Vulnerabilities in pkg:golang/github.com/kcp-dev/kcp

PACKAGE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-c8w2-fgvx-vhv4
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-61682 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.9) masters vulnerability (CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data) affecting Github.com/kcp dev/kcp libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves masters in any workspace. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.31.4, 0.32.2.

5 Known Advisory Record(s)
Package Vulnerability Intelligence

pkg:golang/github.com/kcp-dev/kcp

5 Known Advisory Record(s)

Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:golang/github.com/kcp-dev/kcp. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.

Advisory ID CVE / NVD Severity Summary
GHSA-c8w2-fgvx-vhv4 CVE-2026-61682 CRITICAL kcp front-proxy does not strip inbound X-Remote-* identity headers, allowing any authenticated client to inject groups/warrants and impersonate system:masters in any workspace
GHSA-3j3q-wp9x-585p CVE-2026-39429 HIGH kcp's cache server is accessible without authentication or authorization checks
GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h - LOW kcp is missing update validation allows arbitrary LogicalCluster status patches through initializingworkspaces Virtual Workspace
GHSA-w2rr-38wv-8rrp CVE-2025-29922 CRITICAL kcp allows unauthorized creation and deletion of objects in arbitrary workspaces through APIExport Virtual Workspace
GHSA-c7xh-gjv4-4jgv - MODERATE kcp's impersonation allows access to global administrative groups

CVE-2026-61682 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-61682
GHSA Identifier GHSA-c8w2-fgvx-vhv4
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.9
CWE Classification CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data
Affected Product Github.com/kcp dev/kcp
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.9

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required Low (PR:L)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-61682

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/kcp dev/kcp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/kcp-dev/kcp fixed: 0.31.4
Upgrade github.com/kcp-dev/kcp to 0.31.4
github.com/kcp-dev/kcp fixed: 0.32.2
Upgrade github.com/kcp-dev/kcp to 0.32.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/kcp-dev/kcp

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-61682, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/kcp dev/kcp:

inspect dependencies for github.com/kcp-dev/kcp

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/kcp dev/kcp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.31.4), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data, where the authentication scheme or implementation uses key data elements that are assumed to be immutable, but can be controlled or modified by the attacker. In Github.com/kcp dev/kcp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

# Summary The kcp front-proxy fails to strip client-supplied identity headers before forwarding requests to shards. Any authenticated tenant can inject their own `X-Remote-Group` and `X-Remote-Extra-*` headers, which the shard trusts as a verified identity assertion — allowing a low-privilege user to escalate to cluster administrator (`system:masters`) and read, write, or delete resources in any workspace on the shard. This is a complete multi-tenant isolation and authorization bypass. ## Impact In a sharded kcp deployment, external clients reach shards through the front-proxy, which authenticates the client and then forwards the resulting identity to the shard using Kubernetes request-header authentication (`X-Remote-User` / `X-Remote-Group` / `X-Remote-Extra-*`). The shard trusts these headers because they arrive over the front-proxy's mutually-authenticated connection. Because the front-proxy appended its identity headers instead of replacing them — and never removed any copies the client sent — an authenticated attacker could smuggle forged identity headers through to the shard. With this, an attacker holding any ordinary credential (client certificate, OIDC token, or service-account token) and no special privileges could: - assert `X-Remote-Group: system:masters` and act as cluster super-user, bypassing the entire kcp authorizer chain in every workspace on the shard; - forge `authorization.kcp.io/warrant` to assume an arbitrary user/group identity via kcp's delegated-identity mechanism; - forge `authentication.kcp.io/scopes` to escape the cluster-scoping that confines service-account and impersonated identities to their origin workspace; - satisfy per-workspace required-group gating by injecting the required group. The result is arbitrary read/write/delete access to any tenant's resources, secrets, RBAC, APIExports/APIBindings, and LogicalClusters — a cross-workspace access break and authorizer bypass across the proxy's trust boundary. # Patches Fixed in v0.31.4, 0.32.2. The front-proxy and the shard's in-process local-proxy now unconditionally remove any inbound `X-Remote-*` identity headers before stamping the authenticated identity, so no client-supplied value can be forwarded to a shard. Operators should upgrade to a patched release. No configuration changes are required after upgrading. # Workarounds There is no complete workaround other than upgrading. Deployments that terminate client connections at an external proxy capable of stripping `X-Remote-User`, `X-Remote-Group`, and all `X-Remote-Extra-*` headers from inbound requests before they reach the kcp front-proxy can mitigate exposure in the interim. Credit to [5ud0er](https://github.com/5ud0er) / Tarmo Technologies.

