CVE-2026-80612: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

CRITICAL
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-gcxj-phfp-fv28
CVSS 9.8
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-80612 is a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-80612 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-80612
GHSA Identifier GHSA-gcxj-phfp-fv28
Severity CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.8
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.8

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-80612

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-80612, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation skb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives in the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot access the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata. However, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back over the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded) packet that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different ways, depending on the encap type: 1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull() and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom. 2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move(). That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header. skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before skb->data, warns and clears metadata: WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90 CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G O 6.18.21 #1 RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90 Call Trace: <IRQ> bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0 bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3 run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360 bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0 lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0 ip_output+0x63/0x100 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0 process_backlog+0x9c/0x150 __napi_poll+0x2b/0x190 net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0 handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270 do_softirq+0x3f/0x60 </IRQ> That is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that carries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT redirect modes: LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT ip6_rcv_finish dst_input lwtunnel_input LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT ip6_rcv_finish dst_input ip6_forward ip6_forward_finish dst_output lwtunnel_output LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT ip6_rcv_finish dst_input ip6_forward ip6_forward_finish dst_output ip6_output ip6_finish_output ip6_finish_output2 lwtunnel_xmit Every encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the metadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This single chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes: - lwtunnel_input(): seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local - lwtunnel_output(): ioam6 - lwtunnel_xmit(): mpls, LWT BPF xmit Alternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook. That would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become inaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the hook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path).

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-80612?
CVE-2026-80612 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-80612?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-80612?
CVE-2026-80612 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-80612?
CVE-2026-80612 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-80612?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-gcxj-phfp-fv28",
  "modified" : "2026-08-29T09:30:25Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-28T09:31:46Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-80612" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: lwtunnel: Drop skb metadata before LWT encapsulation\n\nskb metadata is meant for passing information between XDP and TC. It lives\nin the skb headroom, immediately before skb->data. LWT programs cannot\naccess the __sk_buff->data_meta pseudo-pointer to metadata.\n\nHowever, LWT encapsulation prepends outer headers, moving skb->data back\nover the headroom where the metadata sits. On an RX-originated (forwarded)\npacket that still carries XDP metadata this goes wrong in two different\nways, depending on the encap type:\n\n1. Non-BPF LWT encaps (mpls, seg6, ioam6 ...) call skb_push()/skb_pull()\n   and silently overwrite the metadata that sits in the headroom.\n\n2) BPF LWT xmit calls bpf_skb_change_head(), which uses skb_data_move().\n   That helper expects metadata immediately before skb->data. But since\n   the IP output path runs LWT xmit before neighbour output has built\n   the outgoing L2 header, for forwarded packets skb->data points at the\n   L3 header while skb_mac_header() still points at the old L2 header.\n   skb_data_move() sees metadata ending at skb_mac_header(), not before\n   skb->data, warns and clears metadata:\n\n  WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 454557 at include/linux/skbuff.h:4609 skb_data_move+0x47/0x90\n  CPU: 21 UID: 0 PID: 454557 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Tainted: G           O        6.18.21 #1\n  RIP: 0010:skb_data_move+0x47/0x90\n  Call Trace:\n   <IRQ>\n   bpf_skb_change_head+0xe6/0x1a0\n   bpf_prog_...+0x213/0x2e3\n   run_lwt_bpf.isra.0+0x1d3/0x360\n   bpf_xmit+0x46/0xe0\n   lwtunnel_xmit+0xa1/0xf0\n   ip_finish_output2+0x1e7/0x5e0\n   ip_output+0x63/0x100\n   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0\n   process_backlog+0x9c/0x150\n   __napi_poll+0x2b/0x190\n   net_rx_action+0x40b/0x7f0\n   handle_softirqs+0xd2/0x270\n   do_softirq+0x3f/0x60\n   </IRQ>\n\nThat is what happens, as for how to fix it - a received packet that\ncarries metadata can reach an encap through any of the three LWT\nredirect modes:\n\n  LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT\n   ip6_rcv_finish\n     dst_input\n       lwtunnel_input\n\n  LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT\n   ip6_rcv_finish\n     dst_input\n       ip6_forward\n         ip6_forward_finish\n           dst_output\n             lwtunnel_output\n\n  LWTUNNEL_STATE_XMIT_REDIRECT\n   ip6_rcv_finish\n     dst_input\n       ip6_forward\n         ip6_forward_finish\n           dst_output\n             ip6_output\n               ip6_finish_output\n                 ip6_finish_output2\n                   lwtunnel_xmit\n\nEvery encap funnels through the three LWT dispatch helpers, so drop the\nmetadata there, right before handing the skb to the encap op. This\nsingle chokepoint covers all encap types and all three redirect modes:\n\n  - lwtunnel_input():  seg6, rpl, ila, seg6_local\n  - lwtunnel_output(): ioam6\n  - lwtunnel_xmit():   mpls, LWT BPF xmit\n\nAlternatively, we could clear the metadata right after TC ingress hook.\nThat would require a compromise, however. Metadata would become\ninaccessible from TC egress (in setups where it actually reaches the\nhook it tact, that is without any L2 tunnels on path).",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80612"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19eec11f3ab5dd29ba58f5f209c24e946c95ef12"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c00320b0e355c4bf0ae4743a53b4180fea237546"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "CRITICAL",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-28T08:16:45Z"
  }
}