Vulnerabilities in pkg:golang/github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring

{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25",
  "modified" : "2026-04-24T20:28:49Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-16T20:46:48Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-32771" ],
  "summary" : "Monitoring is vulnerable to Archive Slip due to missing checks in sanitization",
  "details" : "The `sanitizeArchivePath` function in `pkg/extract/extract.go` (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the `strings.HasPrefix` check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the `extractor` CLI tool or the `extract.DumpOTelCollector` library function.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `pkg/extract/extract.go`, lines 248–254\n\n```go\nfunc sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {\n    v = filepath.Join(d, t)\n    if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) {   // ← missing trailing separator\n        return v, nil\n    }\n    return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filepath is tainted: %s\", t)\n}\n```\n\nThe function is called at line 219 inside `untar`, which is invoked by `copyFromPod` (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d))` does not append a trailing `/` to the directory prefix, causing a **directory name prefix collision**. If the destination is `/home/user/extract-output` and a tar entry is named `../extract-outputevil/pwned`, the joined path `/home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned` passes the prefix check — it starts with `/home/user/extract-output` — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. **Deploy the monitoring stack** with `ColdExtract: true`. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (`otel_traces`, `otel_metrics`, `otel_logs`) to the shared PVC.\n\n2. **Place the PoC tar on the PVC.** Any pod with write access to the `ReadWriteMany` PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a `poc-path-traversal.tar` into the `/data/collector` mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.\n\n3. **Run the extractor against the namespace:**\n\n   ```\n   extractor \\\n     --namespace monitoring \\\n     --pvc-name <signals-pvc-name> \\\n     --directory /home/user/extract-output\n   ```\n\n4. **Observe the bypass.** `untar` processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:\n\n   ```\n   // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\n   filepath.Join(\"/home/user/extract-output\", \"../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\")\n     => \"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\"\n\n   strings.HasPrefix(\"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\",\n                     \"/home/user/extract-output\")\n     => true   // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir\n   ```\n\n   Both malicious entries are written outside `/home/user/extract-output/`. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:\n\n- Overwriting `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` / `~/.profile` for RCE on next shell login\n- Appending to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistent SSH backdoor\n- Dropping a malicious entry into `~/.kube/config` to hijack cluster access\n- Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution\n\nThe attack surface is widened by the default `ReadWriteMany` PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the OTEL Collector itself.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.2.2"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/security/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32771"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/commit/269dba165aa42210352628c0db6756f3b8fd3c8a"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability#expandable-socPI9fFAJ-title"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-16T20:46:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-20T01:15:55Z"
  }
}