CVE-2026-74430: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-px3f-ghhp-7f3w
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CVSS 7.5
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-74430 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.5) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-74430 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-74430
GHSA Identifier GHSA-px3f-ghhp-7f3w
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.5
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.5

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality None (C:N)
Integrity None (I:N)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-74430

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release: 

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-74430, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means: (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may still happen). The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the first packet is transmitted. RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the reply to be received. (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong state. Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this. (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition. Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL packet[1].

References

NVD — CVE-2026-74430 NVD
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74430
git.kernel.org/stable/c/523cb58567... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/523cb585672ae681b2d3b0d620aec5313774e2e2
git.kernel.org/stable/c/8db6a2c95e... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8db6a2c95e36938076b37466ce36774526a5c8c3
git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b6ce59480... WEB
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b6ce594808580b2a19e6e1aa459ef56c0153ac1

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-74430?
CVE-2026-74430 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-74430?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-74430?
CVE-2026-74430 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-74430?
CVE-2026-74430 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-74430?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
View Raw JSON 
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  "id" : "GHSA-px3f-ghhp-7f3w",
  "modified" : "2026-08-17T06:33:44Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-15T06:32:33Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-74430" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling\n\nrxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the\ncall is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.\nA forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in\nRXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.\n\nIn that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so\nrxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a\nnull-pointer dereference.\n\nFix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:\n\n (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates\n     that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as\n     yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything\n     has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the\n     stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may\n     still happen).\n\n     The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned\n     a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the\n     first packet is transmitted.\n\n     RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate\n     that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the\n     reply to be received.\n\n (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks\n     that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx\n     buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than\n     AWAIT_REPLY.  ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong\n     state.\n\n     Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check\n     to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this.\n\n (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than\n     call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number\n     transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition.\n\nThanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL\npacket[1].",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
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    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8db6a2c95e36938076b37466ce36774526a5c8c3"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b6ce594808580b2a19e6e1aa459ef56c0153ac1"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-15T06:22:45Z"
  }
}