CVE-2026-75837: Grav Missing Admin.super Guard On Core Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx
CVSS 9.1
CWE-269 CWE-862
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-75837 is a HIGH (CVSS 9.1) missing admin.super guard on core vulnerability (CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management) affecting Grav libraries in the Packagist ecosystem. The issue involves missing admin.super guard on core group blueprint access field allows admin.users operator to escalate to super-admin. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.0.14.

CVE-2026-75837 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-75837
GHSA Identifier GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 9.1
CWE Classification CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
Affected Product Grav
Package Ecosystem Packagist
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 9.1

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required High (PR:H)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-75837

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Grav dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

getgrav/grav fixed: 2.0.14
Upgrade getgrav/grav to 2.0.14
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your application is affected by CVE-2026-75837, inspect your project dependencies for Grav:

inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Grav in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.0.14), your application is affected.

Note: Verify declared build manifests and deployed runtime container environments.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management, where the product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor. In Grav, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The core Flex group blueprint `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (access field, lines 48-55) omits the `security@: admin.super` field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (`account.yaml:131/138/150`, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding `admin.users.update` can therefore save a group whose `access` map contains `admin.super: true`, which `UserGroupObject::authorize` then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories. ## Root Cause The CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account `access`/`groups` fields with a blueprint-level `security@: admin.super` gate, which `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662`) uses to mark a field `validate.ignore=true` for non-super users so `BlueprintSchema::filterArray()` (`BlueprintSchema.php:263-311`) drops it. The functionally-identical group `access` field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55` with `check_authorize: false` and NO `security@` guard. `check_authorize` has ZERO PHP enforcement (`grep -rn check_authorize` across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so `security@` is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks `security@`, `dynamicSecurity` never flags it, `filterArray` retains it, and `Validation::filterArray` (`type: array, value_type: bool`) passes the nested `admin.super:true` leaf through. The core save path (`FlexObject::update()` then `Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683` `$blueprint->filter($data,true,true)` then `save()`) persists it to `user://config/groups.yaml`. ## Impact A delegated `admin.users` operator (strictly below `admin.super`) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group's ACL is itself a full escalation primitive. ## Proof of Concept As a non-super `admin.users` operator who is a member of group `ops`: ``` POST /admin/accounts/groups/ops (or groups.json task:save) data[access][admin][super]=1 ``` `user/config/groups.yaml` gains `ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }`, so the operator is super-admin on the next request. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: authenticated delegated admin (`admin.users.update`, no `admin.super`) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), body `access[admin][super]=true`. Guard: `FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedAction` to `admin.users.update`. Bypass proof: `user-groups.yaml` exposes groups at `admin.users:crudl`; operator legitimately holds update. 2. Check (field guard): `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity` marks `validate.ignore` only for `security@` fields. Guard: none on group access (no `security@`). Bypass proof: `group.yaml:48-55` has no `security@`; `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty. 3. Filter: `BlueprintSchema::filterArray` retains the non-ignored field; `Validation::filterArray` (`value_type: bool`) passes `admin.super:true` through. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved. 4. Sink (persist): `FlexObject::update` then `filter` then `save` writes to `user://config/groups.yaml`. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering. 5. Impact: any member request triggers `UserGroupObject::authorize('admin.super')` (`.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75`) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE. ## Bypass Evidence - `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55`: access block with `check_authorize: false`, no `security@` (confirmed live on tag 2.0.12). - `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression). - `git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (no post-release fix). - `grep -rn check_authorize` (whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP). - `grep -rn "typePermissions|filterPermissions" system/src/Grav/Common/Data` returns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys). - Guard asymmetry: `account.yaml:131/138/150` carry `security@: admin.super`; `group.yaml` carries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm's own text confirms the blueprint `security@` gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys. ## Affected Versions `<= 2.0.12` (latest release; the guard never existed on `group.yaml`, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core `getgrav/grav`; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core. ## Suggested Fix Add `security@: admin.super` to the `access` field in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (mirroring `account.yaml`), and/or enforce a super-only strip on group ACL saves in core so all callers are covered. --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use

CVE-2026-75837 Affected Grav Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.0.14
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
getgrav/grav
Packagist
< 2.0.14
2.0.14