CVE-2026-61682 Affected Github.com/kcp dev/kcp Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.31.40.32.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/kcp-dev/kcp
Go
< 0.31.4
0.31.4
github.com/kcp-dev/kcp
Go
≥ 0.32.0
< 0.32.2
0.32.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-61682?
CVE-2026-61682 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/kcp dev/kcp involving masters in any workspace under CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data.
Which Github.com/kcp dev/kcp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.31.4, 0.32.2 across affected packages: github.com/kcp-dev/kcp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-61682?
Upgrading to 0.31.4, 0.32.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/kcp-dev/kcp affected?
Yes, github.com/kcp-dev/kcp is affected in releases prior to 0.31.4, 0.32.2. Upgrade your dependency to 0.31.4, 0.32.2 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-61682?
CVE-2026-61682 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.9 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-61682?
CVE-2026-61682 is classified under CWE-302: Authentication Bypass by Assumed-Immutable Data (The authentication scheme or implementation uses key data elements that are assumed to be immutable, but can be controlled or modified by the attacker.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-61682?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/kcp-dev/kcp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-c8w2-fgvx-vhv4",
  "modified" : "2026-09-18T17:15:49Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-18T17:15:49Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-61682" ],
  "summary" : "kcp front-proxy does not strip inbound X-Remote-* identity headers, allowing any authenticated client to inject groups/warrants and impersonate system:masters in any workspace",
  "details" : "# Summary\n\nThe kcp front-proxy fails to strip client-supplied identity headers before forwarding requests to shards. Any authenticated tenant can inject their own `X-Remote-Group` and `X-Remote-Extra-*` headers, which the shard trusts as a verified identity assertion — allowing a low-privilege user to escalate to cluster administrator (`system:masters`) and read, write, or delete resources in any workspace on the shard. This is a complete multi-tenant isolation and authorization bypass.\n\n## Impact \n\nIn a sharded kcp deployment, external clients reach shards through the front-proxy, which authenticates the client and then forwards the resulting identity to the shard using Kubernetes request-header authentication (`X-Remote-User` / `X-Remote-Group` / `X-Remote-Extra-*`). The shard trusts these headers because they arrive over the front-proxy's mutually-authenticated connection.\n\nBecause the front-proxy appended its identity headers instead of replacing them — and never removed any copies the client sent — an authenticated attacker could smuggle forged identity headers through to the shard. With this, an attacker holding any ordinary credential (client certificate, OIDC token, or service-account token) and no special privileges could:\n\n- assert `X-Remote-Group: system:masters` and act as cluster super-user, bypassing the entire kcp authorizer chain in every workspace on the shard;\n- forge `authorization.kcp.io/warrant` to assume an arbitrary user/group identity via kcp's delegated-identity mechanism;\n- forge `authentication.kcp.io/scopes` to escape the cluster-scoping that confines service-account and impersonated identities to their origin workspace;\n- satisfy per-workspace required-group gating by injecting the required group.\n\nThe result is arbitrary read/write/delete access to any tenant's resources, secrets, RBAC, APIExports/APIBindings, and LogicalClusters — a cross-workspace access break and authorizer bypass across the proxy's trust boundary.\n\n\n# Patches\nFixed in v0.31.4, 0.32.2. The front-proxy and the shard's in-process local-proxy now unconditionally remove any inbound `X-Remote-*` identity headers before stamping the authenticated identity, so no client-supplied value can be forwarded to a shard.\n\nOperators should upgrade to a patched release. No configuration changes are required after upgrading.\n\n# Workarounds\n\nThere is no complete workaround other than upgrading. Deployments that terminate client connections at an external proxy capable of stripping `X-Remote-User`, `X-Remote-Group`, and all `X-Remote-Extra-*` headers from inbound requests before they reach the kcp front-proxy can mitigate exposure in the interim.\n\nCredit to [5ud0er](https://github.com/5ud0er) / Tarmo Technologies.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/kcp-dev/kcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
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      }, {
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      } ]
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  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/kcp-dev/kcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0.32.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.32.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/security/advisories/GHSA-c8w2-fgvx-vhv4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/7437cdcfec8f927d1a9bf1b2dd1e075d038e27ca"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.31.4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.32.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-290", "CWE-302", "CWE-348" ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-18T17:15:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}