Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@cardano402/mcp-server

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446",
  "modified" : "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
  "aliases" : [ ],
  "summary" : "@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url",
  "details" : "## Summary\n`@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an\n\n## Impact\n### 1. No spending limits on signed payments\nAn LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.\n\n### 2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication\n`cardano402-mcp --transport http` listens on all interfaces with no `Origin` allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP `tools/call` and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet.\n\n### 3. SSRF via `catalog.server.url`\nA malicious catalog can declare a `server.url` pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data`). The `allowInsecure` guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the `server.url` it returns. `endpoint.path` is also not normalized, so `..` traversal or absolute URLs work.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in `@cardano402/mcp-server@0.1.2`:\n  - Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP `elicitation/create` confirmation hook.\n  - HTTP transport defaults to `127.0.0.1`; non-loopback requires `--http-bearer-token`; per-request `Origin` allowlist + bearer check.\n  - `catalog.server.url` validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless `CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true`.\n  - `endpoint.path` rejected if it contains `..`, NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or `//host/...`.\n  - Per-tool mainnet opt-in via `--mainnet-confirmed-tools`.\n\n  ## Workarounds for 0.1.1 users\n  - Do not run with `--transport http` on an untrusted network; use `--transport stdio` (default).\n  - Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited.\n  - Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet.\n  - Avoid `MAINNET=true` until upgraded to 0.1.2.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@cardano402/mcp-server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.1.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 0.1.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MorganOnCode/cardano402/security/advisories/GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MorganOnCode/cardano402"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-770", "CWE-862", "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}