CVE-2026-60091: PraisonAI Jobs API Is Unauthenticated By Vulnerability

HIGH
Advisory Identifier: GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg
CVSS 7.2
CWE-367 CWE-306 CWE-918 CWE-200
Published
Advisory Summary

CVE-2026-60091 is a HIGH (CVSS 7.2) jobs api is unauthenticated by vulnerability (CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) affecting PraisonAI libraries in the PyPI ecosystem. The issue involves jobs api is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook ssrf. Remediation is available by upgrading affected packages to version 4.6.78.

CVE-2026-60091 at a Glance

CVE Identifier CVE-2026-60091
GHSA Identifier GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg
Severity HIGH
CVSS v3.1 Base Score 7.2
CWE Classification CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affected Product PraisonAI
Package Ecosystem PyPI
Published Date
Last Updated

Security Impact

CVSS: 7.2

The security impact metrics below are parsed directly from the CVSS v3.1 vector string (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Attack Vector Network (AV:N)
Attack Complexity Low (AC:L)
Privileges Required None (PR:N)
User Interaction None (UI:N)
Scope Changed (S:C)
Confidentiality Low (C:L)
Integrity Low (I:L)
Availability None (A:N)

How to Fix CVE-2026-60091

To remediate this vulnerability, upgrade all affected PraisonAI dependencies to a patched release. Both direct and transitive dependencies should be checked, as frameworks or security libraries may pull in vulnerable versions transitively.

praisonai fixed: 4.6.78
pip install praisonai>=4.6.78
Verify Direct and Transitive Dependencies

Run the following command in your project directory to verify that all resolved dependencies use the patched release:

pip show praisonai

How to Check if You Are Affected

To determine whether your Python environment is affected by CVE-2026-60091, inspect your installed packages using pip:

pip show praisonai

Analyze the terminal output to locate any version of PraisonAI in your dependency tree. If any resolved version matches the vulnerable ranges listed in the table below (for example, versions earlier than 4.6.78), your application is affected.

Note: The pip show praisonai command checks currently installed packages in your active Python environment.

Technical Details

Vulnerability Mechanism & Technical Analysis

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition, where the product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. In PraisonAI, software state validation or input boundaries are circumvented during processing. Review the official source advisory statement below for specific affected components, classes, and reproduction details.

Source Advisory Statement

## Summary PraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware **only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set**, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/runs` accepts an attacker-controlled `webhook_url`; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via `httpx`. The `webhook_url` has an SSRF validator (`gethostbyname` + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while `httpx` re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an **unauthenticated, blind** SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium. ## Details ### Affected component - Package: `praisonai` 4.6.63. Files: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`, `jobs/router.py`, `jobs/executor.py`, `jobs/models.py`. ### Vulnerable code / root cause Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py` Function: `create_app` Snippet: ```python jobs_api_key = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY") # ... if jobs_api_key: app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware) # auth ONLY when env var is set ``` Issue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is `127.0.0.1`. Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py` Function: `submit_job` Snippet: ```python @router.post("", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202) async def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...): # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...) await executor.submit(job) ``` Issue: attacker-controlled `webhook_url` flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint. Path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py` (validator) and `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py` (sink) Function: `validate_webhook_url` → `_send_webhook` Snippet: ```python # models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time) ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...: raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address") # executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning) async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client: response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...) ``` Issue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the `httpx.post` connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services. ### Attack flow 1. Operator runs the Jobs API without `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` (default → unauth). 2. Attacker `POST /api/v1/runs` with `webhook_url` = a rebinding domain. 3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion `httpx.post` re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal. ### Why existing protection is bypassed Auth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The `webhook_url` validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.) ### Security boundary Unauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind `127.0.0.1` limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback. ## Proof of Concept ### Environment Real Jobs API (`python -m praisonai.jobs.server`, no API key) in a local runtime (`127.0.0.1:18085`), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\` (`docker-compose.jobs.yml`). ### Steps to reproduce 1. `PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth`: `POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello"}` → `202` (no auth). 2. `PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind`: `POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello","webhook_url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}` → `202`. ### Expected result Unauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing. ## Impact Unauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook. ## Suggested remediation - Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway. - For `webhook_url`: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.

