CVE-2026-98547: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-9w5q-r82v-2r6x
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-98547 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-98547 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-98547
GHSA Identifier GHSA-9w5q-r82v-2r6x
Severity N/A
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-98547

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-98547, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic: mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024); If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0 as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through (and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it). 0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps (div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047. The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1, so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and [1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this doesn't blow up for everyone. What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc(): p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...)); hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution: if (interval < hrtimer_resolution) interval = hrtimer_resolution; So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone. The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net: af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a 0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer conversion turned it into. (Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.) Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works): int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)); bind(fd, ...); int v = TPACKET_V3; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v)); struct tpacket_req3 req = { .tp_block_size = 0x10000000, .tp_block_nr = 1, .tp_frame_size = 2048, .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048, .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0, }; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)); Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a different fix, just say so and I'll respin.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-98547?
CVE-2026-98547 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-98547?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-98547?
CVE-2026-98547 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-98547?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-9w5q-r82v-2r6x",
  "modified" : "2026-10-18T18:31:53Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-18T18:31:53Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-98547" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()\n\nprb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:\n\n        mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);\n\nIf I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user\ncontrolled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0\nas int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through\n(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).\n0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps\n(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.\n\nThe condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1,\nso the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and\n[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster\nlinks divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this\ndoesn't blow up for everyone.\n\nWhat makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():\n\n        p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));\n        hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime,\n                      HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);\n\nA negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback\nunconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns\nthe negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:\n\n        if (interval < hrtimer_resolution)\n                interval = hrtimer_resolution;\n\nSo the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding\nsk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the\nsocket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.\n\nThe overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with\nTPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 (\"af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer\nimplementation.\"). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa (\"net:\naf_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation\", v6.18) was not\nas clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned\nshort retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a\n0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly\nas detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer\nconversion turned it into.\n\n(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path\nreturning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)\n\nReproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by\ndefault) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):\n\n        int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));\n        bind(fd, ...);\n        int v = TPACKET_V3;\n        setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));\n        struct tpacket_req3 req = {\n                .tp_block_size = 0x10000000,\n                .tp_block_nr = 1,\n                .tp_frame_size = 2048,\n                .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,\n                .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,\n        };\n        setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));\n\nCompute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the\nexisting validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a\ndifferent fix, just say so and I'll respin.",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98547"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02afd75649a4e001031ed82153a5c39312ec0737"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/218a944b9e035d4b47d59c69af6ca13319da15fb"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/297acc571d5813db76b147c745b91031d5f9c960"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56d82862a0a243ac14ba11b6d7b57ddc2d064b95"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6279211e7d2456ecd195d236c9ee5e5c6fa5a17a"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2bcc6a254d6f27823a56787668ae4ee8cdb6e71"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be1aacff399d519cc48d6b34354a54dd79041140"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb5b3838b9200dac04bfe33483db0ee8287456fb"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-18T16:17:06Z"
  }
}