensure they also utilize the `MessagePackSecurity` class as required.\n    In particular, a formatter that deserializes an object (as opposed to a primitive value) should wrap the deserialization in a `using (MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep())` block. For example:\n\n    ```cs\n    public MyObject Deserialize(ref MessagePackReader reader, MessagePackSerializerOptions options)\n    {\n        if (reader.TryReadNil())\n        {\n            return default;\n        }\n        else\n        {\n            using (MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep()) // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION\n            {\n                MyObject o = new MyObject();\n                // deserialize members of the object here.\n                return o;\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    ```\n\n    If your custom formatter creates hash-based collections (e.g. `Dictionary<K, V>` or `HashSet<T>`) where the hashed key comes from the messagepack data, always instantiate your collection using `MessagePackSecurity.Active.GetEqualityComparer<T>()` as the equality comparer:\n\n    ```cs\n    var collection = new HashSet<T>(MessagePackSecurity.Active.GetEqualityComparer<T>());\n    ```\n\n    This ensures that when reading untrusted data, you will be using a collision-resistent hash algorithm.\n\nLearn more about [best security practices when reading untrusted data with MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security).\n\n#### MessagePack 2.x users\n\n1. Upgrade to any 2.1.x or later version.\n\n1. When deserializing untrusted data, put MessagePack into a more secure mode by configuring your `MessagePackSerializerOptions.Security` property:\n\n    ```cs\n    var options = MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard\n        .WithSecurity(MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData);\n\n    // Pass the options explicitly for the greatest control.\n    T object = MessagePackSerializer.Deserialize<T>(data, options);\n\n    // Or set the security level as the default.\n    MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions = options;\n    ```\n\n1. Any code produced by mpc should be regenerated with the mpc tool with the matching (patched) version. Such generated code usually is written to a file called `Generated.cs`. A patched `Generated.cs` file will typically reference the `Security` member on the `MessagePackSerializerOptions` parameter.\n\n    Review any custom-written `IMessagePackFormatter<T>` implementations in your project or that you might use from 3rd party packages to ensure they also utilize the `MessagePackSecurity` class as required.\n    In particular, a formatter that deserializes an object (as opposed to a primitive value) should call `options.Security.DepthStep(ref reader);` before deserializing the object's members, and be sure to revert the depth step with `reader.Depth--;` before exiting the method. For example:\n\n    ```cs\n    public MyObject Deserialize(ref MessagePackReader reader, MessagePackSerializerOptions options)\n    {\n        if (reader.TryReadNil())\n        {\n            return default;\n        }\n        else\n        {\n            options.Security.DepthStep(ref reader); // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION, line 1\n            try\n            {\n                MyObject o = new MyObject();\n                // deserialize members of the object here.\n                return o;\n            }\n            finally\n            {\n                reader.Depth--; // STACK OVERFLOW MITIGATION, line 2\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    ```\n\n    If your custom formatter creates hash-based collections (e.g. `Dictionary<K, V>` or `HashSet<T>`) where the hashed key comes from the messagepack data, always instantiate your collection using `options.Security.GetEqualityComparer<TKey>()` as the equality comparer:\n\n    ```cs\n    var collection = new HashSet<T>(options.Security.GetEqualityComparer<T>());\n    ```\n\n    This ensures that when reading untrusted data, you will be using a collision-resistent hash algorithm.\n\nLearn more about [best security practices when reading untrusted data with MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp#security).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe security vulnerabilities are in the formatters.\nAvoiding the built-in formatters entirely in favor of reading messagepack primitive data directly\nor relying on carefully written custom formatters can provide a workaround.\n\nMessagePack v1.x users may utilize the `MessagePackBinary` static class directly to read the data they expect.\nMessagePack v2.x users may utilize the `MessagePackReader` struct directly to read the data they expect.\n\n### References\n\nLearn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp#security).\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Open an issue in [MessagePack-CSharp](https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/issues/new/choose)\n* [Email us](mailto:andrewarnott@gmail.com)\n",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.1.90"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.ImmutableCollection"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.ImmutableCollection"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.1.90"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.ReactiveProperty"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.ReactiveProperty"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.1.90"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.UnityShims"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.9.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.UnityShims"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.1.90"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.Unity"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
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        "fixed" : "1.9.11"
      } ]
    } ]
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "NuGet",
      "name" : "MessagePack.Unity"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.0.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.1.90"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5234"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/aspnet/Announcements/issues/405"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/issues/810"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/commit/56fa86219d01d0a183babbbbcb34abbdea588a02"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/neuecc/MessagePack-CSharp/commit/f88684078698386df02204f13faeff098a61f007"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-121" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2020-01-31T17:47:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}