Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/kozou

PACKAGE
Advisory Summary

GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 is a HIGH unauthenticated mcp http server and vulnerability (CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default) affecting Kozou libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated mcp http server and bundled dev-stack hardening (dns-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 1.8.1.

1 Known Advisory Record(s)
Package Vulnerability Intelligence

pkg:npm/kozou

1 Known Advisory Record(s)

Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:npm/kozou. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.

Advisory ID CVE / NVD Severity Summary
GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 - HIGH Kozou: Unauthenticated MCP HTTP server and bundled dev-stack hardening (DNS-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure)

GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 at a Glance

CVE Identifier N/A
GHSA Identifier GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Affected Product Kozou
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Kozou dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

kozou fixed: 1.8.1
npm install kozou@1.8.1
@kozou/api fixed: 1.8.1
npm install @kozou/api@1.8.1
@kozou/mcp fixed: 1.8.1
npm install @kozou/mcp@1.8.1
@kozou/core fixed: 1.8.1
npm install @kozou/core@1.8.1
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls kozou

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls kozou

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Kozou in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 1.8.1), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls kozou command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default, where the product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure. In Kozou, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in **1.8.1**. ## Issues 1. **MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection.** The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without `Host`/`Origin` validation, a malicious web page in the operator's browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint — reading schema metadata, or (when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled) executing exposed functions as the execution role. 2. **Unbounded request-body buffering (DoS).** Both the MCP HTTP server and the in-house REST server read the entire request body into memory with no size limit, so a reachable client could drive the process toward memory exhaustion. 3. **Read requests ran in a read/write transaction.** The shared role-transaction envelope opened every request with a plain `BEGIN`, so a `GET` ran read/write. A `SELECT` that reaches a volatile function or a writable / `INSTEAD`-triggered view could perform a write that then commits — the "a GET only reads" contract was left to the serving role's grants rather than enforced. 4. **No-auth dev surfaces published on all interfaces by default.** The scaffolded `docker-compose.yml` (and the quickstart) published the unauthenticated Admin UI and MCP HTTP server — and the default-credential demo database — on every host interface, and the config defaulted those binds to `0.0.0.0`. ## What changed in 1.8.1 - **DNS-rebinding guard (MCP HTTP):** the server validates the `Host` header (and a present `Origin`) against an allowlist before handling any request, on every route. Matching is on the hostname; loopback names are always accepted and an operator can add hosts via configuration. A browser cannot forge `Host`/`Origin`, so this closes the rebinding vector. (This is a browser-rebinding defence; network reachability of an unauthenticated server must still be constrained by the network — see workarounds.) - **Request-body size cap:** both HTTP servers reject an over-large declared `Content-Length` (413) and enforce the limit while streaming, so a chunked / `Content-Length`-less body cannot grow unbounded. A non-JSON `Content-Type` on a body is rejected with 415. The cap is configurable. - **Read-only read transactions:** read methods (`GET`) now run in a `READ ONLY` transaction, so the database refuses any write for the duration of the request regardless of the role's grants. - **Loopback-by-default network posture:** the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server now bind loopback by default; the bundled compose files publish every host port (Admin UI, MCP, database) on `127.0.0.1` only, while the container binds all interfaces internally so the loopback mapping still works. Operators opt into a broader bind explicitly. ## Impact The MCP HTTP server's exposure is greatest when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled and/or the server is reachable beyond loopback. The read/write-transaction issue has effect only when the schema exposes a read path that can write (a volatile-function-backed column or a writable/`INSTEAD`-triggered view) and the serving role holds write grants. The all-interface publish affected anyone who ran the scaffolded `docker compose up` on a host reachable from an untrusted network. Requests run under `SET LOCAL ROLE`, so PostgreSQL still enforces grants/RLS at runtime; these are defense-in-depth and read-contract hardening. ## Affected / patched - npm packages `kozou`, `@kozou/api`, `@kozou/mcp`, `@kozou/core` (and the lockstep-versioned siblings): affected `<= 1.8.0`, patched **1.8.1**. - Container image `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou`: patched at tag `v1.8.1`. ## Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade immediately) - Bind the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server to loopback and publish their host ports on `127.0.0.1` only; do not expose them to untrusted networks. - Do not enable the MCP `call` execution tool on a non-loopback / unauthenticated deployment. - Put an authenticating reverse proxy (with `Host`/`Origin` validation and a request-body limit) in front of any non-loopback deployment. - Change the demo database's default credentials and restrict its port. ## Patches Upgrade to **Kozou 1.8.1** (all npm packages and the `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou` image).

GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 Affected Kozou Versions

4 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
1.8.1
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
kozou
npm
< 1.8.1
1.8.1
@kozou/api
npm
< 1.8.1
1.8.1
@kozou/mcp
npm
< 1.8.1
1.8.1
@kozou/core
npm
< 1.8.1
1.8.1

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562?
GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 is a security vulnerability in Kozou involving Unauthenticated MCP HTTP server and bundled dev-stack hardening (DNS-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure) under CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default.
Which Kozou versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 1.8.1 across affected packages: kozou, @kozou/api, @kozou/mcp, @kozou/core.
What version fixes GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562?
Upgrading to 1.8.1 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is kozou affected?
Yes, kozou is affected in releases prior to 1.8.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.8.1 or later.
Is @kozou/api affected?
Yes, @kozou/api is affected in releases prior to 1.8.1. Upgrade your dependency to 1.8.1 or later.
What CWE is associated with GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562?
GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562 is classified under CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default (The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.).
How can I check npm dependencies for GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls kozou'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562",
  "modified" : "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "Kozou: Unauthenticated MCP HTTP server and bundled dev-stack hardening (DNS-rebinding, request-body limits, read-only reads, default network exposure)",
  "details" : "Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in **1.8.1**.\n\n## Issues\n\n1. **MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection.** The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without `Host`/`Origin` validation, a malicious web page in the operator's browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint — reading schema metadata, or (when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled) executing exposed functions as the execution role.\n\n2. **Unbounded request-body buffering (DoS).** Both the MCP HTTP server and the in-house REST server read the entire request body into memory with no size limit, so a reachable client could drive the process toward memory exhaustion.\n\n3. **Read requests ran in a read/write transaction.** The shared role-transaction envelope opened every request with a plain `BEGIN`, so a `GET` ran read/write. A `SELECT` that reaches a volatile function or a writable / `INSTEAD`-triggered view could perform a write that then commits — the \"a GET only reads\" contract was left to the serving role's grants rather than enforced.\n\n4. **No-auth dev surfaces published on all interfaces by default.** The scaffolded `docker-compose.yml` (and the quickstart) published the unauthenticated Admin UI and MCP HTTP server — and the default-credential demo database — on every host interface, and the config defaulted those binds to `0.0.0.0`.\n\n## What changed in 1.8.1\n\n- **DNS-rebinding guard (MCP HTTP):** the server validates the `Host` header (and a present `Origin`) against an allowlist before handling any request, on every route. Matching is on the hostname; loopback names are always accepted and an operator can add hosts via configuration. A browser cannot forge `Host`/`Origin`, so this closes the rebinding vector. (This is a browser-rebinding defence; network reachability of an unauthenticated server must still be constrained by the network — see workarounds.)\n- **Request-body size cap:** both HTTP servers reject an over-large declared `Content-Length` (413) and enforce the limit while streaming, so a chunked / `Content-Length`-less body cannot grow unbounded. A non-JSON `Content-Type` on a body is rejected with 415. The cap is configurable.\n- **Read-only read transactions:** read methods (`GET`) now run in a `READ ONLY` transaction, so the database refuses any write for the duration of the request regardless of the role's grants.\n- **Loopback-by-default network posture:** the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server now bind loopback by default; the bundled compose files publish every host port (Admin UI, MCP, database) on `127.0.0.1` only, while the container binds all interfaces internally so the loopback mapping still works. Operators opt into a broader bind explicitly.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe MCP HTTP server's exposure is greatest when the opt-in `call` execution tool is enabled and/or the server is reachable beyond loopback. The read/write-transaction issue has effect only when the schema exposes a read path that can write (a volatile-function-backed column or a writable/`INSTEAD`-triggered view) and the serving role holds write grants. The all-interface publish affected anyone who ran the scaffolded `docker compose up` on a host reachable from an untrusted network. Requests run under `SET LOCAL ROLE`, so PostgreSQL still enforces grants/RLS at runtime; these are defense-in-depth and read-contract hardening.\n\n## Affected / patched\n\n- npm packages `kozou`, `@kozou/api`, `@kozou/mcp`, `@kozou/core` (and the lockstep-versioned siblings): affected `<= 1.8.0`, patched **1.8.1**.\n- Container image `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou`: patched at tag `v1.8.1`.\n\n## Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade immediately)\n\n- Bind the Admin UI and MCP HTTP server to loopback and publish their host ports on `127.0.0.1` only; do not expose them to untrusted networks.\n- Do not enable the MCP `call` execution tool on a non-loopback / unauthenticated deployment.\n- Put an authenticating reverse proxy (with `Host`/`Origin` validation and a request-body limit) in front of any non-loopback deployment.\n- Change the demo database's default credentials and restrict its port.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to **Kozou 1.8.1** (all npm packages and the `ghcr.io/kozou-dev/kozou` image).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "kozou"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.8.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.8.0"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@kozou/api"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.8.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.8.0"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@kozou/mcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.8.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.8.0"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@kozou/core"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.8.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.8.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kozou-dev/kozou/security/advisories/GHSA-v52w-28xh-v562"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kozou-dev/kozou"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-1188", "CWE-272", "CWE-346", "CWE-770" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-19T20:47:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}