CVE-2026-60091 Affected PraisonAI Versions

1 component(s)
Fixed Versions:
4.6.78
Product / Package Ecosystem Affected Versions Fixed Version
praisonai
PyPI
< 4.6.78
4.6.78

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-60091?
CVE-2026-60091 is a security vulnerability in PraisonAI involving Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
Which PraisonAI versions are affected?
Affected versions include releases prior to 4.6.78 across affected packages: praisonai.
What version fixes CVE-2026-60091?
Upgrading to 4.6.78 (or the latest patched release for your respective branch) resolves the vulnerability.
Is praisonai affected?
Yes, praisonai is affected in releases prior to 4.6.78. Upgrade your dependency to 4.6.78 or later.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-60091?
CVE-2026-60091 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.2 (HIGH) with vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.
What CWE is associated with CVE-2026-60091?
CVE-2026-60091 is classified under CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition (The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.).
How can I check PyPI dependencies for CVE-2026-60091?
Run the dependency tree command: 'pip show praisonai'. This command lists direct and transitive dependencies in your build configuration so you can verify if a vulnerable version is resolved.
Machine-readable OSV JSON OSV v1.5 Schema
Normalized schema output
{
  "schema_version" : "1.4.0",
  "id" : "GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg",
  "modified" : "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
  "published" : "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
  "aliases" : [ "CVE-2026-60091" ],
  "summary" : "PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF",
  "details" : "## Summary\n\nPraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware **only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set**, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/runs` accepts an attacker-controlled `webhook_url`; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via `httpx`. The `webhook_url` has an SSRF validator (`gethostbyname` + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while `httpx` re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an **unauthenticated, blind** SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.\n\n## Details\n\n### Affected component\n- Package: `praisonai` 4.6.63. Files: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`, `jobs/router.py`, `jobs/executor.py`, `jobs/models.py`.\n\n### Vulnerable code / root cause\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`\n\nFunction:\n`create_app`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\njobs_api_key = os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY\")\n# ...\nif jobs_api_key:\n    app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware)   # auth ONLY when env var is set\n```\nIssue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is `127.0.0.1`.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py`\n\nFunction:\n`submit_job`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n@router.post(\"\", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202)\nasync def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...):\n    # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled\n    job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...)\n    await executor.submit(job)\n```\nIssue: attacker-controlled `webhook_url` flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py` (validator) and `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py` (sink)\n\nFunction:\n`validate_webhook_url` → `_send_webhook`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n# models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time)\nip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\nif ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...:\n    raise ValueError(\"Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address\")\n\n# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning)\nasync with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:\n    response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...)\n```\nIssue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the `httpx.post` connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.\n\n### Attack flow\n1. Operator runs the Jobs API without `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` (default → unauth).\n2. Attacker `POST /api/v1/runs` with `webhook_url` = a rebinding domain.\n3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion `httpx.post` re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal.\n\n### Why existing protection is bypassed\nAuth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The `webhook_url` validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)\n\n### Security boundary\nUnauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind `127.0.0.1` limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\nReal Jobs API (`python -m praisonai.jobs.server`, no API key) in a local runtime (`127.0.0.1:18085`), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\\runtime-files\\` (`docker-compose.jobs.yml`).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. `PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\"}` → `202` (no auth).\n2. `PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\",\"webhook_url\":\"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret\"}` → `202`.\n\n### Expected result\nUnauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n- Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway.\n- For `webhook_url`: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.",
  "severity" : [ {
    "type" : "CVSS_V3",
    "score" : "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"
  } ],
  "affected" : [ {
    "package" : {
      "ecosystem" : "PyPI",
      "name" : "praisonai"
    },
    "ranges" : [ {
      "type" : "ECOSYSTEM",
      "events" : [ {
        "introduced" : "0"
      }, {
        "fixed" : "4.6.78"
      } ]
    } ],
    "database_specific" : {
      "last_known_affected_version_range" : "<= 4.6.77"
    }
  } ],
  "references" : [ {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60091"
  }, {
    "type" : "ADVISORY",
    "url" : "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62175"
  }, {
    "type" : "PACKAGE",
    "url" : "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
  }, {
    "type" : "WEB",
    "url" : "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-unauthenticated-ssrf-via-webhook-url"
  } ],
  "database_specific" : {
    "cwe_ids" : [ "CWE-200", "CWE-306", "CWE-367", "CWE-918" ],
    "severity" : "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed" : true,
    "github_reviewed_at" : "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at" : "2026-07-15T14:18:35Z"
  }
}