Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/devbridge-autocomplete

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq",
  "modified" : "2026-06-22T23:00:50Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-22T23:00:50Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "devbridge-autocomplete has XSS in its default formatters: formatGroup and formatResult fail to escape HTML in untrusted inputs",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe default `formatGroup` and `formatResult` functions in `devbridge-autocomplete` concatenate values into HTML without escaping, allowing XSS when an attacker controls (or can taint) the suggestion data source.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. `formatGroup` — `category` is interpolated raw.**\n\n`src/format.ts`:\n\n```ts\nfunction formatGroup(suggestion, category) {\n    return '<div class=\"autocomplete-group\">' + category + '</div>';\n}\n```\n\nIf `groupBy` is used and the grouping field of any suggestion contains HTML, that HTML is executed.\n\n**2. `formatResult` — early-return branch returns `suggestion.value` raw.**\n\n`src/format.ts`:\n\n```ts\nfunction formatResult(suggestion, currentValue) {\n    if (!currentValue) {\n        return suggestion.value;   // un-escaped\n    }\n    /* ... non-empty path escapes correctly ... */\n}\n```\n\nThe early-return branch is reached when `suggest()` renders with an empty `currentValue`, which happens with `minChars: 0` and a server that returns suggestions for an empty query. The returned string is concatenated into the container's `innerHTML`.\n\n### PoC (formatGroup)\n\n```html\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n    <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n    <title>PoC: formatGroup XSS in jQuery-Autocomplete v2.0.0</title>\n</head>\n<body>\n    <input id=\"ac\" type=\"text\" placeholder=\"Type 'a' to trigger\" autocomplete=\"off\">\n\n    <script src=\"https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.7.1.min.js\"></script>\n    <script src=\"dist/jquery.autocomplete.js\"></script>\n    <script>\n        var poisoned = [\n            { value: 'Apple',   data: { category: \"<img src=x onerror=\\\"alert('XSS via formatGroup')\\\">\" } },\n            { value: 'Avocado', data: { category: 'Safe Group' } }\n        ];\n\n        $('#ac').devbridgeAutocomplete({\n            lookup: poisoned,\n            groupBy: 'category',\n            minChars: 1\n        });\n    </script>\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\nOriginally identified by an earlier human analysis; the PoC above was produced with the assistance of Claude Opus 4.7.\n\n### Impact\n\nXSS in pages that render attacker-controllable suggestion data. The actual impact depends on what the embedding page has access to (cookies, session tokens, DOM), per standard reflected/stored XSS.\n\n### Patch\n\nBoth formatters now run their interpolated input through the browser's text-node escaping (`createElement` + `textContent`) before producing the HTML string. Fixed in version `2.0.1`.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "devbridge-autocomplete"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.0.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.0.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/devbridge/jQuery-Autocomplete/security/advisories/GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/devbridge/jQuery-Autocomplete/commit/63ff096ff5b77a90aac7fb5dad7c86e538a59ce0"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/devbridge/jQuery-Autocomplete"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-22T23:00:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}