Vulnerabilities in pkg:npm/@agenticmail/api

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm",
  "modified" : "2026-07-20T22:00:53Z",
  "published" : "2026-06-18T17:20:55Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-57494" ],
  "summary" : "AgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nA low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent.\n\nBecause ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass.\n\n## Affected component\n\nPackage: `@agenticmail/api`\nObserved version: `0.9.62`\nRepository: `agenticmail/agenticmail`\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `packages/api/src/app.ts`: `createAuthMiddleware(...)` is mounted before `createAccountRoutes(...)` and `createTaskRoutes(...)`, so these routes are reachable by any valid bearer token.\n- `packages/api/src/routes/accounts.ts`: `GET /accounts/directory` is available to any authenticated user and returns agent names.\n- `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=name` resolves arbitrary agent names and returns that agent's pending/claimed tasks.\n- `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` do not check whether the authenticated caller is the task assignee, assigner, or otherwise authorized for the task.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker only needs a valid agent API key. They can:\n\n1. List agent names using `/accounts/directory`.\n2. Query another agent's task queue using `/tasks/pending?assignee=<victimName>`.\n3. Read sensitive task payloads intended for the victim agent.\n4. Use the disclosed task ID to complete/fail/claim the victim's task or submit attacker-controlled results.\n\n## Local reproduction\n\nI reproduced this locally with a focused Vitest test mounted directly on `createTaskRoutes`. The test creates two agents, Alice and Bob, and one pending task assigned to Bob. Alice authenticates with her own agent key and performs the following sequence:\n\n1. `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=Bob` with `Authorization: Bearer ak_alice`.\n2. The response is HTTP 200 and includes Bob's task ID and payload: `task-for-bob`, `{ \"task\": \"secret task intended for Bob\" }`.\n3. Alice then sends `POST /api/agenticmail/tasks/task-for-bob/complete` with her own bearer token and an attacker-controlled result.\n4. The task status becomes `completed` and the stored result is controlled by Alice.\n\nThe local verification command was:\n\n```bash\nnpm run test --workspace=@agenticmail/api -- task-routes-authz.test.ts\n```\n\nResult:\n\n```text\nPASS src/__tests__/task-routes-authz.test.ts (1 test)\n```\n\n## Expected behavior\n\nTask listing and task mutation endpoints should enforce an authorization relationship between the authenticated caller and the task. For example:\n\n- `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=<name>` should either be restricted to the current agent, master/admin callers, or an explicit delegated relationship.\n- `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` should verify that the caller is the assignee, assigner, master/admin, or otherwise explicitly authorized.\n- If capability-based task IDs are retained, the API should not expose those IDs to unrelated agents through the assignee-name listing path.\n\n## Credit\n\nPlease credit the finder as: Yaohui Wang",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@agenticmail/api"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.9.64"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639", "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-18T17:20:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}