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-75837?
CVE-2026-75837 is a security vulnerability in Grav involving Missing admin.super guard on core group blueprint access field allows admin.users operator to escalate to super-admin under CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management.
Which Grav versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.0.14 across affected packages: getgrav/grav.
What version fixes CVE-2026-75837?
Upgrading to 2.0.14 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is getgrav/grav affected?
Yes, getgrav/grav is affected in releases prior to 2.0.14. Upgrade your dependency to 2.0.14 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-75837?
CVE-2026-75837 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-75837?
CVE-2026-75837 is classified under CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management (The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.).
How can I check Packagist dependencies for CVE-2026-75837?
Run the dependency tree command: 'inspect dependencies for getgrav/grav'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx",
  "modified" : "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-75837" ],
  "summary" : "Grav: Missing admin.super guard on core group blueprint access field allows admin.users operator to escalate to super-admin",
  "details" : "## Summary\nThe core Flex group blueprint `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (access field, lines 48-55) omits the `security@: admin.super` field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (`account.yaml:131/138/150`, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding `admin.users.update` can therefore save a group whose `access` map contains `admin.super: true`, which `UserGroupObject::authorize` then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories.\n\n## Root Cause\nThe CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account `access`/`groups` fields with a blueprint-level `security@: admin.super` gate, which `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662`) uses to mark a field `validate.ignore=true` for non-super users so `BlueprintSchema::filterArray()` (`BlueprintSchema.php:263-311`) drops it. The functionally-identical group `access` field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55` with `check_authorize: false` and NO `security@` guard. `check_authorize` has ZERO PHP enforcement (`grep -rn check_authorize` across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so `security@` is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks `security@`, `dynamicSecurity` never flags it, `filterArray` retains it, and `Validation::filterArray` (`type: array, value_type: bool`) passes the nested `admin.super:true` leaf through. The core save path (`FlexObject::update()` then `Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683` `$blueprint->filter($data,true,true)` then `save()`) persists it to `user://config/groups.yaml`.\n\n## Impact\nA delegated `admin.users` operator (strictly below `admin.super`) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group's ACL is itself a full escalation primitive.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nAs a non-super `admin.users` operator who is a member of group `ops`:\n```\nPOST /admin/accounts/groups/ops   (or groups.json task:save)\ndata[access][admin][super]=1\n```\n`user/config/groups.yaml` gains `ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }`, so the operator is super-admin on the next request.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: authenticated delegated admin (`admin.users.update`, no `admin.super`) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), body `access[admin][super]=true`. Guard: `FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedAction` to `admin.users.update`. Bypass proof: `user-groups.yaml` exposes groups at `admin.users:crudl`; operator legitimately holds update.\n2. Check (field guard): `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity` marks `validate.ignore` only for `security@` fields. Guard: none on group access (no `security@`). Bypass proof: `group.yaml:48-55` has no `security@`; `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty.\n3. Filter: `BlueprintSchema::filterArray` retains the non-ignored field; `Validation::filterArray` (`value_type: bool`) passes `admin.super:true` through. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved.\n4. Sink (persist): `FlexObject::update` then `filter` then `save` writes to `user://config/groups.yaml`. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering.\n5. Impact: any member request triggers `UserGroupObject::authorize('admin.super')` (`.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75`) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55`: access block with `check_authorize: false`, no `security@` (confirmed live on tag 2.0.12).\n- `git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression).\n- `git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (no post-release fix).\n- `grep -rn check_authorize` (whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP).\n- `grep -rn \"typePermissions|filterPermissions\" system/src/Grav/Common/Data` returns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys).\n- Guard asymmetry: `account.yaml:131/138/150` carry `security@: admin.super`; `group.yaml` carries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm's own text confirms the blueprint `security@` gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`<= 2.0.12` (latest release; the guard never existed on `group.yaml`, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core `getgrav/grav`; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd `security@: admin.super` to the `access` field in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (mirroring `account.yaml`), and/or enforce a super-only strip on group ACL saves in core so all callers are covered.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  }, {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "Packagist",
      "name" : "getgrav/grav"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.0.14"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75837"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-privilege-escalation-via-group-access-field"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-269", "CWE-862" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}