CVE-2026-76894: ckan-mcp-server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

LOW
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-vqff-r82h-9crc
CVSS 3.1
CWE-940 CWE-345
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-76894 is a LOW (CVSS 3.1) remote code execution vulnerability (CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel) affecting ckan-mcp-server libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves datastore table ui resource does not validate postmessage origin (in) and posts to targetorigin "*" (out). Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 0.4.112.

CVE-2026-76894 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-76894
GHSA Identifier GHSA-vqff-r82h-9crc
Severity LOW
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 3.1
CWE Classification CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel
Affected Product ckan-mcp-server
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 3.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity High (AC:H)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction Required (UI:R)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-76894

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected ckan-mcp-server dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server fixed: 0.4.112
npm install @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server@0.4.112
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-76894, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of ckan-mcp-server in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 0.4.112), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel, where the product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin. In ckan-mcp-server, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The MCP Apps UI resource (an interactive DataStore table rendered in the host's webview/iframe) communicates with its parent via `postMessage`. Its inbound `message` listener performs no `event.origin` validation, and its outbound messages are sent with target origin `'*'`. Any window/frame able to reach the document can inject data into the table and interfere with the MCP UI handshake, and the UI's own JSON-RPC messages are broadcast without an origin restriction. ## Affected code `src/resources/datastore-table-ui.ts` (inline HTML): ```js window.addEventListener('message', function (event) { var msg = event.data; // no check of event.origin if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return; if (msg.id !== undefined && _pending[msg.id]) { ... resolve/reject pending MCP request ... } ... if (data && (data.fields || data.records)) initTable(data); // renders attacker-supplied data }); // outbound: window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: id, method: method, params: params || {} }, '*'); mcpNot: window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc:'2.0', method:method, params:params||{} }, '*'); ``` There is no allowlist of accepted origins for inbound messages and no fixed target origin for outbound messages. ## Impact - **Content spoofing.** A frame that can `postMessage` to the UI can supply arbitrary `fields`/`records`, causing the table to render fabricated rows and links (e.g. a phishing `__link_url`) that appear to come from the queried portal. (Values are HTML-escaped, so this is display spoofing, not script injection — no XSS.) - **Handshake/UX interference.** Because inbound messages matching a pending `id` resolve/reject the UI's MCP requests, an attacker frame can spoof responses to the `ui/initialize` handshake or otherwise disrupt the panel. - **Outbound leakage.** Posting to `'*'` means the UI's JSON-RPC messages are delivered to whatever the parent origin is; if the resource is ever embedded by a context other than the trusted host, those messages leak to it. Exploitability depends on the host embedding model (in a correct MCP Apps host the parent is the trusted host, which limits who can message the frame), so this is a hardening / defense-in-depth issue rather than a directly remotely-triggerable one — hence Low. ## Proof of concept - `poc/verify-no-origin-check.mjs` — static confirmation that the listener has no origin check and outbound uses `'*'`: ``` [x] validates event.origin : NO [x] outgoing postMessage targetOrigin : '*' (any) RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` - `poc/parent-spoof-poc.html` — a page that embeds the UI and injects fabricated rows cross-origin with no handshake; the UI renders them. ## Remediation - Validate `event.origin` against the expected host origin on every inbound message; drop messages from other origins. - Send outbound `postMessage` with an explicit target origin (the host origin established at initialize time) instead of `'*'`. - Optionally, bind to a nonce/channel established during `ui/initialize` so only the negotiated host can drive the panel.

CVE-2026-76894 Affected ckan-mcp-server Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
0.4.112
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server
npm
< 0.4.112
0.4.112

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-76894?
CVE-2026-76894 is a security vulnerability in ckan-mcp-server involving DataStore Table UI resource does not validate postMessage origin (in) and posts to targetOrigin "*" (out) under CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel.
Which ckan-mcp-server versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 0.4.112 across affected packages: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server.
What version fixes CVE-2026-76894?
Upgrading to 0.4.112 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server affected?
Yes, @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server is affected in releases prior to 0.4.112. Upgrade your dependency to 0.4.112 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-76894?
CVE-2026-76894 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.1 (LOW) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-76894?
CVE-2026-76894 is classified under CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel (The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-76894?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-vqff-r82h-9crc",
  "modified" : "2026-10-16T19:23:48Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-16T19:23:48Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-76894" ],
  "summary" : "ckan-mcp-server: DataStore Table UI resource does not validate postMessage origin (in) and posts to targetOrigin \"*\" (out)",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe MCP Apps UI resource (an interactive DataStore table rendered in the host's webview/iframe) communicates with its parent via `postMessage`. Its inbound `message` listener performs no `event.origin` validation, and its outbound messages are sent with target origin `'*'`. Any window/frame able to reach the document can inject data into the table and interfere with the MCP UI handshake, and the UI's own JSON-RPC messages are broadcast without an origin restriction.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`src/resources/datastore-table-ui.ts` (inline HTML):\n\n```js\nwindow.addEventListener('message', function (event) {\n  var msg = event.data;                    // no check of event.origin\n  if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return;\n  if (msg.id !== undefined && _pending[msg.id]) { ... resolve/reject pending MCP request ... }\n  ...\n  if (data && (data.fields || data.records)) initTable(data);   // renders attacker-supplied data\n});\n\n// outbound:\nwindow.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: id, method: method, params: params || {} }, '*');\nmcpNot: window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc:'2.0', method:method, params:params||{} }, '*');\n```\n\nThere is no allowlist of accepted origins for inbound messages and no fixed target origin for outbound messages.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Content spoofing.** A frame that can `postMessage` to the UI can supply\n  arbitrary `fields`/`records`, causing the table to render fabricated rows and\n  links (e.g. a phishing `__link_url`) that appear to come from the queried\n  portal. (Values are HTML-escaped, so this is display spoofing, not script\n  injection — no XSS.)\n- **Handshake/UX interference.** Because inbound messages matching a pending `id`\n  resolve/reject the UI's MCP requests, an attacker frame can spoof responses to\n  the `ui/initialize` handshake or otherwise disrupt the panel.\n- **Outbound leakage.** Posting to `'*'` means the UI's JSON-RPC messages are\n  delivered to whatever the parent origin is; if the resource is ever embedded by\n  a context other than the trusted host, those messages leak to it.\n\nExploitability depends on the host embedding model (in a correct MCP Apps host the\nparent is the trusted host, which limits who can message the frame), so this is a\nhardening / defense-in-depth issue rather than a directly remotely-triggerable\none — hence Low.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n- `poc/verify-no-origin-check.mjs` — static confirmation that the listener has no\n  origin check and outbound uses `'*'`:\n\n  ```\n  [x] validates event.origin             : NO\n  [x] outgoing postMessage targetOrigin  : '*' (any)\n  RESULT: VULNERABLE\n  ```\n\n- `poc/parent-spoof-poc.html` — a page that embeds the UI and injects fabricated\n  rows cross-origin with no handshake; the UI renders them.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Validate `event.origin` against the expected host origin on every inbound\n  message; drop messages from other origins.\n- Send outbound `postMessage` with an explicit target origin (the host origin\n  established at initialize time) instead of `'*'`.\n- Optionally, bind to a nonce/channel established during `ui/initialize` so only\n  the negotiated host can drive the panel.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "0.4.112"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ondata/ckan-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vqff-r82h-9crc"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/ondata/ckan-mcp-server"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-345", "CWE-940" ],
    "severity" : "LOW",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-16T19:23:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}