CVE-2026-98641: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-rmw7-mmh2-5m8g
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Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-98641 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-98641 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-98641
GHSA Identifier GHSA-rmw7-mmh2-5m8g
Severity N/A
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-98641

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-98641, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, arm64: set up the frame pointer for the exception callback A program acting as exception boundary saves all callee-saved registers, so build_prologue() takes the exception_cb path and never calls push_callee_regs(). That is the only place find_used_callee_regs() runs, and with it the only place ctx->fp_used is set, so the callback prologue does not emit the mov x25, sp that points BPF_REG_FP at the frame the callback runs on. x25 keeps whatever it held when bpf_throw() was called. If the throw came from a subprogram that uses its own BPF stack, that is the subprogram's frame pointer, and since the subprogram never returns it never restores x25 either. Stack accesses through BPF_REG_FP are rewritten to be stack pointer relative, so those still land in the callback's own frame. Materializing the register does not: a callback that passes the address of a local variable to a helper hands over an address in the dead subprogram's frame. That address is below the callback's stack pointer by then, and the helper's own call chain covers it, so the helper can write over its own return address. 0x1234 below is the value the helper was asked to store: pc : 0x1234 lr : 0x1234 Call trace: 0x1234 (P) bpf_test_run+0x188/0x3e0 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x47c/0x998 __sys_bpf+0xbdc/0xdd8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt Set ctx->fp_used on the exception callback path so that the existing code further down sets x25 from the stack pointer. The epilogue restores it from the main program's save area along with the other callee-saved registers, as it already does. x86 sets the frame pointer for the callback from the argument it is passed, and powerpc computes it from the stack pointer.

References

NVD — CVE-2026-98641 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98641
git.kernel.org/stable/c/b67b4c763f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08a
git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7cd5ebe13... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22
git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecdd770a9f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0f
git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef1fb82f12... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef1fb82f12186dd26153b14d9fbcf4ec98db81b3

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-98641?
CVE-2026-98641 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-98641?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-98641?
CVE-2026-98641 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-98641?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-rmw7-mmh2-5m8g",
  "modified" : "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-18T18:31:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-98641" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, arm64: set up the frame pointer for the exception callback\n\nA program acting as exception boundary saves all callee-saved registers,\nso build_prologue() takes the exception_cb path and never calls\npush_callee_regs(). That is the only place find_used_callee_regs() runs,\nand with it the only place ctx->fp_used is set, so the callback prologue\ndoes not emit the\n\n  mov x25, sp\n\nthat points BPF_REG_FP at the frame the callback runs on. x25 keeps\nwhatever it held when bpf_throw() was called. If the throw came from a\nsubprogram that uses its own BPF stack, that is the subprogram's frame\npointer, and since the subprogram never returns it never restores x25\neither.\n\nStack accesses through BPF_REG_FP are rewritten to be stack pointer\nrelative, so those still land in the callback's own frame. Materializing\nthe register does not: a callback that passes the address of a local\nvariable to a helper hands over an address in the dead subprogram's\nframe. That address is below the callback's stack pointer by then, and\nthe helper's own call chain covers it, so the helper can write over its\nown return address. 0x1234 below is the value the helper was asked to\nstore:\n\n  pc : 0x1234\n  lr : 0x1234\n  Call trace:\n   0x1234 (P)\n   bpf_test_run+0x188/0x3e0\n   bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x47c/0x998\n   __sys_bpf+0xbdc/0xdd8\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nSet ctx->fp_used on the exception callback path so that the existing code\nfurther down sets x25 from the stack pointer. The epilogue restores it\nfrom the main program's save area along with the other callee-saved\nregisters, as it already does. x86 sets the frame pointer for the\ncallback from the argument it is passed, and powerpc computes it from\nthe stack pointer.",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98641"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08a"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0f"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef1fb82f12186dd26153b14d9fbcf4ec98db81b3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-18T16:17:17Z"
  }
}