Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/mcp-memory-keeper

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx",
  "modified" : "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "published" : "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-54561" ],
  "summary" : "mcp-memory-keeper: Arbitrary local file read in context_import via unvalidated filePath",
  "details" : "### Impact\n\n`context_import` passed the caller-supplied `filePath` directly to `fs.readFileSync` with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client — or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool — could point `filePath` at **any file readable by the server process**, outside any session or export directory:\n\n- **Full disclosure (JSON files):** a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user's exported session, or a `*.json` credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller's session, then retrievable verbatim via `context_get` / `context_export`.\n- **Partial disclosure (any file):** for a non-JSON target (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, an SSH key, a `.env`), `JSON.parse` throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file's leading bytes in the `SyntaxError` message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.\n\nBoth `../` traversal and absolute paths worked — there was no path confinement of any kind.\n\nIn a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer's machine, so the reachable set includes other users' exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) `.env` files, SSH keys, and `/etc/passwd`. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling `context_import`, or any MCP client connected to the server.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.13.0** (PR #36):\n\n- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (`<DATA_DIR>/exports`, overridable via `MEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR`), resolved with `realpathSync`. `../` traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected.\n- File read and `JSON.parse` are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the `SyntaxError`-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic.\n- An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to **`>= 0.13.0`**. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Report: GitHub issue #35\n- Fix: PR #36\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Zhihao Zhang ([@mcfly-zzh](https://github.com/mcfly-zzh)).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "mcp-memory-keeper"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.13.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/security/advisories/GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/issues/35"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/pull/36"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/commit/84f6dfa692736a34ff36e2d2cf2188b71facf73b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/releases/tag/v0.13.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-209", "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}