CVE-2026-61647: @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp Path Traversal Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq
CWE-73 CWE-22
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-61647 is a HIGH path traversal vulnerability (CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path) affecting @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp libraries in the npm ecosystem. The issue involves @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 2.0.3.

CVE-2026-61647 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-61647
GHSA Identifier GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score N/A
CWE Classification CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Affected Product @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp
Package Ecosystem npm
Published Date
Last Updated

How to Fix CVE-2026-61647

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp fixed: 2.0.3
npm install @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp@2.0.3
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

npm ls @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Node.js application is affected by CVE-2026-61647, inspect your project dependencies using npm:

npm ls @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 2.0.3), your application is affected.

Note: The npm ls @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp command inspects dependencies declared in your package.json and lockfile; it does not perform automated runtime dynamic scanning.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path, where the product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations. In @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary The `vault_batch` MCP tool (and the equivalent `POST /batch-to-vault` HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied `vault_dir` path that was passed directly to `path.resolve()` + `fs.mkdir()` with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write `.md` / `.json` answer files anywhere the server process can write. The `slug_prefix` parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing `/` or `..` could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component. ## Impact File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation. The vulnerability exists from **v1.6.0** (when the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the `batch_to_vault` MCP tool) through **v2.0.2**. ## Patch Fixed in **v2.0.3**: - **Opt-in containment via `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` env var.** When set, `vault_dir` is resolved relative to that root and `realpath`-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or `..` segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error. - **`slug_prefix` is always sanitized.** Path separators (`/`, `\`), `..` sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is set. - 15 unit tests in `src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.ts` cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, `..` traversal, NUL/separator stripping). ## Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade - Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory. - Do not expose the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint beyond localhost. - If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any `vault_dir` arguments before forwarding them to the MCP. ## Configuration requirement after upgrade (important) v2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is **unset**, to keep existing single-user local setups working. **To enable containment, set `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` in the server environment** to a directory that should bound all vault writes. ## Credit Reported by @mcfly-zzh — thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.

CVE-2026-61647 Affected @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
2.0.3
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp
npm
≥ 1.6.0
< 2.0.3
2.0.3

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-61647?
CVE-2026-61647 is a security vulnerability in @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp involving @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
Which @roomi fields/notebooklm mcp versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 2.0.3 across affected packages: @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp.
What version fixes CVE-2026-61647?
Upgrading to 2.0.3 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp affected?
Yes, @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp is affected in releases prior to 2.0.3. Upgrade your dependency to 2.0.3 or later.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-61647?
CVE-2026-61647 is classified under CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path (The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.).
How can I check npm dependencies for CVE-2026-61647?
Run the dependency tree command: 'npm ls @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq",
  "modified" : "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
  "published" : "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-61647" ],
  "summary" : "@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nThe `vault_batch` MCP tool (and the equivalent `POST /batch-to-vault` HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied `vault_dir` path that was passed directly to `path.resolve()` + `fs.mkdir()` with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write `.md` / `.json` answer files anywhere the server process can write.\n\nThe `slug_prefix` parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing `/` or `..` could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.\n\n## Impact\n\nFile write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.\n\nThe vulnerability exists from **v1.6.0** (when the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the `batch_to_vault` MCP tool) through **v2.0.2**.\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in **v2.0.3**:\n\n- **Opt-in containment via `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` env var.** When set, `vault_dir` is resolved relative to that root and `realpath`-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or `..` segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error.\n- **`slug_prefix` is always sanitized.** Path separators (`/`, `\\`), `..` sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is set.\n- 15 unit tests in `src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.ts` cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, `..` traversal, NUL/separator stripping).\n\n## Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade\n\n- Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory.\n- Do not expose the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint beyond localhost.\n- If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any `vault_dir` arguments before forwarding them to the MCP.\n\n## Configuration requirement after upgrade (important)\n\nv2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is **unset**, to keep existing single-user local setups working. **To enable containment, set `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` in the server environment** to a directory that should bound all vault writes.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @mcfly-zzh — thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V4",
    "score" : "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "npm",
      "name" : "@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "1.6.0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "2.0.3"
      } ]
    } ]
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61647"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/issues/15"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/commit/13828d9ff3933839ce14c1797d3b20a6bb7694a6"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/releases/tag/v2.0.3"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-22", "CWE-73" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-09-21T21:17:07Z"
  }
}