CVE-2026-90264: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

UNKNOWN
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-wxhm-52wr-87x4
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Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-90264 is a security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-90264 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-90264
GHSA Identifier GHSA-wxhm-52wr-87x4
Severity N/A
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-90264

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-90264, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races [BUG] Syzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same range: BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[ 179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264! Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026 RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0 Call Trace: <TASK> cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0 fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00 run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20 writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0 btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0 do_writepages+0x338/0x560 filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300 btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0 btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790 do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0 vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990 __se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0 do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [CAUSE] Since commit ff66fe666233 ("btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback for append direct writes"), if the direct IO finished short, we will revert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be respected during the buffered fallback. Normally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during buffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents. But that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside the isize. Since we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not wait for any ordered extents. This means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the tree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the buffered write, causing the above crash. [FIX] Make the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize situation. And since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the extents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles no-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the "_if_need" suffix. The following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for btrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1m"` workload, all values are the average runtime in nano seconds. function runtime | before | after -----------------------------------+-------------+--------------- lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() | 58.2 | 183.0 btrfs_buffered_write() | 2115.6 | 2973.3 The overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty tiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still acceptable. An alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during iomap_end() where the isize revert is done. But that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct IO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the next append buffered IO can still hit the same problem. So here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least the code is slightly more streamline.

References

NVD — CVE-2026-90264 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90264
git.kernel.org/stable/c/58ce50b180... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58ce50b1802a446d3b26df1b9c58be1ab8913d0e
git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaac9b352f... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaac9b352f7f53f5d2f7e58e612d67d2a2bf7094
git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec78575dde... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec78575dde998c21be7e0cb2503b5620f34b6255

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-90264?
CVE-2026-90264 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-90264?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-90264?
CVE-2026-90264 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-90264?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-wxhm-52wr-87x4",
  "modified" : "2026-09-17T18:31:58Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-17T18:31:58Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-90264" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races\n\n[BUG]\nSyzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same\nrange:\n\n  BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[  179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists)\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264!\n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026\n  RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0\n  Call Trace:\n   <TASK>\n   cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0\n   fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00\n   run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0\n   btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20\n   writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0\n   btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0\n   do_writepages+0x338/0x560\n   filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300\n   btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0\n   btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30\n   btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790\n   do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0\n   vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990\n   __se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0\n   do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n   </TASK>\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\n[CAUSE]\nSince commit ff66fe666233 (\"btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback\nfor append direct writes\"), if the direct IO finished short, we will\nrevert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be\nrespected during the buffered fallback.\n\nNormally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during\nbuffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents.\n\nBut that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside\nthe isize.\nSince we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not\nwait for any ordered extents.\n\nThis means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the\ntree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the\nbuffered write, causing the above crash.\n\n[FIX]\nMake the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize\nsituation.\n\nAnd since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the\nextents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles\nno-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the \"_if_need\" suffix.\n\nThe following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for\nbtrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c \"pwrite 0 1m\"` workload,\nall values are the average runtime in nano seconds.\n\n      function runtime              |   before    |     after\n -----------------------------------+-------------+---------------\n lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need()  |     58.2    |    183.0\n btrfs_buffered_write()             |   2115.6    |   2973.3\n\nThe overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty\ntiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still\nacceptable.\n\nAn alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during\niomap_end() where the isize revert is done.\n\nBut that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct\nIO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the\nnext append buffered IO can still hit the same problem.\n\nSo here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least\nthe code is slightly more streamline.",
  "severity" : [ ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90264"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58ce50b1802a446d3b26df1b9c58be1ab8913d0e"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aaac9b352f7f53f5d2f7e58e612d67d2a2bf7094"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec78575dde998c21be7e0cb2503b5620f34b6255"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : null,
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-17T17:17:22Z"
  }
}