CVE-2026-72343: Software Security Vulnerability Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-4xw9-57x7-f4g8
CVSS 8.4
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-72343 is a HIGH (CVSS 8.4) security vulnerability vulnerability (General Security Weakness) affecting Software libraries in the Maven ecosystem. Remediation is available in the latest vendor maintenance releases.

CVE-2026-72343 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-72343
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4xw9-57x7-f4g8
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 8.4
CWE Classification General Security Weakness
Affected Product Software
Package Ecosystem Maven
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 8.4

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Attack Vector Local (AV:L)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Unchanged (S:U)
Confidentiality High (C:H)
Integrity High (I:H)
Availability High (A:H)

How to Fix CVE-2026-72343

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Software dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

mvn dependency:tree

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Java application is affected by CVE-2026-72343, inspect your build dependencies using the Maven Dependency Plugin:

mvn dependency:tree

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Software in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than the patched release), your application is affected.

Note: The mvn dependency:tree command inspects the resolved dependency graph declared in your project's POM files; it does not perform automated security scanning or inspect runtime dynamic classpaths. Always verify runtime container classpaths and shaded JARs.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under General Security Weakness. In Software, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(), before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero, because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(), which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel(). mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10. Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch: - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create(). - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged. The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based on the reduced max_nch. Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns early without (re)creating the agent. Clear priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left from a previous enable/disable cycle. This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating entries up to stats_nch on demand.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-72343?
CVE-2026-72343 is a security vulnerability in Software classified as a security vulnerability vulnerability under General Security Weakness.
Which Software versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to current release patches.
What version fixes CVE-2026-72343?
Upgrading to current release patches (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-72343?
CVE-2026-72343 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.4 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-72343?
CVE-2026-72343 is classified under General Security Weakness.
How can I check Maven dependencies for CVE-2026-72343?
Run the dependency tree command: 'mvn dependency:tree'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4xw9-57x7-f4g8",
  "modified" : "2026-08-17T06:33:24Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-15T06:32:21Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-72343" ],
  "details" : "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),\nbefore mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero,\nbecause it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),\nwhich is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().\n\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and\nkvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather\nthan NULL. The \"if (!buf)\" guard does not catch this, and\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes \"successfully\" with\npriv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.\n\nOnce channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor\nenables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes\nbuf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls\nmemset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.\n\nAllocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in\nmlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:\n\n  - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that\n    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and\n    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().\n  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on\n    stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire\n    format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled\n    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.\n\nThe max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where\nmlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a\ndetach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev\ndoes not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when\nthe netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute\nbuf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based\non the reduced max_nch.\n\nAllocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in\nmlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns\nearly without (re)creating the agent. Clear\npriv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after\nfreeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a\nsubsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left\nfrom a previous enable/disable cycle.\n\nThis mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of\nsize max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating\nentries up to stats_nch on demand.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72343"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : false,
    "github_reviewed_at" : null,
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-08-15T06:22:07Z"
  }
}