CVE-2026-98273: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability
UNKNOWNCVE-2026-98273 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.
CVE-2026-98273 at a Glance
How to Fix CVE-2026-98273
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
mvn dependency:tree
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-98273, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:
mvn dependency:tree
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.
Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-98273?
Which Software versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-98273?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-98273?
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-98273?
Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-c2vj-jp5r-v8vf",
"modified" : "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"published" : "2026-10-06T09:31:33Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-98273" ],
"details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions\n\nWhen using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,\na crash can be triggered.\n\nThe eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()\nfunction:\n\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax\n<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi\n\nWhich triggers this crash:\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9\n #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P\n RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230\n\nNote that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is\nat the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL\ninstruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that\ncall instruction.\n\nThe root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a\nfunction, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.\n\nDuring single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,\nint3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes\nlong. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,\nso it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU\nreturns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at\nthe address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,\nstarting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely\ndifferent instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.\n\nFix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from\nthe instruction decoder when constructing the exception return\naddress, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.\n\n[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]",
"severity" : [ ],
"affected" : [ ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98273"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfc1af3d054aaabee08f1f77c441b3533b082869"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8c6a18c0552135cbf0c696c9019b2979d0862c9"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ ],
"severity" : null,
"github_reviewed" : false,
"github_reviewed_at" : null,
"nvd_published_at" : "2026-10-06T09:18:16Z"
}
}